The Monopolisation of Space and the Future of the Domain

The Space Domain

The exploration of the space domain represents a pivotal frontier for humanity, comparable to when people first became able to travel the seas and reach previously undiscovered lands (Zweibelson, 2023:45). The domain has undergone a profound and rapid evolution, marked by an increasing number of man-made objects in orbit, a burgeoning space economy reaching unprecedented heights, and the emergence of tangible threats within the realm (Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), 2023, as cited in Erwin, 2023). Consequently, space capabilities have become a critical issue in contemporary international politics. This is not solely due to the potential for weaponisation but also because of the essential surveillance, command, and control functions that are vital to achieving ‘full spectrum dominance’ (Krishnan, 2015:14).

The Dangers of Space Monopolisation

As space emerges as a critical arena for economic, military, and technological dominance, the concentration of space capabilities among a few powerful nations poses significant global risks. In addition to national governments, private companies such as SpaceX are increasingly influential in shaping strategic space policies, controlling military applications, and affecting the global balance of power. Consequently, government agencies have recognised the value of collaborating with private enterprises, leading to the normalisation of public-private partnerships (Medium, 2024).

The race to deploy mega-constellations by countries such as the United States and China is rapidly populating low Earth orbit (LEO). The U.S. effort, led by SpaceX, continues to accelerate, as illustrated in Figure 1 using data from SpaceXNow (2025). This drive towards monopolisation restricts the ability of emerging nations to deploy their own satellites and engage in the space economy. Consequently, there is a growing concern about the rise of digital colonialism, a concept suggesting that rapid digitalisation has exacerbated significant disparities between the Global North and South, and amplified regional inequalities (UNESCO, 2024).

Central to this issue is the control over global connectivity. The United States leads the world in commercial space enterprises, with SpaceX’s Starlink constellation providing internet access to underserved regions globally. While this democratises access in the short term, it also creates long-term dependence on U.S.-based infrastructure. This is particularly significant in conflict zones, as evidenced in Ukraine, where Starlink has delivered critical capabilities to both Ukrainian soldiers and civilians, and demonstrates that commercial and dual-use satellites can significantly bolster a country’s national security (Siegel, 2022). However, if such a system were to be restricted or influenced by U.S. foreign policy, affected nations would have limited alternatives.

The monopolisation of space and satellite technology also raises concerns regarding the lack of international governance. Existing treaties, such as the Outer Space Treaty (1967) (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2025), are ill-equipped to address modern space dynamics. Additionally, dominant nations often act unilaterally, setting precedents without broader international consensus, which undermines efforts to establish fair and cooperative space governance frameworks. In turn, this lack of governance can impact some nations’ national sovereignty and lead to its erosion. Nations reliant on foreign satellite infrastructure risk losing control over their digital sovereignty, affecting crucial sectors such as agriculture, transportation, and communications (Perez-Ruiz and Upadhyaya, 2012; Aerospace & Defence Review, 2025), thereby limiting their autonomy in decision-making. For instance, the U.S. possesses the technical capability to degrade or deny GPS access to specific regions if deemed necessary for national security (GPS.GOV, 2021). The dual-use nature of these technologies, serving both military and civilian purposes, underscores the complexity of their integration into global security frameworks.

A Glimpse into the Future of the Space Domain

The future of space exploration is expected to follow the prevailing trend of nations increasingly focusing on exploiting outer space for economic gains. This shift represents a departure from the era when international prestige was the primary motivation for space exploration, as exemplified by the Soviet-American space race during the Cold War. This competitive drive is particularly evident in the space launch and satellite markets, with the prospect of exploration being enticing. This could potentially drive other global powers and second-tier space-faring states to pursue similar ambitions, particularly when the advent of reusable rockets has caused a reduction in launch costs (Hickman, 2024), already amplifying the scope and intensity of space activities.

An intriguing and potentially less contentious approach would be for a nation to declare an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) over their Moon base (Hickman, 2024), functioning similarly to the nautical EEZs established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 (United Nations, 1982). A ‘Moon base’ refers to a facility on or beneath the lunar surface that supports human activity and maintains a continuous presence. The United States and China are at the forefront of international efforts to establish permanent lunar bases, each leading initiatives with the support of various partner nations (Space.com, 2022; Space.com, 2024). This epitomises the new ‘space race’ in which the world is currently engaged. While initiatives like the International Space Station (ISS) promote greater cooperation between nations and represents the most politically complex space exploration program ever undertaken (NASA, 2025), expanding such models is essential to mitigate some risks of monopolisation.

The competition among global powers is poised to open new frontiers in space, with the discovery of new celestial objects driving the development of advanced technologies (Hickman, 2024). More importantly, this competition embodies a clash of differing visions for the future of humanity, with the outcome holding significant implications for what humanity may achieve or fail to achieve over the next century.

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