Invoking Article 7 and the Issue of Hungarian Dissensus in a Tariff-Driven World

The implementation of tariffs by the US has created a demand for an increasingly insular European governance that is more responsive to geopolitical pressures and highlighted a paralysis in the EU’s ability to deal with rule of law breaches from member states. Bernd Lange, chair of the trade Committee, said, “We will not change legislation that we have shaped democratically and in the interests of EU citizens, even if this displeases some US billionaires.” (European Parliament, 2025) However, claims of democracy are challenging to assert when a country can ban pride marches and gridlock significant negotiations within the bloc. Hungary’s rapid constitutional changes have led to a LIBE rule of law mission into Budapest, chaired by MEP Tineke Strik and a revival of article 7 discussions. With the emergence of security risks surrounding Russian asset seizure, objections to sanctions against Israel, and the threat of future inhibitions with the Trump administration, there is a need for consensus within intergovernmental organisations, which might force the Parliament to enforce its values on member states.

The European Parliament’s increasing relevance

The European Parliament has become increasingly significant over time. Following the Lisbon treaty, the institution gained parity with the European Council. These explicitly intergovernmental institutions still lack the prerogative to start legislation but can suggest recommendations to the European Commission to start policy. With global security threats affecting Europe, intergovernmental organisations within the European Union have become more important to reduce geopolitical risk. However, dissenting states are often the source of these very challenges.

The war in Ukraine has reintroduced tensions between members stemming from extra-European relationships. While the EU sides with Ukraine (as clear by accession proceedings), energy insecurity is a common theme in which overreliance on Russian supplies can severely harm economies. Hungary has received help from discounts and has enjoyed 4.5 billion cubic meters of gas from Moscow annually since the war. (Bortoletto, 2024) Hungary has therefore been decidedly critical of the Ukrainian human rights record. It has been vocal about the impact of the war on Hungarian people, claiming that the EU has done little to diversify the energy mix of Eastern European nations. As a result, “No EU geopolitical decision related to the war in Ukraine or its defence against Russia has escaped Hungary’s blackmail.” (Landsbergis, 2025) This highlights a dynamic in which Hungary is holding the EU to ransom and threatening individual countries’ foreign policies, creating a fundamental threat to the EU.

Abusing the Veto?

Hungary’s decision to veto sanction packages threatens the “security of all other Member States to foster one’s advantage – and systematically using vetoes as leverage for other concessions – Strikes at the very core of solidarity among the Member states.” (Spieker, 2025) Unsurprisingly, Hungarian media considered the latest fact-finding mission to have predetermined conclusions (Zemplényi, 2025), but little has changed over seven years. Article 7 implementation leads to a precedent where national interests are sidelined for common agreement, but integration is agreed upon throughout the accession process, meaning certain behaviours should be considered as contradictory. Spieker suggests that the European Council needs to put a time-limited vote to swiftly plan, and force member states to take a stance to overcome the challenge, but we have seen failures in 2018, as Hungary has allies like Poland who could veto proceedings. This suggests that there is a flaw in the system.

Article 7 has been criticised in law journals along two primary axes. From a structural point of view, “The gap between the commitment of candidate countries to respect the rule of law at the time of accession to the EU and the Union’s actual capacity to enforce these criteria.” (Coli, 2018, p.296) This line of reasoning suggests that the mechanism is considered particularly weak compared to the highly stringent requirements expected when states must negotiate chapters and prove their adherence to the Copenhagen criteria and Article 2. This has led policy advisers to suggest that a backsliding mechanism must be put in place to prevent states from abusing Article 2 at the cost of their freedom to enact their policies. Others take a political critique and suggest that “Article 7 in case of Hungary has less to do with the legal intricacies of Article 7 than with the absence of political will to use it” (Bugarič, 2016, p.3)

Recent discussions on Hungarian dissent provide insight into the political will literature, as Trump’s confusing tariff policy has created an unusual risk. The EU is compelled to navigate uncertain trade relations that directly impact livelihoods in a previously high-interest environment. With direct effects on European importers, the inability to respond to tariffs that may arise from Hungarian opposition fosters internal tensions throughout the entire European market. Hungary’s prior track record puts the EU in a vulnerable position, highlighting the potential for dysfunction. This situation could compel Europe to remove bad actors, especially since other nations are endangered by the existing veto power.

Priorities

Polling data carried out in early 2025 suggests that the European Parliament’s priorities should be focused on inflation and managing the cost of living. Our sample states all show high levels of prioritisation, at around 15% of those polled. This demonstrates a level of elasticity to Trump’s policies in which dissent could be negatively perceived by various nations.

EU defence and security is the next priority, which now has more relevance than the issue of asylum. This is important because the migrant crisis dominated the headlines in 2017, and this monumental shift to contemporary issues changes the balance of power by creating a need for a more unified Europe. Germany is an outlier in this, but is making unprecedented contributions to Ukraine, demarcating a structural change. However, tariffs and a rising cost of living are so dominant in the eyes of the people that it is clear Hungary must tread carefully if it wishes to avoid Article 7 proceedings, as public pressure might shift state opinion.

Bibliography

Bortoletto, F. (2024) ‘Hungary to buy even more gas from Russia in 2025’ EUNews 15/10/2024 [accessed online: 30/04/2025] available at: https://www.eunews.it/en/2024/10/15/hungary-to-buy-even-more-gas-from-russia-in-2025/

Bugarič, B. (2016) ‘Protecting Democracy inside the EU: On Article 7 TEU and the Hungarian Turn to Authoritarianism. In Closa, C. Kochenov, D. (eds.). Reinforcing the rule of law oversight in the European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016

Coli, M. (2018) ‘Article 7 TEU: From a Dormant Provision to an Active Enforcement?’ Perspectives on Federalism, 10(3) pp.272-302

Eurobarometer (2025) ‘Special Eurobarometer EB047EP: EP Winter 2025 survey’ European Parliament 14.04.2025 [accessed online: 30/04/2025] available at: https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/s3492_103_1_eb047ep_eng?locale=en

Zemplényi, L. (2025) ‘European Parliament’s “Factfinders” Arrive in Hungary with Conclusions Predetermined’ Hungarian Conservative. 22/04/2025 [accessed online: 22/04/2025] available at: https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/politics/european-parliament-hungary-rol-libe-biased-conclusions/

Landsbergis, G. (2025) ‘Suspend Hungary’s Voting Rights to Save the EU’s Credibility’ Carnegie Endowment [accessed online: 23/04/2025] available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2025/02/suspend-hungarys-voting-rights-to-save-the-eus-credibility?lang=en

Spieker, L.D. (2025) ‘Tackling the Union’s “Orbάn Problem” Now. Seizing Momentum, Reviving Article 7 TEU, Sharpening Conditionality. Verfassungsblog. [accessed online: 22/04/2025] available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/tackling-orban-problem/