Contentious Politics: Turkey and Egypt

Flashpoints Between Turkey and Egypt

A proper understanding of the bilateral relations between states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) often rests on a broader understanding of geostrategic competition in the region. However, there are good reasons for paying close attention to the emerging confrontation between Turkey and Egypt. Although this clash has attracted less attention than other inter-state rivalries, it comes with its own unique set of potential consequences, given Turkey’s increasingly strained relationship within NATO and European interests in theatres of Turkish involvement.

Relations between the Ankara and Cairo significantly deteriorated in 2013, when the democratically elected President Morsi, of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), was ousted by the Egyptian military and replaced by President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. President Erdogan of Turkey, whose Justice and Development Party (APK) has ideological resonance with the MB, has since called for the current Egyptian government to be tried in an international court for the subsequent death of former President Morsi. However, the tension between the two countries goes well beyond personal feelings. There is an additional and significant clash of interests in three clearly identifiable areas: Libya, the eastern Mediterranean and, to a lesser extent, Yemen.

Major Areas of Tension

Libya

Although the conflict in Libya is comprised of a complex assortment of an internationally recognised state, warlords, jihadists, imported Arab militias and Russian mercenaries, Turkey and Egypt are drawn up on the opposite sides of the primary two antagonistic groups. Ankara supports the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA), whilst Cairo (along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE) directly endorses and aids the prominent warlord Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.

Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) split from the state in 2015 and in 2020, Haftar publicly abandoned efforts to find a political solution, declaring himself the legitimate ruler of Libya. In contrast, the GNA, Ankara and much of the international community view Haftar as an outlaw and claim the right to forcibly evict Haftar from the eastern portion of Libya under his control.

Recent setbacks on the battlefield for the LNA led President el-Sisi to announce that he would deploy Egyptian forces to prevent Haftar’s bases in Sirte or Juffra from falling to the Turkish-sponsored GNA. In July, the Egyptian parliament voted to grant President el-Sisi permission to intervene in Libya under the guise of counter-terrorism. However the recent performance of Turkey’s military, particularly its use of drones in Idlib and its anti-air defence systems in Tripoli, may deter el-Sisi from following through with his threat.

The rivalry between Turkey and Egypt in Libya may have spill over effects. For example, France has been a major sponsor of Haftar and the LNA since 2015, whilst Italy has supported the GNA. Italy in particular has a stake in the conflict given the domestic response to refugees fleeing from the conflict. A major shift in the balance of power within Libya may therefore strain the relationship between two major European Union and NATO allies.

Economic Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean

Interestingly, economic ties between Egypt and Turkey have strengthened in recent years. A 2005 free trade deal is still in effect and 2018 was a record year for bilateral trade between the two states. However, disputes over shared resources in the eastern Mediterranean preclude full economic cooperation. In 2015, Egypt discovered enormous natural gas supplies which it has sought to use against Turkey. The formation of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) which includes Cyprus, Israel, Greece, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority and Italy – but not Turkey – has caused tension.

At the same time, Turkey has emphasised the rights of Northern Cyprus to benefit from the resources surrounding the island. Although it is not internationally recognised as a sovereign state, Ankara has pressed for it to be granted its own economic exclusion zone. In August, Turkey extended a seismic exploration mission – under escort from the Turkish Navy – into an area claimed by Greece. In addition, Turkish naval exercises have been carried out in the same region. In response, France and Italy have executed their own exercises, with full knowledge they are likely to be interpreted as provocative by Turkey.

The status of the Greek Islands in the Aegean is also creating difficulties between Turkey and the EMGF. Turkey argues that the small Greek Islands interfere with its ability to exploit gas fields in the Mediterranean. President Erdogan forcefully stated that there is ‘no way Turkey will consent to any initiative trying to lock the country to its shores’. Although the Greco-Turkish dispute may not directly impact Turkish-Egyptian relations, it is clear that the Eastern Mediterranean is an area in which Ankara believes it has legitimate and significant interests which could be leveraged by Cairo via the EMGF. Crucially for the broader international system, these disputes are pitting NATO allies against one another.

Yemen

Given Egypt’s alignment with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, there is potential for tension over the issue of Yemen. The petro-states are drawn up on the opposing side to Turkey, who it appears is supporting the Islah Party, Yemen’s branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although Turkey’s interests and actions in Yemen are less clear than in other theatres, this has raised concerns in the Egyptian security community – where Turkish influence in the Gulf of Aden is viewed as a potential threat to the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait and consequently the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

Conclusion

When the areas of potential conflict are mapped, as below, Egypt’s fears can be laid out:

If Ankara became the dominant force in Libya, if its ships were to dominate the eastern Mediterranean, and if Yemen emerged as point where Ankara could project influence through the Red Sea, then Cairo would be awash with a sense of encirclement. On the other hand, the regional alliance between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE and the economic cooperation of the EMGF acts as a counter-weight against this eventuality. However, the ambitions of both Erdogan and el-Sisi should not be lightly dismissed and further confrontation is possible.

Yet despite these tensions, the prospects of Turkish-Egyptian relations leading to a major international incident are slim. Although Turkey has attempted to rally NATO behind its objectives in the Middle East, the response has been cold. Critically, the more politically sensitive Article 5 of the UN Charter is defensive in nature and the chances of Egypt launching an attack on Turkey is minimal, with a maritime incident perhaps the most likely flashpoint.

Overall, it is sensible to maintain a close eye on the rivalry given the possible ramifications, deriving from Turkey’s relationship with NATO and the West. This is especially significant given the regional power struggle that both countries are embedded within, the US’s seeming reluctances to fulfil its traditional role as a guarantor in the Middle East and Turkey’s evolving relationship with Russia.