The Elephant in the ‘Council’: Assessing the Need and Hesitancies for Climate Security Within The UNSC

While climate change increasingly threatens international peace and security, disagreements over the Security Council’s mandate and legitimacy continue to hinder the formal adoption of a climate security framework.

In December 2021, Ireland and Niger co-authored and presented a draft resolution in the United Nations Security Council that claimed harmful effects of climate change can “lead to social tensions…, exacerbating, prolonging, or contributing to the risk of future conflicts and instability and posing a key risk to global peace, security, and stability” (Security Council Report, 2021). However, the draft resolution eventually failed to pass because of a veto by Russia. The following paper argues against Russia’s decision and aims to discuss the necessity of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in adopting a framework for incorporating climate security issues under its mandate. This paper shall base its theoretical framework on the understanding of a broadened conceptualization for security as discussed by the Copenhagen School (Buzan et al, 1998) and ultimately contends climate change can have spillover effects on traditional concerns of peace and security.

The central agenda of the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) mandate has always been to maintain international peace and security. However, its conception of international peace and security has primarily been restricted to traditional military concerns of global peace and security (United Nations, n.d.). Before criticizing the UNSC’s limited lens on peace and security, one must be cognizant of the fact that the United Nations itself was created at the end of the Second World War. Thus, it is reasonable that the Security Council’s mandate was based on anxieties of preventing such a devastating, large-scale military conflict from happening again. However, this mandate was decided in 1945 and hence this paper critiques the UNSC’s failure to adapt to new concerns of peace and security that have emerged since the advent of globalization in the 1990s.

One of their recent concerns is the concern of climate change and its spillover effects on international peace and security. While the UNSC has discussed the adverse impacts of climate change on specific resolutions and field missions, there has been no significant development in the official recognition of climate change’s interconnected adverse effect on a larger socio-political phenomenon (Hardt, 2020), such as international peace and security. It was the findings of Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that predicted that if climate change concerns resulting in negative effects on the environment were not addressed, this would eventually lead to violent conflicts in the future (Sindico, 2007). Sindico goes on to state that various previous studies indicate that adverse effects of climate change not only create potentially new violent conflicts but also exacerbates already existing ones because “negative impacts on the environment are coupled with other social and military factors of instability” (Sindico, 2007). For example, the 2006-07 drought in the greater Fertile Crescent, during which climate scientists attributed greenhouse emissions and climate change as caused by humans, is seen as one of the primary factors that led to the Syrian Civil War. The drought led to agricultural collapse that resulted in rural people migrating to urban areas in large numbers. This led to increased competition over resources and jobs, leading to great frustration amongst citizens, resentment towards the government, and the onset of the Syrian Civil War (Karak, 2019). While it would be unfair to categorize a single cause for a civil war, the potential role of climate change as a factor often gets overlooked when assessing conflicts.

It is important to note that the UNSC holds the unique ability to pass resolutions that are legally binding on all its member states. According to the United Nations charter, the Security Council has the power to establish sanctions and peacekeeping operations, and to even authorize military action (United Nations, n.d.). Thus, if there is any international body that has the legal authority and power to hold states accountable for addressing concerns of climate change resulting in security issues, it is the UNSC. This paper argues that the UNSC must broaden its understanding of peace and security beyond their 20^th century understanding and that it is imperative that it officially incorporates ‘climate security’ in its mandate. If the UNSC successfully alters its original mandate to include matters of climate security, it would have the ability to hold states accountable for their environmental promises, such as the Nationally Determined Contributions agreed upon during the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2019) made in international forums. In turn, this could potentially lead to greater compliance and hence a step forward in tackling the adverse global effects of climate change.

Broadening Security

The concept of ‘broadening’ the conception of security was proposed by Barry Buzan in his seminal book, ‘Peoples, States and Fear’ (Buzan, 1991), where he critiqued the concept of security as being too narrow and aimed to offer a “broader framework of security”. In his book as well as his article, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century”, (Buzan, 1991), Buzan discusses five ‘sectors’ of security: military, political, economic, societal, and economic. While traditional conceptions of security have focused on the ‘military’ sector, he argues in favour of expanding this understanding and claims that each of the sectors do not work in isolation, but rather impact each other (Buzan, 1991 as cited in Stone, 2009). Thus, based on Buzan’s logic, if the purpose of the UNSC is to maintain I-international peace and security, then it must incorporate all five sectors of security in its doctrine rather than just military security.

This paper engages with the environmental security sector discussed by Buzan, which deals with the protection of the biosphere. In addition, it recognizes that ecological instability, such as environmental degradation and climate change, can lead to violent conflict and hence can result in a security issue (Buzan, 1991).

‘Climate security’ comes under the umbrella of environmental security and more specifically aims to address security challenges that stem directly from climate change (Dalby, 2012). Sharon Burke (2003) aligns with Buzan’s (1991) argument to broaden the framework of security and take a ‘climate centric’ focus to environmental security. She claims that “climate security is best defined as the interactions between change in global, regional, or local climate patterns and the political, economic, and social risks to peace, security, and stability. Or, in brief, climate security is the effect of climate change on the risks to peace and security” (Burke, 2023, p. 4-5). Taking purely an American perspective, she states that the U.S. Congress in 2020 defined ‘climate security’- which had been considered a ‘threat multiplier’ in the USA since 2007- as “the effects of climate change on: the national security of the United States, including national security infrastructure; subnational, national, and regional political stability; the security of allies and partners of the United States; or ongoing or potential political violence, including unrest, rioting, guerilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution, civil war, and interstate war” (Burke, 2023, p. 5-6). While the Syrian example mentioned in the introduction highlights how climate change can be a cause for conflict, it can also be a consequence of conflict. For example, the American military is often a high consumer of fossil fuels. Thus, if it is in operation during times of conflict, it has a significantly adverse effect on the climate (Dalby, 2012). Aftermaths of conflicts can lead to regions and states to be economically devastated. Thus, they are unable to practice sustainable development, which ultimately risks a vicious cycle in which adverse effects on climate change can lead to conflict and result in environmental harms exacerbating climate change (Dalby, 2012). However, Burke herself clarifies that this specific definition of ‘climate security’ is not shared internationally and is based on American interests (Burke, 2023, p. 6). It is important to keep this in mind as the contestations that shall be discussed below tackles with the differing notions of climate security amongst states and how they play a role in shaping their understanding of the role the UNSC should play regarding the adverse effects of climate change.

The UNSC in 2005 adopted Resolution 1625 that stated: “Reaffirming the need to adopt a broad strategy of conflict prevention, which addresses the root causes of armed conflict and political and social crises in a comprehensive manner, including by promoting sustainable development…” (Security Council Resolution 1625). Sindico (2007) hence argues that if this resolution is interpreted widely, sustainable development is an important facet of conflict prevention and tackling climate change is an important part of sustainable development (Sindico, 2007, p. 3). Therefore, Resolution 1625 creates a provision for broadening the conversations around security that are particularly inclusive of climate security.  It should be noted that concerns of climate change have been present in the UNSC’s discussions. In 2007, the permanent UK representative shared a document that stated: “While the physical effects of climate change and what can be done about them are important issues, it is their potential impact on security that is the proposed focus of this Security Council debate” (Sindico, 2007, pg. 2). The purpose of this document by the UK was to broaden the understanding of contemporary security issues and investigate the relationship of climate change with “potential drivers of conflict, such as border disputes, migration, security of energy supplies, other resource shortages, societal stress, and humanitarian crises” (Sindico, 2007, p. 2). However, this document failed to move toward a concrete resolution that addressed implications for climate change on international peace and security as well as the potential role the UNSC could play in tackling it. As mentioned earlier in the paper, this hesitancy of adopting a climate security framework was again at display in the UNSC with the rejection of the draft resolution presented by Ireland and Niger in 2021. At the time of this paper being written in 2024, the UNSC is yet to adopt such a resolution.

Climate Security Hesitancy

The following section aims to highlight the reasons for climate security hesitancy in the UNSC that prevented it from adopting an official framework for tackling security issues that lead to and stem from climate change. Interestingly, the 2021 draft resolution regarding climate change failed because of Russia’s veto power. The result of the voting was 12 votes in favour, 2 against (Russia and India), and 1 abstention (China) (UN Press, 2021). Thus, it is evident that in 2021, the majority of the UNSC argued in favour of adopting a resolution that would “integrate climate-related security risk as a central component into comprehensive conflict prevention strategies of the United Nations, to contribute to the reduction of the risk of conflict relapse due to adverse effects of climate change” (UN Press, 2021). If there is a broad recognition of the connection between security conflict and climate change in the UNSC, then why did India and Russia go against the draft resolution? India’s justification- while claiming to take climate change issues seriously- was that the UNSC was not the appropriate body for discussing climate change issues and would undermine the work being done in the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). Russia, on the other hand, argued that not just them, but 80 member states of the United Nations were against the idea of adding climate change to the UNSC’s mandate and claimed that this highlighted the divide regarding the topic in the international community. Hence, they felt that it was appropriate to vote ‘no’ and veto the draft resolution so that no decision was made in haste. Russia also argued that these discussions were more appropriate for the UNFCCC than the UNSC (UN Press, 2021). While they are the official diplomatic positions of these countries in the UN, Sindico (2007) highlights that the division between countries in favour of climate change being a part of the UNSC and those against it is a difference in perspectives between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries.

Most developing countries, such China and India, believe that climate change should not be dealt with in the UNSC because it is a sustainable development issue rather than a a security issue (Sindico, 2007, p. 4-5). Thus, they argue that other organizations of the UN, such as the General Assembly or the UNFCCC should be forums where concerns of climate change are discussed. While this may be a legitimate concern, Sindico (2007) points out that the UNSC is not the most democratic international institution. He argues that this is evident with the unequal distribution of influence possessed by the P5 with their veto power and the rest of the ‘Non-Permanent’ UNSC members. Considering that 3 of the 5 permanent members (USA, UK, France) are considered developed countries, Russia is also considered by many to be a ‘developed’ country. Also, while considered a developing country, China has shown capabilities that are equivalent to developed countries. Hence, Sindico (2007) claims “that there exists fear amongst developing countries that addressing climate change in the UN Security Council is a way for developed countries to change the rules of the game. Their concern is that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities might be replaced by a shared responsibility principle, which would not reflect the true nature of climate change” (Sindico, 2007, p. 5). The ‘common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)’ is a principle imbued in the mandate of the UNFCCC that claims that every state should play a role in tackling climate change. However, it acknowledges that not all states have the same capabilities and would have differentiated responsibilities in tackling climate change based on their capability. This principle was ratified in the 1992 UNFCCC treaty and is of the utmost importance to developing countries that do not have the same capacities as developed countries (Climate Nexus, 2019). One should also note that other developing nations, such as Singapore and Mexico, recognize climate change as a security issue but would want the deliberations over the matter at the General Assembly rather than the Security Council (Sindico, 2005, p. 5). Therefore, it is the structural mechanism of the UNSC itself that has led to hesitancy towards adopting a climate security framework in the UNSC. The fear stems from the fact that the P5 would dominate matters related to climate change, enforce their own agendas on the rest of the world, and make developing countries burden the costs that were historically incurred by developed countries.

Solutions to Developing Countries’ Hesitancy

While most of the developing world has valid concerns regarding the integration of ‘climate security’ into the UNSC as a formal resolution, there are developing states that acknowledge the urgency to view climate change as a security issue. These countries are developing countries and small island nations that are at immediate risk of the adverse effects of climate change (Sindico, 2007, p. 4). In fact, McDonald (2023) states that ‘climate security’ is integrated in over 70% of national security strategy documents as well as regional organizations, such as NATO and the EU (McDonald, 2023). This demonstrates that there is certainly a growing recognition of the adverse effects on international security that climate change can have. McDonald (2023) himself is an advocate of the UNSC adapting its mandate and adopting frameworks to tackle climate security and claims. He claims that the Security Council must identify and potential ‘hotspots’ where climate change may cause increased conflict. In addition, he argues that the UNSC has the capability and responsibility to encourage cooperation amongst civil societies, states, international organizations, and other stakeholders to collaboratively promote sustainable development matters and protect vulnerable communities (McDonald, 2023, p. 4).

Murphy (2019) recognizes the structural barriers the veto power currently presents for developing countries. These barriers have led to the hesitancy of states to officially incorporate climate security in the UNSC. However, he argues that there is a significant benefit in effectively tackling climate change under the UNSC and thus suggests strategies the UNSC can adopt to help overcome the hesitancy of states. Additionally, Murphy states that the UNSC must respect state sovereignty and use a tone of cooperation rather than one of intrusion when it comes to tackling climate change in developing countries (Murphy, 2019, p.10). Another potential solution suggested by Murphy is the UNSC attempting to pass ‘non-binding resolutions’ that avoid being ‘binding’ on countries and thus reduce the risk of being vetoed by any P5 country that disagrees with the resolution (Murphy, 2019, p. 13). Additionally, he also critiques that the UNSC should use existing climate change frameworks outlined by the Paris Agreement and serve as an institution that is complementary to organizations such as the UNFCCC rather than an alternative. (Murphy, 2019, p.6)

Conclusion

Francesco Sindico (2007), Ash Murphy (2019), and Matt McDonald (2023) all recognize the hesitancies of developing countries that may be posed by the UNSC due to the veto power possessed by the P5. However, they recognize the pressing need to adopt ‘climate security’ within the mandate of the UNSC. Climate change is a matter of urgency that requires an organization, such as the UNSC, that has the legal authority to take decisive actions in preventing adverse impacts on international peace and security. This paper argues that the UNSC’s ability to pass binding resolutions and its global authority is instrumental in ensuring that states that flout environmental norms can be held accountable. Significantly, the UNSC’s authority to deploy military force to intervene through the usage of UN peacekeepers allows a provision where in extreme situations of instability due to a state experiencing climate change, the UNSC can intervene and attempt to restore its peace and security.

However, as identified by Ash Murphy, this paper agrees that the central barrier that has prevented a resolution that incorporates ‘climate security’ in the UNSC mandate is the very structure of the UNSC itself. The veto power has been utilized by Russia in 2021 to fail a draft resolution that the majority of the UNSC membership had voted in favour of. This unbalance of influence by the P5 members raises legitimate fears that the developing world’s concerns would be undermined and the Security Council has been insufficient at restoring their faith in the institution. Furthermore, the UNSC is represented by just 15 member states per ‘term’ and thus excludes the rest of the UN members that do not have the privilege of having a representative during deliberations of resolutions. Therefore, the UNSC and the P5 states must apply appropriate consensus building measures with the developing world and be open to reforms within the structure of the Security Council. Can the UNSC and P5 make sufficient reforms and changes in the UNSC to reassure the developing world? As every year passes, the risk of climate change becoming an existential threat to humanity increases. This is the ultimate security issue that UNSC and the developing world have to solve together.

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