The Future of Iran’s Nuclear Policy

In light of heightened Israeli military aggression and President Elect Donald Trump’s previous stance on Iran, how should the nuclear programme policy adapt, if at all? Examined are three options for  nuclear development, including pursuit of the bomb, and the effects of each on Iran’s stability. This  paper advises the Iranian Supreme Leader on contemporary issues faced by Iran and how nuclear  policy should proceed by giving a capability and threat brief, followed by the different avenues of  approach, and a final prescribed approach of nuclear development.

Capability and Threat Brief

In 1974, Iran’s nuclear energy programme aimed to relieve the usage of oil and gas by establishing an  output of 23,000 megawatt electric units (MWe) of nuclear energy (World Nuclear Association, 2024).  From 1975-6 the construction of various plants began, including one 18km south of Bushehr, but were  heavily damaged by Iraqi air strikes in 1985 during the war (Elbahtimy, 2022; World Nuclear  Association, 2024). Having suffered various setbacks and tougher international regulations for safer  nuclear programmes (World Nuclear Association, 2024), Iran’s 2011 launch had to be abandoned. By  September 2013 however, commercial operation commenced (World Nuclear Association, 2024).

As of 2014, Iran had produced low-enriched uranium (LEU) containing 5% fissile uranium-235  (Congressional Research Service, 2019). Efforts to further enrich this LEU could have potentially  yielded enough high-enriched uranium (HEU) for up to eight nuclear weapons (Congressional Research  Service, 2019). Though previously, the official target of the nuclear programme was not the pursuit of  the bomb, production of nuclear weapons under an Iranian programme was not a question of capability  until the introduction of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

In July 2015, the JCPOA was established and was fully complied with until US withdrawal. The  JCPOA placed restrictions on the procurement of HEU resulting in a 96% reduction the existing  stockpile (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 2020) so that, according to official US policy, Iran’s  capable timeframe to assemble a nuclear weapon would be extended from three months to at least one  year (World Nuclear Association, 2024; Congressional research service, 2019). Lacking the ability to  quickly produce nuclear weapons severely curtails Iran’s national security when facing existential threats,  yet the JCPOA has nonetheless indirectly provided bargaining power; for example President Biden’s  recent waiver amendment allowing energy dealing with Iraq worth $10 billion (Goldberg, 2024; Iran  International Newsroom, 2024).

In light of the recent election, the incumbent Trump administration will no-doubt pose a  significant threat to a reconciliatory nuclear deal, given his withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018  (Robinson, 2023; Zurcher, 2018), resulting in stifling the economic benefits which justify Iran’s  involvement in the JCPOA. The Trump administration has made clear its stance to enact

“unprecedented financial pressure on the Iranian regime,” (Congressional Research Service, 2019, p.71)  and there exists little evidence indicating that President Elect Trump’s second term will deviate from it.  Whilst Iranian nuclear policy should not act entirely contingent on U.S. policy it should remain a  considerable factor for determining it, considering how clear President Elect Trump’s position remains.

Another current threat to the nuclear project has manifested in the Netanyahu regime especially  considering Israel’s heightened aggression throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).  Israel is a sophisticated military entity and is one that should be regarded as extremely dangerous to  Iranian security given its covert and overt operational ability. Its recent operations against Hezbollah,  notably the pager attack on the 17th September 2024 and the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah on the  27th September, demonstrates Israel’s ability to subvert potential efforts to curtail the effect of its  technological advancements. Furthermore, the pager attack demonstrated Israel’s extremely effective  planning capabilities which resulted in an “unprecedented event, with a high number of casualties that  had the same pattern of injuries,” (Helou et al., 2024, p.2). In relation to the nuclear programme, Israel  expresses its concern in the form of missiles with dual purpose. Having hit the Parchin nuclear research  facility in October 2024 (Gritten, 2024), Israeli attacks serve the added purpose of exposing Iranian  anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence capability and location (Karkazis et al., 2024). Israeli intelligence,  offensive capability, and motives must therefore be considered if nuclear development in Iran is to be  pursued.

Avenues of Approach 

Iran has achieved enrichment of uranium to 60% purity—weapons-grade requires 90% (World Nuclear  Association, 2022; Mills, 2024). Official nuclear policy currently stipulates that Iran is not pursing  nuclear weaponry, however (Mills, 2024). When pursuing a particular avenue of approach towards  Iranian nuclear policy, national security remains the primary aim. Considering the security threats of  Israel and the Trump administration outlined above, how should we proceed? There are three possible  avenues of approach; option A) pursue immediate development of the bomb; option B) roll back nuclear  development in accordance with a renewed international deal; and option C) maintain the current  trajectory of nuclear development without the bomb.

Option A, to produce a nuclear weapon and achieve the bomb, comes with many benefits for  Iran. The first, and most important, is that the existence of a nuclear weapon provides the ultimate  deterrent against existential threats. Especially Israel, close in proximity and small in size, knows that to  engage in nuclear war would be heavily self-inflicting (Sagan and Waltz, 2013) so Iran’s pursuit of the  bomb would incite no further nuclear aggression from Israel. History lends credence to this claim, where  Pakistan and India continue to exercise caution in regard to their nuclear arsenals (Sagan and Waltz,  2013). Further adhering to the example of Pakistan and India, relations with Israel may improve  significantly under the acquisition of the bomb and enrich peace negotiations by essence of balancing

power in the region (Sagan and Waltz, 2013). Provided second-strike capability is maintained, through  dispersed uranium deposits and diverse nuclear launch methods, the balance of power is hardly  contingent on the size of one’s nuclear arsenal as the existential threat persists (Sukin, 2023). Therefore,  any existence of Iranian nuclear weapons would likely be enough to instigate peace.

On the contrary, nuclear armament comes with potential costs. Firstly, the financial burden  could have significant long-term effects on the economy. Although Sagan and Waltz (2013) argue that  effects of sanctions are hard to determine, contemporary research suggests that economic sanctions  from the international community, combined with the actual cost of producing HEU and nuclear  warheads, could potentially plunge Iran into further economic stagnancy or decline, reminiscent of the  Pakistani experience (Mayberry, 2022). Pursuit of the bomb also invokes the potential risk of preventive  war (Sagan and Waltz, 2013), notably with Israel. Having done so against Iraq in 1985 (Elbahtimy, 2022;  World Nuclear Association, 2024), and more recently against the Parchin nuclear research facility in  October 2024 (Gritten, 2024), it is within the realm of likelihood that outwardly accelerating Iran’s  pursuit of the bomb would invoke further attacks from Israel, at least. This presents a considerable risk;  the closer Iran is to achieving nuclear armament the greater the potential of receiving attacks. Pursuit  of the bomb flirts with weak statehood by greatly inducing the potential for instability. Finally, there is a  potential risk that pursuing the bomb would enact a nuclear proliferation chain, where rival states such as  Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey would reactively pursue nuclear armament, but there is no conclusive  evidence to suggest such given their international ties (Saudi and US, Turkey and NATO) or economic  capability (Egypt) allows them to do so (Sagan and Waltz, 2013).

Option B, rolling back nuclear development in accordance with a renewed international deal,  could present a viable option for future nuclear policy. Rolling back development would likely require  JCPOA compliant levels of enriched uranium—around 3.67% (Mills, 2024)—and return to increased  cooperation with and monitoring from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Mills, 2024).  This would essentially present the inverse effects of acquiring the bomb; the potential for preventive war  decreases and international economic sanctions would likely be lifted which would alleviate financial  burden on Iran. Primarily, considerable rollback of nuclear development would be in line with P5+1  and the Trump administration targets, improving international cooperation whilst allowing some  continuation of the nuclear energy programme. Evidently this would be a more viable solution for Iran  when strictly considering the economic impact (Mayberry, 2022), at the same time demonstrating on  the world stage that Iran directly facilitates the peaceful use of nuclear energy (Elbahtimy, 2022). On  the contrary, the lack of a nuclear arsenal poses a substantial threat to Iranian stability. Neighbours such  as Israel have become increasingly undeterred with the recent maiming of Hezbollah, who previously  constituted an effective resistance-axis-deterrent (Mason, 2021; Ruehl, 2024). Additionally, nuclear  development has become a key characteristic of Iranian sovereignty and is a significant applicator for  nationalism and source of “political capital” for the regime (Bowen and Moran, 2014, p.46). Rollback  would therefore negate any political capital gains.

Finally, Option C, maintaining the current trajectory of nuclear development without the bomb,  poses some benefits for Iran. Nuclear development, as previously mentioned, fosters “political capital”  which in turn procures state-nation congruence by maintaining negative sentiment towards western and  American interference (Bowen and Moran, 2014) in Iranian sovereignty. Furthermore, the current  policy has fostered “skilled scientists and a burgeoning nuclear industry,” (Juneau and Razavi, 2018,  p.73) that produces some economic benefit for Iran. Despite these short-term benefits from the  nuclear programme, however, many argue they are outweighed by the costs of the current trajectory  (Juneau and Razavi, 2018). Current uranium enrichment levels equate to an outwardly perceived  hedging policy, where enrichment levels indicate to the international community Iran’s ability to  assemble a bomb (Bowen and Moran, 2014). This greatly agitates the international community,  encouraging similar results to pursuing the bomb—sanctions, long-term financial costs (Bowen and  Moran, 2014) and preventive war (Sagan and Waltz, 2013)—with no justification of possessing a  nuclear deterrent.

Prescribed Approach 

It must be reiterated, first and foremost, that the security of Iran is the priority when considering the  possible avenues of approach towards the nuclear programme. Option C is currently the least desirable  avenue of approach; it offers the worst elements of both option A and option B for little benefit,  where Iran experiences economic sanctions and international castration by maintaining its HEU levels  whilst bereft of a nuclear deterrent. Option B is also undesirable given the current dangers posed by  Israel and President Elect Trump. Additionally any significant rollback on the nuclear programme has  the potential to harm Iranian sovereignty and state-nation congruence, seen as “capitulating to  international pressure” (Bowen and Moran, 2014, p.47). Option A, to produce a nuclear weapon and  achieve the bomb, is therefore the recommended approach. Iran must be mindful of the costs already  presented; public knowledge of pursuing a developed nuclear arsenal invites preventive war (Sagan and  Waltz, 2013), sanctions, a potential nuclear proliferation chain, and general upset of the international  order until the bomb is acquired.

These costs can be negated. A proliferation chain is wholly unlikely as history shows this is yet  to occur, whilst states such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt do not possess either the autonomy or  means to do so (Sagan and Waltz, 2013). Sanctions and preventive war can potentially be reduced  during nuclear armament if such a task is undertaken covertly. Although nuclear weapons are relatively  easy to hide (Sagan and Waltz, 2013), there is no guarantee that nuclear research centres would not be  discovered by the IAEA or state actors such as Israel. Iran should therefore enact nuclear ambiguity,  endure sanctions and aim to produce the bomb as quickly as possible, deterring enemies from inciting  conflict (Sagan and Waltz, 2013). Once the bomb is achieved, second strike capability must be ensured by  establishing secure methods of delivery such as a nuclear triad or strategic ballistic missile submarines

(SSBNs) (Jenkins, 2018). Although during the pursuit of the bomb Iranian security is downgraded,  achieving a nuclear deterrent will significantly improve Iran’s national security and therefore it must be  achieved quickly.

Bibliography

• Bermudez, K. (2024). U.S. Grants Iran Sanctions Waiver Worth $10 Billion. [online] FDD. Available at:  https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/03/14/u-s-grants-iran-sanctions-waiver-worth-10-billion/.
• Bowen, W. and Moran, M. (2014). Iran’s Nuclear Programme: A Case Study in Hedging? Contemporary  Security Policy, 35(1), pp.26–52. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.884338.
• Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (2020). Iran’s nuclear policy. [online] cnduk.org. Available at: https:// cnduk.org/resources/irans-nuclear-policy/.
• Congressional Research Service (2019). Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status. [online] Available at: https:// sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/RL34544.pdf.
• Elbahtimy, H., King’s College London Centre for Science and Security Studies and Elbahtimy, H.  (2022). NPT briefing book. London: King’s College London.
• Goldberg, R. (2024). Biden continues Iran’s access to $10 billion just weeks after its proxy killed three American  soldiers. [online] New York Post. Available at: https://nypost.com/2024/03/14/opinion/biden continues-irans-access-to-10-billion-just-weeks-after-its-proxy-killed-three-american-soldiers/ [Accessed  22 Nov. 2024].
• Gritten, D. (2024). Israel hit part of Iran nuclear programme, Netanyahu says. BBC News. [online] 19  Nov. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cy0l1ep34pro.
• Helou, M., Weinstein, E.S., Kalaji, J., Chaaban, T. and Yammine, K. (2024). Pager Explosion in Beirut:  An Unprecedented Event. Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, [online] 18(215). doi:https:// doi.org/10.1017/dmp.2024.281.
• Iran International Newsroom (2024). Biden Faces Critical Decision On $10 Billion Iran Sanctions Waiver.  [online] Iran International. Available at: https://www.iranintl.com/en/202403113522 [Accessed 22  Nov. 2024].
• Jenkins, I. (2018). Producing Second Strike. In: A Collection of Papers from the 2017 Conference Series and  Nuclear Scholars Initiative. [online] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Available at:  https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep22425.14.pdf [Accessed 22 Nov. 2024].
• Juneau, T. and Razavi, S. (2018). Costly gains: a cost–benefit assessment of Iran’s nuclear program. The  Nonproliferation Review, 25(1-2), pp.69–86. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1477456. Karkazis, J., Anastasiadou, E. and Markopoulos, T. (2024). Iran-Israel Military Confrontation. Center of  Strategic Studies, pp.1–27.
• Mason, R. (2021). Strategic Depth Through Enclaves: Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. Middle East Policy,  28(2). doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12554.
• Mayberry, A.A. (2022). The Economic Cost of A Nuclear Weapon: A Synthetic Control Approach.  Defence and Peace Economics, 34(6), pp.1–20. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2022.2065186. Mills, C. (2024). What is the status of the Iran nuclear deal? [online] House of Commons Library. Available  at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9870/.
• Murphy, F. (2024). Where are Iran’s main nuclear sites and what does it use them for? [online] Reuters. Available  at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-main-nuclear-facilities-long-israels sights-2024-10-02/.
• Robinson, K. (2023). What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal? [online] Council on Foreign Relations. Available at:  https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal.
• Ruehl, J.P. (2024). Understanding Iran’s Non-State Network. [online] CounterPunch.org. Available at:  https://www.counterpunch.org/2024/02/23/understanding-irans-non-state-network/.
• Sagan, S.D. and Waltz, K.N. (2013). The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate. New York: W.W.  Norton & Co.
• Sukin, L. (2023). When Nuclear Superiority Isn’t Superior: Revisiting the Nuclear Balance of Power. [online]  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/ 2023/10/when-nuclear-superiority-isnt-superior-revisiting-the-nuclear-balance-of-power?lang=en.
• World Nuclear Association (2022). Uranium Enrichment | Enrichment of uranium – World Nuclear Association.  [online] world-nuclear.org. Available at: https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel cycle/conversion-enrichment-and-fabrication/uranium-enrichment.
• World Nuclear Association (2024). Nuclear Power in Iran – World Nuclear Association. [online] World nuclear.org. Available at: https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g n/iran#non-proliferation [Accessed 22 Nov. 2024].
• Zurcher, A. (2018). Three reasons behind Trump ditching Iran deal. BBC News. [online] 8 May.  Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-43902372.