The New Scramble for Africa: The Role of Middle Powers in a Great Power Competition
Africa has become a battleground, the great powers– the United States, Russia, and China– are scrambling to secure natural resources, defence cooperation and political influence across the continent. By engaging with Africa pragmatically, middle powers can secure advantages for themselves while helping shape the global order (Zeleza, 2025; Garbil, 2025).
Europe
European countries have mostly focused on mutually beneficial, moderate economic partnerships. Initiatives like the Africa-EU Partnership, which aims to develop economic cooperation, and the Global Gateway Initiative, which invests €1.2 billion in energy and transport, illustrate Europe’s cooperative approach (European Commission). There are however, some limited more specific and strategically important investments, like the €1 billion pledged by the EU to develop the Lobito Corridor, which aims to better connect Angola, the DRC and Zambia through the Copperbelt (von der Leyen, 2025). However, Europe has struggled to economically counter China’s influence, as seen with the competing TAZARA Railway renovation but also with the recent DRC-Rwanda conflict being resolved with U.S. mediation, highlighting Europe’s limited political influence.
Militarily, Europe has played a minor role. France led significant deployments to the Shael region under Operation Serval and Operation Barkhane, these have however come to an end and the bases have been shut down or transferred (Zuffa, 2023). The Sahel and North Africa however remain vital for Europe’s security, and without European engagement, rival middle powers like Turkey and great powers like Russia will fill the security void (Tastan, 2023).
Turkey
Ankara, with its engagement in Africa, is attempting to enhance its own prestige and power, but also help reinforce regions key for the development of the Turkish economy.
On the soft power front, Turkey has focused on humanitarian aid and educational programmes with agencies like the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) building schools, mosques and hospitals (Geopolitical Futures, 2024). With 44 embassies now across the continent, Ankara has also expanded its diplomatic footprint. With powers now actively competing in Africa, the economy of Africa is increasingly politicised. Turkish construction projects have proven to be a rival to even great powers, Chinese BRI projects in Libya have been supplanted by Turkish projects and companies.
Militarily, Ankara has expanded its footprint significantly. Turkey has taken over former bases, like former French bases Abeche and Faya-Largeau in Chad. It has also maintained bases in Libya where it has taken an active role in the civil war, backing the GNA/ GNU with arms, troops and drones (Parens, 2025). Turkey has also expanded its efforts in Sudan, on Suakin Island, and in Somalia where the Turkish navy has been authorized to operate and protect Turkish gas and oil exploration efforts (Parens, 2025).
Ankara demonstrates the ability of middle powers to extend their influence, secure a military foothold and boost economic cooperation. A middle power like Turkey, should it identify its key interests in Africa and should it act decisively can challenge great powers and protect their own interests.
Gulf States
Gulf states have focused their efforts in Africa on economic cooperation, mostly hoping to diversify away from domestic oil and gas production. Consequently, they have focused on ports, logistical hubs and the agricultural sector. The UAE’s DP World exemplifies this, owning strategic ports around Africa and key trade corridors in Southern Africa (Ersozoglu, 2021). These investments give even small Gulf states significant influence, which great powers like China and Russia must take into consideration. Gulf investments often even rival or exceed the influence of China or U.S.
Gulf states have also established a minor military footprint. The UAE, for example, has helped establish and fund the Puntland Maritime Police Force (IISS, 2024), successfully curbing piracy along the coast of Somalia, a vital maritime trade route for Emirati crude oil.
Other Gulf states like Qatar and Saudi Arabia have flexed their diplomatic power. Saudi Arabia, for example, effectively mediating between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Bhardwaj, 2025). Gulf states have however been dragged into regional conflicts, in Sudan for example the UAE backs the RSF while Saudi Arabia supports the SAF. The differing interests between them may therefore be perpetuating the conflict (ADF, 2025).
Emerging as major political and economic players, Gulf states have proven that they can challenge great powers when they act collectively. Chinese BRI investments are substantial but are dwarfed by the combined efforts of the Gulf states. Their strategic investments cement their political and economic leverage over not only those African countries but also over the countries which are economically dependent on the continued operation of those assets.
Europe cannot match the financial investments of Gulf states or China, nor the military presence of Russia or Turkey, limiting its influence in Africa. Yet, Africa remains vital for European security and for its economy. Stability in North Africa and the Sahel is crucial for Southern Europe. Africa’s population and resources could boost growth and competitiveness against the U.S. and China. Europe must engage more pragmatically or risk yielding influence to both great and rival middle powers.
Ankara has proven that middle powers can secure their interests through pragmatic engagement. Turkey’s naval presence in Somalia helps secure the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a vital trade chokepoint for Turkey. Middle powers can exercise tremendous influence on the continent if they act pragmatically and decisively.
The Gulf states have proven that middle powers are able to challenge the influence of great powers in Africa if they act based on their strengths (Ecofin Agency, 2025). The financial and economic weight of the Gulf States allow for them to carve out influence for themselves and leverage their investments in dealing with great powers both in Africa but also globally.
Middle powers are inherently limited in their ability to exercise influence in Africa. Nevertheless, the rewards can be great if they deploy their limited resources pragmatically. They can secure their economic or security interests and also influence global developments.
Bibliography
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