Tianjin Summit: Forging a Greater Alignment Between SCO and BRICS

Travelling along Tianjin’s avenues, world leaders and dignitaries passed under banners proclaiming “Meet in Tianjin for Win-Win Cooperation.” For two days (31 August – 1 September 2025), the Chinese port city was transformed into a hub of regional diplomacy, with cultural and political visuals resonating to Eurasian territories. The 25th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Heads of State Summit, the largest in the organisation’s history, brought together more than 20 world leaders and representatives from around 10 international organisations.

The Tianjin Declaration began with a pronouncement that “equitable and representative multipolarity” is destined to be the defining feature of the future international system. It called for reforms in the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), to ensure a fairer and inclusive space for Global South countries in global governance. In this respect, the declaration closely echoed the Rio de Janeiro Declaration adopted in July 2025 by BRICS, which also stressed “strengthening Global South cooperation for more inclusive and sustainable governance.”

A key takeaway from Tianjin was the deepening alignment between SCO and BRICS. This is likely not incidental: with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin emerging as central architects of what can be described as an anti-Western organisational convergence. In his address, Xi urged members to “oppose the Cold War mentality, bloc confrontation and bullying practices.” These remarks can be seen as a pushback against the United States’ strategic competition with China. Similarly, Putin criticised the use of finance as an instrument of neo-colonialism, while declaring that SCO has revived ‘genuine multilateralism’ in its endeavours to use local currencies for mutual trade.

This convergence brings two key questions: what would this alignment look like, and how will the West react to this alignment? In response to the first question: overlapping membership already provides a natural bridge: China, Russia and India belong to both organisations, while Iran, a relatively new entrant in both SCO and BRICS provides a vital bridge to the wider Global South. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE are the new entrants in BRICS which also maintains close ties to the SCO. When looked at separately, BRICS comprises 56% of the world population and 44% of global GDP, whereas SCO consists of 42.8% of the world population and 23.6% of global GDP. Together, these are strong indicators of both organisations’ potential to alter large global power dynamics.

The most notable breakthrough at Tianjin was Xi’s announcement of plans to establish a development bank of SCO, potentially modelled on the BRICS New Development Bank. Coordinated financing of infrastructure and connectivity projects across Eurasia and the Global South could eventually provide an alternative to the traditional Bretton Woods system.

Both the Tianjin Declaration and Rio de Janeiro Declaration have highlighted the salience of emerging technologies. Therefore, digital integration of BRICS and SCO is another equally important factor of organisational convergence, with China being the key link in this regard. China is already leveraging its Digital Silk Road for the digital transformation of BRICS members. During the Tianjin summit, Xi offered SCO members access to China’s BeiDou satellite system, which is an alternative to the American-led GPS system. The existing overlapping of members could pave the way for technological partnerships, digital interoperability and standardisation of systems.

The SCO and BRICS have successfully engaged with international organisations, further internationalising their agendas and dialogue frameworks. In his remarks at the Tianjin summit, UN Secretary General António Guterres endorsed the SCO’s stance and remarked that the organisation is ‘uniquely positioned to help shape a more peaceful, inclusive and sustainable future.’ The growing participation of international organisations in the SCO and BRICS summits somehow assuages the concerns that these are anti-liberal and revisionist groupings. However, these concerns are not entirely misplaced, given the authoritarian credentials of major players in the SCO and BRICS.

On the other hand, Donald Trump has reacted strongly against both organisations. In July 2025, he threatened “any country” with tariffs should they align with what he termed as “Anti-American policies” of BRICS. Soon after the Tianjin Summit, he accused Xi, Putin and Kim of “conspiring against” the US. The Trump administration is particularly irked by BRICS’s de-dollarisation agenda, which is finding resonance in SCO as well. Needless to say, the Bretton Woods System essentially hinges on the supremacy of the dollar as an international reserve currency.

However, SCO and BRICS’ ability to emerge as a collective counterweight against the West is still debatable. The misalignment of member states’ foreign policy is a hurdle in the larger organisational alignment of the two groupings. For instance, Sino-Indian tensions and India’s multi-alignment approach erode the collective strength of anti-West overtures. Although Trump’s tariffs have nudged New Delhi closer to China, India is less likely to reduce its active participation in the anti-China Quad alliance. Notably, Modi also decided to skip China’s Victory Day parade, which was attended by Putin, Kim and other world leaders. Apart from that, both SCO and BRICS have yet to match, let alone exceed, the EU and NATO in terms of institutional cohesion and seamless integration among member states. For decades, Western organisations have established their preponderance through both realpolitik as well as liberal semantics.

Lastly, will the deepening SCO-BRICS alignment pose a decisive challenge to Western dominance? It appears less likely in the near future, considering that the alignment is still unfolding amidst the multiple challenges. Yet the shifting landscape should not be underestimated. Trump’s unpredictability, combined with persistent fractures in transatlantic relations, could accelerate momentum towards non-Western alliances. International orders have shifted before; the current order is not immune to the same fate.