November 16, 2026

Fight Unfunded and Win: Inside the US Army’s New Warfighting Guidance

By Levente Bartha

How the Army Fights, released on 7 October, invokes AirLand Battle as its model for institutional change, but lacks the budget, leadership and force design that once made it work.


A Framework Announced as Doctrine, Written as an Instrument

On 7 October 2026, the US Army released How the Army Fights (HTAF), 46 pages of ‘operational warfighting guidance’ signed by General Christopher LaNeve, the vice chief of staff and acting chief of staff since April (Department of the Army, 2026; Cook, 2026). It sets out the four elements of land power – Convergence, Strike, Close Battle and Endurance – and stresses war’s enduring human dimension (Association of the United States Army, 2026; Small Wars Journal, 2026). Early coverage has largely restated those elements. That reading is accurate but misses what the document is actually for.

Its institutional ambition is clearest in its account of AirLand Battle, which the Army credits with aligning training, leadership and technology behind a single operating concept, and which HTAF will replicate ‘to drive institutional change across the Army’ (Department of the Army, 2026, p. 7). HTAF is an instrument for deciding what the Army buys, where it puts its headquarters and which formations are modernised first; the four elements are the vocabulary in which those decisions will be argued. On those terms, it is both more ambitious and more fragile than its reception suggests: it asks the Army to repeat the 1980s reform without most of the conditions that made it work.

Why the Army Reaches for 1982

The guidance invokes the Army’s reform history to justify its approach. The Pentomic division of the late 1950s, built for tactical nuclear war and reliant on ‘unproven technologies that existed only on blueprints’, lasted five years before the Reorganization Objective Army Division restored a conventional combined-arms structure (Department of the Army, 2026, pp. 6–7; Bacevich, 1986). AirLand Battle is the preferred precedent: its 1982 doctrine aligned the Big Five platforms, a professionalised non-commissioned officer corps, the combat training centres and the Division 86 force design around a single threat (Romjue, 1984). But that precedent supports institutional alignment rather than doctrinal primacy, and alignment depends on money, leadership and force design as much as on doctrine.

The Centre of Gravity Moves Above the Brigade

What is distinctive is not the four elements but the echelons attached to them. Convergence is executed by theatre armies and corps, Strike by divisions through theatre armies, and Endurance by theatre armies, corps and their enabling commands. Only Close Battle sits at division and below (Department of the Army, 2026, pp. 8–9, 17). Three of the four elements of land power now live above the brigade.

The direction is not new. The modular Army of the 2000s treated the brigade combat team as the unit of action. From 2020 the Army began rebuilding the echelons above it, reactivating V Corps, expanding Multi-Domain Task Forces and planning theatre fires commands (Feickert, 2022), and in 2022 it restored the division as the principal tactical echelon. HTAF pushes further to corps and theatre army: the Army has ‘built lethal tactical formations’ and must now ‘bring greater institutional weight to the operational level’ (Department of the Army, 2026, p. 1). What is new is that HTAF ties the shift to named functions and to the budget machinery.

Nor does HTAF start from scratch. The 2025 Army Transformation Initiative merged Forces Command, Army North and Army South into a Western Hemisphere Command, combined Army Futures Command with Training and Doctrine Command, cut 1,000 Army headquarters posts, began converting infantry brigades to mobile brigades and promised drones and launched effects to every division by the end of 2026 (Judson, 2025). That reform cut and reshaped the Army; HTAF sets out what the reshaped Army is for.

The operational logic is sound. Peer anti-access networks have no single point of failure, and only corps and theatre armies have the authorities and staff to synchronise space, cyber and electromagnetic effects against them – capacity that ‘cannot be assembled after the fight begins’ (Department of the Army, 2026, p. 17).

The institutional implication is the one to watch. Weight shifted above brigade is taken from somewhere, and on a flat budget the likeliest source is the brigades. The guidance never says so, but the echelon assignments point that way.

Annex G and the Machinery of Change

The document insists it is ‘guidance’, not doctrine: Multidomain Operations remains the Army’s capstone operational doctrine, which HTAF ‘distills’ at the operational level (Department of the Army, 2026, p. 37). It is not a doctrinal rewrite but an attempt to change how the Army acts on the doctrine it already has.

What gives it practical weight is Annex G, which feeds HTAF directly into the Army’s planning, programming and budgeting process under Army Regulation 1-1. The guidance informs an execution order; the order directs Army Campaign Plan objectives; those feed Total Army Analysis and the Program Objective Memorandum, where force structure and funding are decided. The order ‘tasks the Army enterprise to determine force structure changes required’ (p. 38). This is the linkage the Army invokes when it names AirLand Battle, whose doctrine mattered because force design, procurement and training were tied to it. Annex G tries to engineer that linkage rather than hope for it.

The facts-and-assumptions annex is frank about the conditions: a base budget flat in real terms, constant end strength, no organic strategic lift, limited distribution capacity inside the First Island Chain and a homeland that is not a sanctuary in a large-scale conflict (p. 31). A document that lists its constraints this plainly should be judged against them.

Four Conditions the 1980s Had and 2026 Lacks

Judged that way, the AirLand Battle comparison fails on four counts: money, sequencing, leadership and headquarters.

Money

AirLand Battle was written into a rising topline: Army funding grew by almost half in real terms between fiscal year (FY) 1980 and FY1985 (Department of War, 2026, Table 6-16). HTAF assumes a flat real budget eroded by manpower costs, inflation and ‘continuous unforeseen external requirements’ (Department of the Army, 2026, p. 19). Its answer is ‘focused modernisation’: each capability goes to ‘a focused portion of the Army’ while research funding moves to the next (p. 20). That is a sensible response to scarcity, but it means tiered readiness: some divisions will be modernised and others will not. The question is which.

The Army’s own projections sharpen that choice. Between FY2026 and FY2031, total Army funding is planned to rise by about 5% in real terms but procurement by almost 60% – more, in dollars, than the growth of the whole budget, so other accounts must shrink (Department of War, 2026, Table 6-16). The figures include war and supplemental funding, which inflates the years before 2026, and out-year projections rarely survive Congress intact; neither changes the direction of the comparison. The execution order will have to make the trade-offs explicit.

Sequencing

The guidance holds that doctrine should precede force structure, and in its own case it can claim to: Field Manual 3-0 codified Multidomain Operations in 2022, and HTAF is the follow-through. The difficulty is the lesson itself. The Division 86 studies began under General Donn Starry at Training and Doctrine Command in 1978, four years before the AirLand Battle manual; doctrine and force design developed in parallel, each pulling the other along (Romjue, 1982; Romjue, 1984). The tidy sequence is a flattering myth. Concept, structure and budget must move together, and the 1980s reformers had a decade and a rising budget in which to manage it. Annex G has to manage it at once, on a flat one.

Leadership

AirLand Battle had Starry at Training and Doctrine Command and General Edward Meyer as chief of staff, both in post for years. HTAF is signed by a vice chief who has been acting chief since April 2026 and was released under an acting Secretary of the Army (Cook, 2026; Small Wars Journal, 2026). AirLand Battle outlasted several chiefs because the institution came to own it. Whether guidance from acting leaders gets that far depends on the next chief as much as on this one.

Headquarters

The first chapter promises to cut ‘excess headquarters’ (Department of the Army, 2026, p. 5); the third says corps and theatre armies need Convergence capacity ‘designed into the headquarters from the start’, and theatre armies ‘appropriate force structure and resources to execute Endurance’ (p. 17). Yet the 2025 reforms merged two theatre armies, Army North and Army South, into the Western Hemisphere Command (Judson, 2025; Department of the Army, 2026, p. 25). Fewer, larger theatre armies would square the two. The guidance does not say which theatre armies or corps grow, by how much, or which headquarters remain ‘excess’. The execution order should.

The Claims the Whole Project Rests On

The institutional bet rests on two operational claims, and both deserve to be taken seriously.

The first is that battlefield transparency is relative, not fixed. The Army rejects the view that persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance has made ground manoeuvre obsolete: transparency ‘emerges only when enemy observation goes uncontested and a formation’s signatures are left unmanaged’ (Department of the Army, 2026, p. 6). Its evidence cuts both ways. Ukraine’s Kursk incursion of August 2024 is offered as proof that concealment and deception still produce surprise; the 47th Brigade’s assault near Robotyne in June 2023, hunted vehicle by vehicle by drones in a minefield, is the warning (p. 35). The honest reading is that the first was a raid and the second a deliberate attack. Whether a corps can do what Kursk did is the question the guidance needs answered.

The second is that Close Battle is the one thing no other service can replicate at scale, and that strike alone rarely compels. HIMARS strikes on Russian depots in the Donbas, the guidance notes, ‘severely weakened’ Russian fires but ‘did not displace Russian forces from occupied lands’ (p. 13). That is the Army’s enduring case for itself, and it is correct. Yet Close Battle sits at the lowest echelons while most of the new institutional weight sits above them. The Army is investing lower down too, with drones for every division and mobile brigades (Judson, 2025), but the budget tables do not show how procurement divides between echelons, so whether investment matches the claim remains open.

AirLand Battle divided the fight into deep, close and rear; HTAF has Strike, Close Battle and Endurance, with Convergence as an integrating layer the 1980s could not have conceived. The four elements are its grandchild, not a departure.

The tension is between the guidance’s history and its ambitions. Its account of the Pentomic era warns that building a force around ‘the promise of novel technology’ produced something ‘structurally brittle’ (p. 7). Yet HTAF calls for autonomy at machine speed, AI-enabled sensing, transport-agnostic networks, forward additive manufacturing and an industrial base that can pivot between products (pp. 15–18). None is misguided; the risk is that ambition again outruns the money and force design needed to field them. HTAF promises to fund only what its four elements demand. Holding that line against industry, Congress and the Army’s own enthusiasm will be the test.

What the Joint Force and Allies Should Read into It

For the Joint Force, the shift to theatre armies and corps is a bid for the land-based operational fight, including the sustainment, air defence and theatre-setting on which Navy and Air Force operations in the Pacific depend: joint operations ‘reach forward from secure land areas’ (Department of the Army, 2026, p. 15).

For European allies, the posture annex formalises a handover: the Army will provide ‘critical, but limited capabilities’ in Europe while European allies ‘assume primary responsibility for conventional ground defence’ (p. 30). That sentence, more than any element of land power, is the one to focus upon in London, Berlin and Warsaw.

What Congress Should Do Now

The House and Senate armed services committees should use the National Defence Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2028 to make the Army define the two terms on which the guidance turns: which formations make up the ‘focused portion’ that is modernised first, and which headquarters count as ‘excess’ beyond the 2025 cuts – and which theatre armies and corps grow. The committees already receive force-structure briefings, so this asks for definitions, not new disclosure, and most of it need not be classified.

They should also make the Army reconcile its money with its concept: show how the 93% real rise in procurement in its FY2027 request maps onto the four elements, and which accounts shrink in FY2028–31 to pay for planned procurement growth (Department of War, 2026, Table 6-16). The guidance stakes its credibility on replicating AirLand Battle’s link between concept and resourcing; making that link visible is the only way to test it. The Army has reasons not to name losers, but an undefined tasking invites every formation and vendor to lobby as if the decisions were still open.

The test should be measures that cannot be relabelled, since budget lines will be renamed to fit the four elements whatever happens: the number and size of corps and theatre-army headquarters, the share of procurement going above division rather than to brigades, whether theatre armies get the structure Endurance needs, and whether a confirmed chief of staff adopts the framework. If those do not move, HTAF will join the Army vocabularies that outlived their authors by about a year.

The Army has written a serious document about how to change an army. The precedent it invokes succeeded because doctrine, money, leadership and force design arrived together and stayed together for a decade. The guidance has the first. The other three are still open.

 

Bibliography: 

Association of the United States Army (2026) ‘New guidance outlines how Army must prepare for war’, AUSA News, 7 October. Available at: https://www.ausa.org/news/new-guidance-outlines-how-army-must-prepare-war (Accessed: 1 November 2026).

Bacevich, A.J. (1986) The Pentomic Era: The US Army Between Korea and Vietnam. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.

Cook, E. (2026) ‘Pete Hegseth faces questions as Army sets leadership vacancy record’, Newsweek, 30 August. Available at: https://www.newsweek.com/pete-hegseth-faces-questions-as-army-sets-leadership-vacancy-record-12368925 (Accessed: 1 November 2026).

Department of the Army (2026) How the Army Fights: Operational Warfighting Guidance. Washington, DC: Office of the Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army. Available at: https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2026/10/07/1af84728/how-the-army-fights.pdf (Accessed: 1 November 2026).

Department of War (2026) National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2027 (Green Book). Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary (Comptroller). Available at: https://comptroller.war.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2027/fy27_Green_Book.pdf (Accessed: 1 November 2026).

Feickert, A. (2022) The Army’s AimPoint and Army 2030 Force Structure Initiatives. CRS In Focus IF11542, updated 31 January. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11542 (Accessed: 1 November 2026).

Judson, J. (2025) ‘SecDef wields axe to brass, HQs, formations to fashion leaner Army’, Defense News, 1 May. Available at: https://www.defensenews.com/land/2025/05/01/secdef-wields-axe-to-brass-hqs-formations-to-fashion-leaner-army/ (Accessed: 1 November 2026).

Romjue, J.L. (1982) A History of Army 86, Volume I: The Development of the Heavy Division. Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

Romjue, J.L. (1984) From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973–1982. Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

Small Wars Journal (2026) ‘Army releases “How the Army Fights” operational warfighting guidance’, Small Wars Journal, 7 October. Available at: https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/10/07/army-releases-how-the-army-fights-operational-warfighting-guidance/ (Accessed: 1 November 2026).

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