The Privatisation of Persistent Surveillance: Risks and Opportunities for NATO’s Space Strategy

NATO is turning to private space companies to strengthen its defences, increase speed and bring more innovation. This coincides with a time of satellite proliferation and decreased launch costs. Such a shift brings new challenges and vulnerabilities, including over-reliance on companies, cyber threats, and the blurring of civilian and military space.

In February 2025, NATO approved its first Commercial Space Strategy (CSS) at the Hague Summit; the document called for the integration of commercial space capabilities into the Alliance’s defence. As a consequence, on 8 August 2025, NATO’s Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) released a Request for Information (RFI) for a Space Data Marketplace (SDM) with a response due date of 8 September. The purpose of the RFI is to gather information on industry capabilities to support NATO’s Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS) programme. These strategic moves signal NATO’s shift towards using private-sector innovation to strengthen security, increasing speed and flexibility.

Why NATO Turned to Industry

NATO’s shift towards commercial space was significantly driven by the rapid growth of the private sector (May, Taylor and Schurman, 2025). Commercial actors have become increasingly essential for collective defence and crisis management, as space-based threats become more complex. NATO has therefore been motivated by the need to keep pace with the dynamism of the private space sector. In recent years, the commercial space sector has experienced explosive growth and shows no signs of slowing down. In 2024, the global space economy reached $613 billion, with the commercial sector accounting for 78% of this total (Space Foundation, 2025). Estimates suggest it could reach $935.6 billion by 2035, with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 7.6% (Future Market Insights, n.d.).

Further supporting these motivations has been the dramatic decrease in launch costs, with reductions of up to 95% for Low Earth Orbit (LEO) over the past decades, thanks in part to reusable launch technologies developed by companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin (Daehnick, Gang and Rozenkopf, 2023). Moreover, in recent years, there has been an exponential proliferation of satellites in LEO, with megaconstellations like Starlink, OneWeb, and Amazon Kuiper (Our World in Data, 2025). Such a commercial environment has provided NATO with a timely opportunity to enhance its situational awareness and decision-making processes without incurring the high costs of developing and maintaining its own satellite constellation.

The Risks of Privatised Space Surveillance

While the favourable timing offers numerous benefits, integrating the private sector also introduces significant strategic risks. First among these is the dependency dilemma: what would happen if a key commercial provider were to fail, change allegiances, or be acquired by actors supported by adversaries? In such cases, supply chain risks—including the use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components—would increase exposure to malicious actors (Bousedrai, 2023). 

Moreover, commercial technologies, such as robotic arms, could potentially be repurposed for counter-space operations. This links to a second critical risk: the blurring of civil and military boundaries. Commercial satellites are dual-use infrastructures, raising complex questions regarding legality, targeting, and escalation in the event of conflict (Agachi, Shaikh and McClintock, 2025). This ambiguity could make commercial assets potential targets, dangerously blurring the line between civilian and military infrastructure.

With its increasing success, the Space Data Market (SDM) is set to become a high-value cyber target, greatly increasing supply chain exposure (Cournoyer, 2025). Organisations such as Space ISAC report over 100 attempted cyberattacks on space infrastructure every week (Swope et al., 2025). Hence, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) has highlighted supply chain risks, legacy systems, poor visibility, and weak configurations as key challenges for commercial satellite cybersecurity (Industrial Cyber, 2025; ENISA, n.d.).

NATO’s Path Forward – Balancing Innovation and Resilience

Faced with numerous benefits and risks, NATO stands before a key trade-off: gaining capabilities through commercial integration versus potential loss of control and security risks. In order to mitigate these challenges, NATO could put in place several measures.

First is the legal and contractual safeguards with private providers, including agreements with a pool of suppliers to ensure rapid, reliable access and reduce dependency on any single provider (Fatima, 2025). Second is the building of a trusted space ecosystem of allied companies that would work together to implement strict industry standards such as encryption, post-quantum readiness, intrusion detection, and a zero-trust security model to prevent any unauthorised access (Agachi, Shaikh and McClintock, 2025). Lastly, expand internal capacity to verify and cross-check commercial data, including clear policies, risk management, security design, and supply chain oversight as recommended by ENISA (ENISA, n.d.).

The approval of NATO’s Commercial Space Strategy and the NCIA’s RFI for a Space Data Marketplace mark a crucial moment for the Alliance. The future of defence will increasingly be shaped by the commercial infrastructure rather than strictly traditional domains. Nevertheless, NATO will have to navigate a complex landscape of challenges if it seeks to exploit the agility and innovation of the private sector. 

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