Venezuelan Oil and US’s Pursuit of Power
How an offensive realist perspective explains the US pursuit of regional hegemony in Venezuela.
On 28 August 2026, United States President Donald Trump announced an agreement intended to expand American involvement in Venezuela’s oil industry. This agreement is signed with North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), a privately held oil company, where the US government would gain 35% stakes in NABEP’s parent company and preferential access to its oil production. In conjunction with this agreement, Venezuela’s interim authorities have granted NABEP concessions over 100 years to develop 17 Venezuelen oilfields containing approximately 65 billion barrels of proven reserves (The White House, 2026) As such, this would give the US significant control over Venezuela’s oil reserves.
This deal represents a significant development in US-Venezuela relations, where all parties involved stand to gain. For the US, the arrangement offers access to substantial petroleum resources and an opportunity to expand its economic influence in Latin America. For Venezuela, foreign investment could provide much-needed capital to revitalise its struggling oil industry and generate additional government revenue. For NABEP, this deal brings commercial opportunities and strengthens its place in the industry.
Nevertheless, the agreement also raises questions about the extent to which Venezuela can pursue economic recovery while preserving its autonomy in a relationship with a substantially more powerful state. While both governments may present the agreement as an opportunity for mutual economic benefit, their interests are not necessarily aligned. For the United States, access to Venezuela’s oil reserves offers commercial advantages while potentially strengthening its influence in Latin America. For Venezuela, foreign investment could support economic recovery, but the terms of the arrangement also raise questions about its ability to retain control over its natural resources. The agreement therefore presents an opportunity to examine whether the Trump administration’s America First approach extends beyond economic self-interest towards the consolidation of American power in the region. It can also be argued that NABEP serves as a vehicle of advancing national interests on both sides.
The terms of the Agreement
Venezuela possesses the world’s largest proven oil reserves, estimated at approximately 303 billion barrels, representing around 17% of global reserves (OPEC, 2025). Despite this substantial resource base, the country’s oil industry has experienced prolonged difficulties associated with deteriorating infrastructure, underinvestment, sanctions and political instability (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024). Revitalising production therefore requires considerable capital and technical expertise.
Under the agreement announced in August 2026, NABEP would receive concessions covering 17 oilfields with approximately 65 billion barrels of proven reserves. According to the White House, the concessions would last for 100 years, while the US government would hold rights to a 35% stake in NABEP’s parent company. Washington would also receive preferential access to purchase 20% of the company’s production at cost, following the allocation of oil to Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), with a right of first refusal over the remaining output (The White House, 2026; S&P Global, 2026).
The proposed investment is equally substantial. NABEP has indicated that the agreement could involve nearly US$100 billion in investment to expand production and develop the country’s oil infrastructure. The Venezuelan government has also projected significant fiscal benefits, including more than US$209 billion in royalties and taxes over the first 25 years (S&P Global, 2026). However, these figures represent projected investment and revenue rather than guaranteed returns. Their realisation will depend on production levels, operating costs, oil prices, the implementation of the agreement and the stability of Venezuela’s political and legal environment.
For Venezuela, the potential benefits extend beyond the oil industry itself. Increased production could generate employment, increase government revenue and create opportunities for supporting industries. Additional foreign capital might also contribute to broader economic recovery. Nevertheless, these outcomes are not guaranteed. The extent to which investment benefits Venezuelan society will depend on how revenues are distributed, whether domestic industries gain from the expansion and how much control the Venezuelan government retains over the development of its natural resources.
The agreement therefore presents both an economic opportunity and a strategic dilemma. While foreign investment may help address the country’s longstanding production difficulties, the terms also give the United States a substantial financial interest in a strategically important sector of the Venezuelan economy
Venezuela’s changing relationship with the United States
The agreement must be understood within the broader context of US–Venezuela relations. Under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela pursued a political and economic model characterised by extensive state involvement in the oil industry and frequent tensions with Washington. Nationalisations, disputes over oil assets and US sanctions contributed to a difficult environment for foreign investors, although Venezuela’s economic challenges also reflected domestic policy decisions, declining investment and deteriorating infrastructure (Congressional Research Service, 2026).
The 2026 oil agreement signals a shift towards greater American involvement in Venezuela’s energy sector. Following the US-led removal of Nicolás Maduro in January 2026 (Reuters, 2026)
, the subsequent relationship between Washington and the government led by acting President Delcy Rodríguez has created new opportunities for American investment. However, this development should not be understood solely as an economic rapprochement. The agreement also needs to be considered alongside the Trump administration’s stated ambition to reassert American dominance in the hemisphere. This raises the possibility that the expansion of US commercial interests in Venezuela forms part of a broader effort to consolidate Washington’s regional influence.
These interests raise questions about the relationship between economic engagement and geopolitical influence. Greater American involvement could help Venezuela attract additional investors by providing confidence in the stability of the arrangement. At the same time, the degree of US participation may give Washington greater leverage over a sector vital to Venezuela’s economy.
The central question, therefore, is whether the agreement represents a mutually beneficial economic partnership, an expansion of American strategic influence, or a combination of both. John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism provides a useful framework for examining this tension.
Mearsheimer’s offensive realism and the pursuit of power
In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), John Mearsheimer argues that the structure of the international system encourages great powers to maximise their relative power in pursuit of security. The international system is anarchic, meaning that no overarching authority can reliably protect states from external threats. Because states cannot be certain of one another’s intentions, they must prioritise their own survival and remain attentive to shifts in the distribution of power (Mearsheimer, 2001).
According to Mearsheimer, great powers seek to maximise their relative power and, where possible, establish regional hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2001). Economic resources can contribute to this objective by strengthening a state’s material position and expanding its influence over other actors. From this perspective, the pursuit of oil is not necessarily limited to its commercial value – control over access to strategically important resources can also affect the power dynamics between states. Offensive realism therefore provides a framework for examining how the United States might use its economic position in Venezuela to consolidate its influence in the region and limit the strategic presence of competing powers.
Applied to the Venezuelan oil agreement, offensive realism draws attention to the relationship between economic interests and geopolitical influence. The US government’s equity stake, preferential access to oil production and position within the commercial arrangement could strengthen its influence over a strategically significant sector of the Venezuelan economy. When considered alongside the Trump administration’s stated ambition to reassert American dominance in the Western Hemisphere, these provisions are consistent with an effort to consolidate US regional power. The agreement may therefore illustrate how economic arrangements can serve broader geopolitical objectives, allowing a great power to expand its influence through commercial mechanisms as well as political and diplomatic pressure.
The Venezuelan government’s decision to accept the arrangement also raises an important question about the behaviour of less powerful states. Although Mearsheimer’s theory focuses primarily on great-power competition, the broader realist emphasis on security and self-help helps illuminate the constraints faced by states operating within unequal relationships.
For Venezuela, cooperating with Washington may offer a means of attracting capital, increasing oil production and generating government revenue. The government may therefore regard the potential economic benefits as outweighing some of the risks associated with greater American involvement. Such a decision would not necessarily indicate unconditional submission to US interests. Instead, it could represent a pragmatic response to Venezuela’s economic circumstances and the opportunities available to its interim government.
This distinction is important because smaller states retain agency even when their bargaining power is limited. Venezuela may seek to use the agreement to advance its own domestic objectives while accommodating American interests. The extent to which it succeeds will depend on the terms of the arrangement, the distribution of its benefits and the government’s ability to maintain meaningful control over its economic resources.
The limits of economic cooperation
Although the agreement may create opportunities for both countries, its long-term consequences remain uncertain. For the United States, the arrangement could strengthen its access to Venezuelan oil and increase its involvement in the country’s energy sector. For Venezuela, it could provide investment and support efforts to restore production. However, the benefits available to each party may differ considerably, particularly given the asymmetry in their economic and political power.
A key concern is whether Venezuela can translate foreign investment into sustainable economic development without becoming excessively dependent on American capital and market access. The concentration of investment in the oil sector may also leave the country vulnerable to fluctuations in global petroleum prices unless its revenues contribute to wider economic diversification.
Political and legal uncertainty presents another challenge. An agreement spanning several decades will be exposed to changes in government, domestic political opposition, international relations and the commercial conditions of the oil industry. Although the arrangement is intended to encourage long-term investment, its durability will ultimately depend on whether the parties continue to regard it as beneficial and whether its terms can be implemented consistently.
These uncertainties also qualify the application of offensive realism. While the theory directs attention to the relationship between material resources and strategic power, it cannot by itself establish whether the agreement will succeed economically or whether Venezuela will become more dependent on the United States. Those outcomes require further evidence concerning the agreement’s implementation, the distribution of its revenues and the evolution of bilateral relations.
Conclusion
The US–Venezuela oil agreement provides a contemporary case through which to examine the relationship between economic cooperation and geopolitical power. Although the arrangement may offer Venezuela much-needed investment, its terms also create opportunities for the United States to strengthen its position and influence within a strategically important sector of the Venezuelan economy. Considered alongside the Trump administration’s stated commitment to American energy dominance and regional predominance, the agreement raises questions about whether America First is not merely an economic doctrine, but also a strategy for consolidating American power abroad.
Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism helps explain this pursuit of strategic advantage. The agreement is consistent with the theory’s emphasis on great powers maximising their relative power and seeking regional hegemony. Nevertheless, it remains important to distinguish between the expansion of American influence and comprehensive control over Venezuela. Whether the arrangement ultimately supports Venezuelan economic recovery or deepens its dependence on Washington remains to be seen. Ultimately, it leaves open the question of how far Venezuela can pursue its own interests within that relationship.
References
Congressional Research Service (2026) Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy. In Focus IF10715. Updated 16 January. Available at: https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IF10715.html (Accessed: 19 October 2026).
Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (2025) Annual Statistical Bulletin 2025. Vienna: OPEC. Available at: https://www.opec.org/assets/assetdb/asb-2025.pdf (Accessed: 19 October 2026).
Reuters (2026a) ‘Nicolas Maduro’s tight grip on Venezuela shaken loose by Trump blitz’. Reuters, 3 January. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/newsmaker-nicolas-maduros-heavy-handed-rule-venezuela-is-finally-ended-by-trump-2026-01-03/ (Accessed: 19 October 2026).
S&P Global (2026) ‘NABEP plans $100 billion Venezuela investment, targets 1 million b/d oil output’. S&P Global, 1 September. Available at: https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/090126-nabep-plans-100-billion-venezuela-investment-targets-1-million-bd-oil-output (Accessed: 19 October 2026).
The White House (2026) ‘Fact sheet: President Donald J. Trump announces historic oil agreement to secure American energy dominance and drive Venezuela’s economic recovery’. The White House, 31 August. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/08/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-announces-historic-oil-agreement-to-secure-american-energy-dominance-and-drive-venezuelas-economic-recovery/ (Accessed: 19 October 2026).
U.S. Energy Information Administration (2024) ‘Venezuela’. Country Analysis Brief, 8 February. Available at: https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Venezuela/ (Accessed: 19 October 2026).
