The Geopolitics of the Abraham Accords
Since 7 October 2023, the Middle East’s balance of power has been dramatically altered by the Iranian-backed Islamist group Hamas’ actions. As evidenced by the New York Times, they are determined to halt the expansion of the Abraham Accords by including Saudi Arabia, as disclosed in a Wall Street Journal exposé. The potential resolution of one of the most intractable issues in the Middle East, the Israeli-Saudi relations, would have significantly impacted the old wisdom behind the establishment of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian question, to which the EU and the US, albeit increasingly in lip service, have been referring since the Oslo Accords. Israel has been busy restoring its security and reshaping the relations of power in the region while also curbing the Houthis and Hezbollah insurgency.
As a result of the Israeli counteroffensive against the axis of resistance (Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthis) and the resultant fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Iran, the chief backer and inspirator, found itself on the losing end of the new reconfiguration. At the same time, Israel, once again, restored its supremacy in the region. However, the last military actions against Iran directly exposed the weakness of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Israel’s capacity to target any chief of the regime in the country proper aside from the proxies in the region. Meanwhile, Israeli intelligence has carried out brilliant yet deep operations in Iran itself, allegedly to stop the regime’s nuclear enrichment but possibly also to bring about regime change.
Nonetheless, irrespective of the achievement of the second objective, the further weakening of the Iranian regime offers an opportunity to reshape the region, to be free from the Iranian threat to the Arab and Gulf countries, and to pursue a series of foreign policy objectives.
The objective of strengthening the scope and composition of the Abraham Accords introduced the prospect of peace and pragmatism beyond the ad hoc intelligence cooperation established, as the Saudi-Israeli alliance, a new security environment in the region. According to the vision extolled by the ‘Peace to Prosperity’, the quid pro quo understanding among the parties of the Abraham Accords would relegate extremism and tribalism to the bin of history in favour of cooperation and intelligence in a purely anti-Iranian scope. Hence, in the name of business, a new network of moderate forces working for stability and cooperation might bring forth a new era where the regime of the ayatollahs would not be able to threaten and blackmail. This is arguably the condition sine qua non behind the Saudi Vision 2030, which hopes for Israeli technology in the form of investments and more cooperation.
Furthermore, the enlargement of the Abraham Accords would also serve to distance the Arab and Gulf states from the growing Chinese influence, a fact dreaded by the US, that should raise eyebrows from the EU, as shown by the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement spearheaded by China and the proposed Iranian Muslim West Asian Dialogue Association (MWADA), amenable to China’s objective of augmenting its influence in the region and endorsed by NATO member, Turkey.
The goal of investing in the Abraham Accords presupposes the cooperation and activism of the US and the EU. In particular, the second needs to cashier the failed Oslo Accords and finally condition the support for any Palestinian State to first and last the disarmament of militias and terrorists within the Palestinians and the exclusion of Hamas by supporting the Israeli military operation currently in Gaza. So far, the EU seems unwilling to separate the question of the Palestinian State not just from the Abraham Accords, as the US and its recipients do, but also from the issue of extremism and terrorism espoused by Hamas and present in the West Bank that prevent any agreement between the parties. Therefore, the Palestinians, proving their interest in renouncing and fighting terrorism against Israel and the recognition of the reality on the ground, might also join the accords to the benefit of all. This unrealistic attitude on the EU’s part is concomitant with the soft approach to Iran and the Turkish influence within its external affairs. Moreover, the EU appeared to be sceptical about the US strategy of creating an anti-Iran military coalition, dubbed ‘Arab NATO’, thus rendering Israel’s actions all the more necessary, especially after the terrorist attacks and the resurgence of the militants from Lebanon and the wider region, to ensure deterrence and security. Furthermore, recently, the EU refused to deploy a mission in conjunction with the US in the Red Sea to stop the Houthis from disrupting the merchant vessels transiting through the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb by asserting that it does not want to target the insurgents within the controlled areas in Yemen.
However, this scenario could only be achieved if the Iranian regime collapses under the Israeli operation and is tentatively substituted by a more amenable government willing to negotiate bona fide with the US and the EU. The hypothetical agreement requires the recognition of Israel’s right to exist, withdrawn by the Ayatollahs when they seized power in 1979. Additionally, a new, better-monitored Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) would pressure Iran to renounce the nuclear option detrimental to Israel and the security of the actors in the region. Thus, in due time, the proposition of a Cyrus accord between the two regional powers might become a corollary to the Abraham Accords.
The Abraham Accords represent perhaps the chief Israeli foreign policy objective. Therefore, the possible inclusion of Azerbaijan could strengthen Israel’s business opportunities in the new market and achieve more recognition among Asian countries to the detriment of Turkey, the problem child of the NATO alliance, increasingly at odds with the US on regional and world issues. Furthermore, this would also represent a tool for the US to mitigate the Chinese influence in the broad Asian region. Azerbaijan would also represent a counterplayer to Iran’s influence in the South Caucasus, as shown by the deepening ties with Armenia and the attempted cooling off with Azerbaijan itself. Moreover, the inclusion of Syria would also relieve the pressure on Israel and ensure possible pragmatic cooperation supervised and strengthened by the US itself.
Therefore, the EU should realise that to play a constructive and assertive geopolitical role requires the understanding that the old wisdom of Iranian and Turkish desiderata is a limit to its actorness. This is even more relevant in the aftermath of the new order built by the US and Israel without Iranian interference and unamenable to Erdoganism. As shown by Turkey’s opposition to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, Turkey’s transactionalism should be countered by the strengthening and extension of the Abraham Accords. Nonetheless, Israel’s role in terms of natural resources could help curb Russia’s dominion over it, which is a goal advertised but not often enforced by Brussels while pursuing the goal of renewables.
In the event of the regime in Iran coming out of the current war still tottering, the UAE, a part of the accords, could spearhead a diplomatic initiative to bring the parties to the US table to negotiate a new entente based on the reality on the ground and the need to ensure hostilities cease and prevent a fresh war. Furthermore, witnessed by the Israeli success in establishing an alternative land route to the Houthi through the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan, in 2024, the perception of the common enemy is a factor in pursuing a pragmatic relationship to counter Iran.
Hence, a curbed or even a new Iran would ensure that the question of the smooth handling of the Strait of Hormuz would benefit the world economy. This could be achieved through Western unity and, as opined by a recent Jerusalem Post editorial, by establishing a land route.
Furthermore, as shown by the establishment of the I2U2 initiative, the expansion of the Abraham Accords could establish a new framework for regional cooperation, benefiting the global economy and countering malicious Chinese influence.
The US and its partners should host new discussions to expand and ameliorate the current standing of the accords, with the EU also taking a leading role. To conclude, the EU should show it is not delegating its own long-term security solely to the US but also to Israel by first adopting a more proactive role as a genuine deal broker, both with the Abraham Accords and the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and, secondly, a deterrent force in Yemen as demanded by the US since 2023.
