What Is the Most Determinant of Strategic Behavior of States: Power or Ideas?

Introduction

This essay seeks to address a fundamental question on the strategic behavior of states, asking whether it is power or ideas that contribute to the decision-making process. Strategic behavior can be broadly defined as the construction of a grand strategy in order to secure access to resources, create a market for goods, and for overall security, which may include regional hegemony.[1]In addressing this question, and using the theory of offensive realism as the foundation, it is argued that power is the primary factor in the strategic behavior of states. With a brief overview of the scholarly literature on the theories of international politics, this essay then uses the case study of Chinato to demonstrate that offensive realism is the best theory to demonstrate how, at least in the case of China, power is the primary factor in strategic behavior.

Conceptual Theory

There are many theories that exist in international politics to explain the strategic behaviors of states. The three that seem to exist most commonly in the literature include constructivism, liberalism, and realism. Constructivism commonly assumes that certain non-material factors (e.g. norms, identities, and ideas) play a role in shaping state behavior.[2] Liberalism, broadly, highlights a strong belief in international cooperation including via relevant institutions but does not explicitly focus on the connection between domestic and foreign policy. In more recent literature, both constructivism and liberalism have become the dominant theories in describing the strategic behavior of certain countries.[3] This is because they argue that ideational factors are more important than systemic factors.[4] These arguments have value and publications that advocate for the use of these theories in Asia-Pacific research generally contend that nations, such as China, are able to increase their territorial expansion because other nations deem them to be ‘peaceful rising powers’ (i.e. from the constructivist perspective) or that they prefer a stable environment for economic prosperity (i.e. the liberalist perspective).[5] Yet while these theories have value, it is realism, and more specifically offensive realism, that best explains the strategic behavior of some nations, such as China.

Initially developed by John Mearsheimer in response to defensive realism, the term offensive realism suggests that the international system is primarily responsible for the increase of aggressive state behavior that exists within the realm of international politics. Belonging to the school of neorealist school of thought, realism differs from both constructivism and liberalism because it focuses on the structural effect of material power-on state behavior.[6]

There are five main tenets of offensive realism. These include:

1. The international system is anarchical and the great powers comprise the main actors in world politics;
2. The offensive military capability exists in all states, to some extent;
3. There is always a level of uncertainty about what other states will do;
4. Survival is the primary goal among all states, and
5. States are rational actors and this means that they will undertake decisions to maximize their prospects of survival.[7]

While it is acknowledged that there is a connection between offensive and defensive realism, offensive realism is the preferable option in analyzing the particular case of China (see below) because it focuses on the accumulation of power a state needs to maintain security. Offensive realism takes a somewhat pessimistic view of world politics because it highlights the danger that exists as states attempt to maintain the highest level of security. This competition between nations to maintain security has the potential to lead to conflict and war, suggesting that strategic behavior comes from the need for security.

Case Study

While both constructivist and liberalist theories offer conventional explanations of state behavior, they do not offer the most convincing explanation about the strategic behavior of China. If considering China’s strategic behavior, it is essential that regional hegemony is considered. China has considerably increased its military spending over the past several decades and this aligns with the realist notion that China is seeking relative power.[8] What is important to consider here, under the umbrella of offensive realism, is that China may not necessarily always prefer military power to economic power, which is a characteristic within offensive realism. This demonstrates that while this essay argues that offensive realism is the most appropriate for explaining this case, it does not suggest that China falls exclusively into the ‘box’ of offensive realism. Instead, the assumption is that nations, such as China, may change their wealth into military power in cases where other nations are not able to match such a move. Based on this, China would have a strong incentive to boost its military budget and relinquish some economic prosperity if necessary.

Yet in the case where military expenditures take priority over economic issues, both constructivists and liberals assert that China does not fit this criterion. China’s military, while large, remains largely within the country’s borders and it has launched no major military attack against the nations surrounding it since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, China has not increased its military defenses in the case of nuclear build-up. If realist theory were to be applied to China, constructivists argue, there would not be such a discrepancy between the nuclear military power of the United States and that of China. Finally, both constructivists and liberalists argue that when China does clash militarily with other nations, China takes steps to avoid an escalation of the conflict.[9] For these reasons, scholars argue, the case study of China and especially the Chinese military strategy, cannot be explained through realism. In order to demonstrate that realism actually is the theory that is best able to explain the strategic behavior of China, it is imperative to consider the five tenets of realism and to portray them in a way that applies specifically to China.

When considering the first and second tenets of offensive realism, these can be combined to appropriately explain the strategic behavior of a nation.[10] This combination can broadly be explained as the way that states will construct a grand strategy in an attempt to create regional hegemony by increasing the allocation to military resources. Regional hegemony is broadly defined as the political, economic, or military control of one independently powerful state over neighboring states. Both constructivists and liberalists suggest that China has not created regional hegemony, or that China’s attempts have been futile, but the recent uprisings in Hong Kong have allowed realists to point to specific nations and demonstrate how regional hegemony exists. In a recent news article, Chris Horton provides Cambodia as an example of a neighboring country that is under the thumb of China. China has intervened so strongly in Cambodia, that the nation now relies so heavily on China for existence, resulting in complete control, such as in the case of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), where Cambodia effectively serves as a proxy vote for China.[11]

China, as a nation, would deny this hegemony, claiming that its own constitution bans hegemonism (baquanzhuyi).[12] And if one were to fully believe the words in the Chinese constitution to be true representations of reality, then both constructivists and liberalists would be able to justify their points against realism. What is more likely, however, is that strategic behavior goes beyond what is claimed to be the law or what is reflected in words. In practice, China has taken steps to solidify their regional hegemony, as demonstrated by the statement by a senior Chinese admiral in 2008 who, seeking to rid the Western Pacific from United States’ influence, told US Pacific Commander T.J. Keating that the US could have the east part of the Pacific and China would have the west. This is only one example, among many, that demonstrates China’s desire to create a regional hegemony among its surrounding neighbors.

In order for China to actually put into action the plans of this Chinese admiral, they have needed to increase their military power. China has consistently built up its military in the post-Cold War period, investing more into their military forces than into all other areas of public welfare. When considering the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of China, it has been noted that the growth rate of military spending receiving an increasing share of the GDP, even though China has not been facing clear external threats from other nations.[13] For scholars that suggest theories of offensive realism, China’s military expenditures further solidify their explanations. This is because, under the tenets of realism, states are always uncertain about what other states will do and will remain unsatisfied until regional hegemony is achieved. In the case of China, this is an example where they are clearly expressing a preference for military power over economic power. Through this expenditure, China is demonstrating that they are in a position of relative power, which is seen as advantageous under offensive realism.

In the past two decades, China’s military spending has been unparalleled by any other neighboring states. Under liberalist theory, this fact becomes difficult to explain because they would argue that China wants the international environment to be peaceful in order to facilitate foreign trade and the draw of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a means to sustain economic growth. This would mean that China would have focused on economic prosperity at the expense of modernization of its military. This is because a large military generally dissuades other nations from economically investing.[14] Yet what has been demonstrated by China is the decision to use force even when this might have an impact on their economic interests. This has been repeatedly demonstrated by China, first with Taiwan, and more recently with Hong Kong. In 1996, the Taiwan Strait Crisis has China performing military exercises against Taiwan in order to circumvent the election of Tunghui Lee.[15] In Hong Kong, the excessive military build-up Hong Kong demonstrates that China does not always have economic growth as their primary interest. This is a clear indication that the liberalist ideology that has been applied to China is not one that is truly applicable to the Chinese context. Contrastively, as these outcomes generally align with the tenets of realism, and because power is at the forefront of this decision-making process, it reaffirms the notion that realism is the preferred explanation for China’s strategic behavior in the case of China’s military spending.[16]

The increase in China’s military budget is often justified by liberals as relating to domestic politics. These liberalists claim that internally, China was implementing tax reform systems that allowed for higher investment in the military, indicating that one justified the other. In reality, military spending increases were growing several years prior to any sort of change to the tax system. Instead, China has focused on maintaining tight civilian control and political stability, as demonstrated most recently in Hong Kong. China has made a strategic choice to create a power balance on the domestic front. This typically includes balancing both civilians and military leaders within the larger context of the nation. What is important to recognize in this situation is that despite considering the domestic politics in addition to those on the international level, it is power, and not ideas, that are determining China’s strategic behavior. Furthermore, this type of behavior suggests that it is not the liberalist ideologies that should explain the strategic behavior of China, but rather those of offensive realism which most adequately explain the situation.

Conclusion

This essay considered the question as to whether it was power or ideas that were the foundation for the strategic power of nations. Based on the information presented, which examined the case of China, and more particularly it’s military spending, through the lens of offensive realism, it was determined that it was a power that was the most influential factor in states’ decision-making. In order to make this determination, aspects of both constructivism and liberalism were considered, but because the topic required only one theory to be selected, it was explained that neither constructivism nor liberalism provided adequate factual evidence to apply to the Chinese context. In contrast, through the five tenets of realism, the decision-making strategies of China and its use of force in both Taiwan and Hong Kong provided key evidence to demonstrate that offensive realism was an applicable theory in this case. While it is acknowledged that China offers an obvious example of how power is the primary factor in the strategic behavior of nations, the examples may not necessarily be so clear-cut in all cases. It is for this reason that when attempting to apply theory broadly to the topic of strategic behavior, it is important to consider case studies that offer specific and useful examples to represent the probable outcome.

Bibliography

Horton, Chris. “China’s playbook in Hong Kong is also working in the Asia Pacific” The Atlantic. 2019 Accessed November 11, 2019 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/08/china-uses-its-regional-playbook-hong-kong/596797/

Ivison, Duncan. Postcolonial liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Lantis, Jeffrey S. “Strategic cultures and security policies in the Asia-Pacific.” (2014): 166-186. Accessed November 11, 2019 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2014.927676

Li, Rex. A rising China and security in East Asia: Identity construction and security discourse. London: Routledge, 2008.

Mearsheimer, John J. “Structural realism.” International relations theories: Discipline and diversity 83 (2007). Accessed November 11, 2019 https://www.commackschools.org/Downloads/8_mearsheimer-_structural_realism.pdf

Noguchi, Kazuhiko. “Bringing Realism Back In: Explaining China’s Strategic Behavior in the Asia-Pacific.” Asia-Pacific Review 18, no. 2 (2011): 60-85.

Roy, Nabarun. “Chinese and Indian strategic behavior: growing power and alarm.” (2013): 546-548. Accessed November 11, 2019 https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23473579.pdf? casa_token=IXhQ8zzUztQAAAAA:gaHput_1mmvUXW18OGsg2sBUi3bGsF_3YRyykzJ4l80OoSzoJ2ZEUPpU6gWlXBE 918f6g2JgtkT35xWzrAEbA6serWXl5v1mHben4MZTM-BP0LQz_Q

Sloan, Eleanor. “China’s Strategic Behaviour” Canadian Devence& Foreign Affairs Institute. (2010). Accessed November 14, 2019 https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages /41/attachments/original/1413662050/China_Strategic_Behaviour.pdf?1413662050

Snyder, Glenn H. “Mearsheimer’s World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay.” International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): 149-173.

Toft, Peter. “John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power.” Journal of International Relations and Development 8, no. 4 (2005): 381-408.

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[1]Eleanor Sloan. “China’s Strategic Behaviour” CDAFI (2010) 5.

[2] Jeffrey Lantis. “Strategic cultures and security policies in the Asia-Pacific.” (2014): 166.

[3] Duncan Ivison. Postcolonial liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 4

[4]Ibid. 4-5

[5]Lantis. . “Strategic cultures and security policies in the Asia-Pacific.” 167.

[6] Glenn Snyder. “Mearsheimer’s World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay.” International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): 151.

[7]John Mearsheimer. “Structural realism.” International relations theories: Discipline and diversity 83 (2007).

[8]Kazuhiko Noguchi. “Bringing Realism Back In: Explaining China’s Strategic Behavior in the Asia-Pacific.” Asia-Pacific Review 18, no. 2 (2011): 63.

[9]Ibid. 65

[10] Tang Shiping. “From Offensive Realism to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation.”

[11] Chris Horton. “China’s playbook in Hong Kong is also working in the Asia Pacific” The Atlantic. 2019 Accessed November 11, 2019 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/08/china-uses-its-regional-playbook-hong-kong/596797/

[12] Noguchi. “Bringing Realism Back In: Explaining China’s Strategic Behavior in the Asia-Pacific.” 68.

[13]Nabarun Roy. “Chinese and Indian strategic behavior: growing power and alarm.” (2013): 546-548.

[14] Peter Toft. “John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power.” Journal of International Relations and Development 8, no. 4 (2005): 381-408.

[15]Noguchi. 79

[16] Rex Li. A rising China and security in East Asia: Identity construction and security discourse. London: Routledge, 2008. 12