From Migrant Security to National Security: Hawala in the Western Balkans
Hawala is neither inherently illicit nor inherently benign; it is a dual-use financial system shaped by the institutional environments in which it operates. The Western Balkans demonstrate that effective governance depends less on prohibition than on strengthening financial inclusion, regulatory capacity, and regional cooperation.
Hawala has a reputation problem in the West. The fault for this can be attributed to its informal nature. This ancient informal value transfer system (IVTS) relies, in fact, on trust- and interpersonal relationship-based networks, as opposed to formal financial institutions. The exchange occurs through a hawaladar, whom the sender asks to “transfer” the money to another country — in reality, the money never ends up physically crossing any borders or leaving the hawaladar’s hands, for that matter. The hawaladar simply contacts another of his own in the destination country, asking that an equivalent amount of the remitted money be given to the recipient in local currency, in exchange for a unique code, or a “token” (El Qorchi et al., 2003). What this means is that the transactions remain absent from formal financial institutional records, and thus do not always comply with formal “Know Your Customer” (KYC) protocols. This is what makes hawala so vulnerable to exploitation for illicit purposes, such as money laundering, terrorism financing, organised crime, or sanctions evasion. Despite its ancient roots, traditional character, and convenience for migrants, since 9/11, hawala has been treated as a synonym for illicit finance: terrorism funding, money laundering, and sanctions evasion. In some jurisdictions, it has even been made illegal.
That framing obscures its importance. To many, migrants in particular, hawala is a financial lifeline; one that fills the gaps left by weak institutions, restricted banking access, and the enormous cost of sending money home through formal channels. In Europe, this is noticeable in the Western Balkans region, specifically those countries in the South-Eastern part of Europe that have a communist past but are not part of the European Union. Furthermore, while the region’s criminal networks do exploit it, they do so precisely because the conditions that make hawala necessary also make it difficult to regulate. The problem is therefore not hawala, which is an important distinction to make so as not to undermine migrant security, but rather the institutional environment in which it operates.
The Cost of Sending Money Home
The Western Balkans are among the most remittance-dependent sub-regions in Europe. Kosovo stands out by distinction: remittances account for roughly 17.3% of its GDP, sent largely from diaspora communities in Germany, Switzerland, and Scandinavia (World Bank, 2025). Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania are similarly dependent, with remittances representing a meaningful share of both household income and national economic stability.
Sending that money through formal channels is expensive, and its minimisation becomes favourable when the stakes are that high. The World Bank estimates that remittance costs to Europe and Central Asia average around 6.8% of the transferred sum. Some corridors charge even higher: for example, those of Germany-to-Bosnia and Herzegovina (13.33%), Switzerland-to-Albania (7.52%), United Kingdom-to-Albania (7.04%) and, notoriously, Turkey-to-Bulgaria (47.6%) (RemitFinder, 2026). By contrast, hawaladars typically charge between 0.5% and 7%, while the upper end matches formal costs; the real rate often lies at the lower end for established networks, and they complete transfers within six to twelve hours, with no requirement for a bank account, a stable address, or navigating forms in a foreign language.
This is particularly key when considering the difficulties faced by migrants from rural Kosovo or Bosnia, for example. Beyond the potential loss of a week’s wage to fees, certain individuals may be excluded from formal finance altogether. For instance, data from the Kosovo Central Bank and the World Bank’s 2025 Global Findex database reveal that only 60–65% of Kosovar citizens own a bank or similar financial institution account, leaving a large number unregistered (BQK, 2022; World Bank, 2025). As a result, a large portion of the remittance system, which actively fills the gaps created by a large trade deficit, remains partially or fully excluded from the formal financial system, as the informal system becomes their lifeline.
Conflict, Institutional Collapse, and the Habit of Informality
The region’s dependence on informal finance did not appear out of nowhere. While it did not originate in wartime, it is those conditions that amplified it. The clearest example is Bosnia and Herzegovina; during its wartime conditions between 1992 and 1995, the country had no unified monetary authority, circulating four currencies simultaneously — the Yugoslav dinar, the Croatian kuna, the BiH dinar and the Deutsche mark (Kovačević, 2003; IMF, 2005). Trust in formal financial institutions collapsed, along with the institutions themselves, cutting off citizens from formal banking, which, in the context of active conflict, turned informal finance into a tool for basic economic survival. When the Central Bank of Bosnia was finally established in 1997 (Kovačević, 2003), the informality was deeply embedded.
Those habits carried wider consequences. In the early 2000s, post-9/11 investigations revealed that Bosnia had been a conduit for Al-Qaeda financing, routed partly through Islamic charitable organisations that used hawala’s opacity to move funds undetected. The Al Haramain Islamic Foundation’s Bosnian branch was identified in a 2002 US-Saudi submission to the UN as having functioned as a financial gateway for extremist networks that had embedded themselves during the war’s humanitarian crisis (Zarate, 2013).
This was not incidental, but rather a product of Western inaction with regard to the war in the 1990s. With Serb armed forces remaining in control of the Yugoslav Army’s arsenal, and with an arms embargo placed by Western states on the entirety of Yugoslavia, Bosnia was left helpless, which led to the acceptance of help from Iran and radical Islamic groups, including the Mujahideen. Exploiting weak institutional conditions, those groups began using hawala to their own ends, allowing terrorist groups to grow.
Bosnia’s response has been notable. Rather than outlawing informal finance, it pursued deeper integration with international AML/CTF frameworks: the UNODC, FATF, and MONEYVAL. It has since strengthened domestic transaction recording requirements, most recently through legislation adopted in February 2024, imposing higher KYC standards and risk assessment protocols (Bosnia and Herzegovina Council of Ministers, 2016; MONEYVAL, 2024).
The Permanent Infrastructure of Organised Crime
Armed conflicts and their consequences leave space for the misuse of hawala to emerge and persist. Their long-term entrenchment, however, is observable through organised crime. Unlike wartime financing or ideologically driven terrorist activity, organised crime does not rely on exceptional political moments and climates; rather, it systematically embeds itself within existing economic and financial infrastructures, exploiting regulatory gaps to sustain its routine operations.
Albania presents the starkest example. The Çela-Çopja clan, dismantled by Albania’s Special Anti-Corruption Structure (SPAK) in 2025 after years of investigation, was responsible for smuggling hundreds of tonnes of cocaine from Latin America into Europe between 2018 and 2022 (Europol, 2025; Stephens, 2025). The proceeds were funnelled through a currency exchange office registered under a different name, then moved abroad via hawala and cryptocurrency to pay suppliers and distribute profits among network members (Metushi, 2025).
This was not a workaround. It was standard operating procedure, enabled by the proliferation of cash-intensive exchange offices that Albania’s financial intelligence unit has long flagged as “high-risk.” Between 2014 and 2024, the number of currency exchange offices in Albania nearly doubled, from 356 to 640. In the same period, Albania’s banking regulator revoked 132 institutional licenses for failure to report suspicious activity (Nano & Skara, 2025; Tirana Times, 2025). However, while the Albanian AML framework is elaborate and formally aligns with EU standards, its implementation and oversight remain weak, leading to persistent malevolent uses of informal finance (MONEYVAL, 2018).
Beyond drug trafficking, hawala features prominently in the financing of migrant smuggling along the Balkan Route, the corridor stretching from Turkey and Greece through the Western Balkans toward Western Europe (Leman & Janssens, 2018). The business generates an estimated $10 billion annually in global proceeds. For the smuggling networks operating the route, hawala provides a payment system that leaves no formal record and requires no correspondent banking relationship, as well as a way to launder acquired proceeds (UNODC, 2023b; Leman & Janssens, 2018).
What is interesting, however, is that certain hawaladars interviewed by the UNODC reported viewing assistance to migrants as a moral obligation, a response characterised by the European immigration policy’s dehumanisation of people in desperate circumstances (UNODC, 2023b). That framing is worth considering, even if the networks they fund expose migrants to violence, extortion, and trafficking. The conditions that create demand for irregular migration channels are the same conditions that make informal finance structurally necessary.
The Regulatory Paradox
A significant share of AML/CTF compliance in the region depends on hawaladars voluntarily maintaining records and reporting transactions, which the same UNODC research found most do not do (UNODC, 2023b). FATF has estimated that unregulated hawala transfers account for between 10% and 50% of total global remittances, with more recent World Bank estimates suggesting that 40–80% of the roughly $540 billion remitted annually flows through informal channels (Reitano, 2022; UNODC, 2023a). The scale of what operates outside formal oversight is not marginal. It is the system.
Criminalisation, the instinctive policy response, does not resolve this. It pushes informal finance further underground, reduces the partial visibility that registration requirements provide, and severs the remittance flows on which hundreds of thousands of households depend. The UN itself recognises hawala as a legitimate financial mechanism consistent with SDG 1 (No Poverty), SDG 8 (Economic Growth), and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities) — acknowledging that strong-handed prohibition deepens, rather than addresses, global structural inequality (UNODC, 2023a).
The core challenge, as Passas (Passas, 2005) identified in the foundational literature on IVTS, is that these are dual-use systems: the same features that make hawala indispensable to a Kosovo family separated by migration are the features that make it attractive to a drug trafficking network. Regulation that ignores one half of that duality, in either direction, will fail.
Envisioning Effective Governance
The goal is not to legitimise hawala’s criminal exploitation. The goal is regulation that is proportionate to the actual risk posed by different uses of the system, and that does not eliminate its developmental function in the process.
That means investing in financial inclusion infrastructure so that hawala is genuinely one option among several, not the only accessible one. It means supervisory capacity-building that matches the scope of the AML frameworks already on paper. It means regional cooperation among Balkan regulatory authorities on a system that is, by definition, transnational. And it means tracking currency exchange offices — the primary institutional interface between organised crime and informal finance in this region — with the rigour their risk profile demands.
Hawala in the Western Balkans is not a problem that can be regulated away. It is a symptom of institutional gaps that, if addressed, would reduce both the need for informal finance and the space in which criminal networks exploit it. Until those gaps close, the system will persist — because for millions of people across the region, it works when nothing else does.
This article is based on academic research carried out by Mariia Kliuchnikova jointly with Scott N. Romaniuk.
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