Why Would Iran Build Nuclear Weapons? The Security Perspective
On Tuesday, 6 March 2021, Iran and the United States began indirect talks to revive the nuclear deal in Vienna. The agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was signed between Iran, the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom and Germany in 2015, aiming to curb Iran’s nuclear capabilities. However, deemed insufficient in its ability to do so, the JCPOA was left by the Trump administration in 2018, followed by progressive imposition of economic sanctions on Teheran. As a result, Iran began gradually breaching the limits set by the treaty. Thus, it is believed by some that Iran is pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. For example, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Iran’s major regional adversary Israel, has recently stated that the 2015 deal does not prevent Iran from developing the weapon and warned of Iranian intentions. Yet, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said that Iran does not view nuclear arms as a tool for security. Moreover, the country’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa which forbids the production of any weapons of mass destruction. While it is difficult to determine Iran’s intentions, it is possible to analyse the incentives for going nuclear.
Security, Realism and Nuclear Weapons
In his paper Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bom, Scott D. Sagan introduced three models which explain why states decide to pursue the development of nuclear weapons – the security model, the domestic policy model, and the norms model. The security model focuses on security threats posed by other states, the domestic politics model focuses on domestic actors who might encourage or discourage the government from pursuing the weapons, and the norms model focuses on norms concerning the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which might serve a symbolic function. However, due to the scope of this article, the analysis will focus on the security model only, since it is the one that is arguably the most relevant in case of Iran, mainly due to the Israeli possession of nuclear arms and Iran’s regional competition with Saudi Arabia. To move forward, it is necessary to understand the logic behind the security model.
According to Sagan, the security model is driven by realist considerations, which is arguably more so in case of Iran, given the nature of the regional environment it finds itself in. In the past, numerous scholars have tackled the question of regional security of the Middle East, most of whom concluded that it is driven primarily by realist thinking. The anarchy in the region is described as highly Hobbesian, i.e., driven by self-interest and survival – both motives being the cornerstones of the realist theory. Therefore, it can be expected that Iran’s potential decision to develop nuclear weapons would be, to significant extent, guided by realist thinking.
For realists, nuclear weapons can be the ultimate tool for achieving absolute security, however, some say that their deterrence power might be overstated, and some even argue that realism might necessitate states to forgo the development of atomic bomb. Since states must rely on self-help for survival, they are compelled to acquiring potentially useful capabilities, such as nuclear weapons. These can contribute to national power, or perceptions of power, through its destructive potential, prestige, or symbols of national achievement. Moreover, any state that seeks to maintain its national security is forced to balance against any rival state that develops nuclear weapons itself. Yet, while defensive realists argue that nuclear weapons offer absolute security, offensive realists believe that sub-nuclear war is possible between nuclear powers. Finally, there are also realist arguments for forsaking the atomic bomb whatsoever. Such decisions can be made because of significant change in the security environment, i.e., when states realise that they are not threatened by anyone and, in turn, decide for nuclear restraint (e.g., Brazil and Argentina, or the post-Soviet republics which inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal but decided to renounce the weapons). Alternatively, a state might decide not to develop nuclear weapons in case they would bring unacceptable risks, i.e., producing more security threats and, therefore, leading to the opposite result than the one desired by the security model. As a matter of fact, this could likely be the case of Iran.
Would Iran be Better off Without Nuclear Weapons?
It is very likely that if Iran were close to or actually attained a nuclear weapon, Israel and the United States would launch a pre-emptive attack. Several events from the past suggest that both actors would have the capability and willingness to do so. Israel in particular have been highly active in preventing nuclear aspirations of its neighbours. In 1987, it launched a pre-emptive aerial strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor, known as Osiraq, and in 2008, it targeted Syria’s Al Kibar nuclear facility in a similar operation, successfully impeding both nuclear programs. In terms of the Iranian nuclear program, Israel allegedly launched a cyber-attack in cooperation with the United States, known as Stuxnet, and assassinated Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a top Iranian nuclear scientist, in November of the last year. Similarly, the United States would presumably not remain idle and would act, as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, launched on the pretext of Baghdad’s nuclear program and cooperation with Al Qaeda, may suggest. In fact, the ex-President Donald Trump had reportedly considered a military strike on Iranian civilian nuclear plants and other targets shortly before the end of his term. The question is if such attack would be possible and if Iran would have the ability to retaliate.
Iran’s nuclear facilities remain vulnerable to an attack and, even if Teheran were able to withstand a pre-emptive attack, it would not be able to target the United States. According to Frank Gardner, a BBC security correspondent, the Iranian nuclear program remains vulnerable to different kinds of attacks, including physical (facilities), human (personnel), or cyber. Moreover, it is rather likely that, in case a pre-emptive attack was successful, Iran would not be able to retaliate with nuclear weapons, the so-called second-strike capability, since it can be assumed that such attack would take place before Iran would be able to develop a significant number of warheads. Such capability is an essential part of the mutually-assured destruction doctrine, which presumably ensures balance between nuclear powers and discourages them from striking first, as such event would ultimately lead to the destruction of both actors. Finally, even if Iran retained some nuclear capability after a potential pre-emptive attack, it does not have the ability to target the United States. According to the Missile Defense Project (2020), the maximum range of Iranian ballistic missile arsenal is 2,000km, i.e., reaching as far as India only. Such range is sufficient for targeting Israel though, which is arguably why Tel Aviv is so concerned with the Iranian nuclear program. Nevertheless, launching a nuclear attack against Israel is in any case not in Iran’s interest, since it could lead to its annihilation by a retaliatory attack, be it by Israel or the United States. Besides, Iranian decision to build nuclear weapons might lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
If Iran decided to acquire an atomic bomb, it is rather likely that other regional actors would follow suit, leading to a potential arms race in the region. A hot candidate for participation would arguably be Saudi Arabia, Iran’s major regional rival. In fact, the Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman stated in an interview that “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible”. Similarly, Turkey could be pushed towards the development of nuclear capabilities. The past few years have shown that Ankara aims to play a more assertive role in the region. Moreover, Turkish President Recep Erdogan has been a vocal critic of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reportedly told an official meeting of his party that while some countries possess nuclear weapons, the West insists that Turkey cannot, which is something that he cannot accept. The problem for Iran is that it might lose such an arms race, effectively ending up in a worse position, due to its economic condition.
A potential arms race would pose a significant burden on Iranian economy, which is already under the pressure of the American sanctions. The need to keep up with its regional rivals would thus add to the effects of the economic sanctions re-imposed by Trump in 2018. These have reflected negatively on Iranian trade, oil exports, inflation, and other economic indicators. In addition, it is fair to assume that in case Iran developed an atomic bomb, more sanctions would follow, adding further pressure on its economy. Finally, not only would these curb its nuclear capabilities or military budget, but they could directly threaten the regime security as well. For example, the sanctions led to a steep rise in the prices of oil, which spurred protests in November 2019, and eventually turned into widespread demonstrations. The repressive measures taken by Teheran left at least 180 people dead, marking the deadliest political unrest since the Islamic Revolution. Therefore, it can be argued that the potential economic impact of Iran’s decision to develop nuclear weapons could leave it in a worse security situation overall.
Dealing with the Impasse
The above analysis clearly shows that acquisition of a nuclear weapon might in fact leave Iran in a worse security situation than the on it finds itself in now. Therefore, based on the realist thinking, Iran will refrain from building an atomic bomb. In addition, the fact that Iran publicly announced all of its moves to breach the limits posed by the JCPOA, all of which are reversible, suggests that it indeed does not seek a weaponization of its nuclear program. If it wanted to do so, it would arguably opt for a clandestine project. Hence, it can be assumed that, by breaching the limits, Iran aims put pressure on the United States and to gain a leverage for any negotiations that might unfold, such as the indirect talks in Vienna. Currently, Iran can be expected to look to solve the impasse with the United States in order to achieve the lifting of the economic sanctions and the much-needed boost of its economy. Therefore, the upcoming months will likely be crucial, since the Iranian elections scheduled for June might install a more hard-line government that could in turn adopt a different position towards the nuclear programme. As a result, the other two models proposed by Sagan, particularly the domestic politics one, could begin to play a more significant role.
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