The Arctic Paradox: Rising Pressures, Enduring Cooperation

Since the establishment of the Arctic Council with the Ottawa Declaration in 1996, it has been the leading institution for governance in the Arctic (Pomerants, 2017). Once categorised as a place of cooperation distinct from exterior political dynamics, the region now faces threats to its order due to international turmoil and rapid developments from climate change. This article examines the prospects of continued stable cooperation within the Council and argues that it has demonstrated resilience despite growing external pressures. However, its future stability hinges on its capacity to adapt to the increasingly tense geopolitical climate and competition induced by economic opportunities presented by climate change. 

Previous friction

On the occasion of the Kingdom of Denmark taking over chairmanship of the Arctic Council from 2025 to 2027 in May, the eight Arctic states issued a joint statement confirming their commitment to maintaining “peace, stability, and cooperation in the Arctic,” (Edvardsen, 2025). Conversely, Hughes, Fergusson and Charron observe: “Anticipated economic opportunities, in the context of broader geopolitical competition and conflict, portend hostilities,” (Hughes, Fergusson and Charron, 2024). In addition to melting ice, which gives access to previously limited but critical sea routes, the relationships between the Arctic states have been under varying strain since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. While some minor disputes resulted from Russia planting a flag on the North Pole seabed in 2007, and a US Geological Survey highlighting undiscovered gas and oil reserves in 2008, de-escalatory mitigations were taken to reverse the effects (Käpylä and Harri, 2018). Despite this, cooperation remained relatively stable within the Council until the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Soft security as a resilience factor

Historically, a part of the reason for the council’s internal stability is that it has primarily tackled “soft” security issues. It was founded on the explicit exclusion of military concerns, focusing instead on scientific cooperation, the inclusion of indigenous peoples, and climate issues. This has kept tensions low between the members. Nevertheless, the rise of potential militarisation of the Arctic region and broader geopolitical developments has forced members to revise their policies and consider reinvesting in their conventional capabilities. As emphasised by the Arctic Institute, the members’ strategic priorities have slightly shifted on the home front, with multiple of them pivoting towards enhancing national security in matters related to the region (Pechko, 2025). For instance, there is contestation amongst scholars related to Russia’s role in the Arctic and its level of current assertiveness. Russia’s military buildup is not intended as a form of aggression (Boulègue, 2019; Lasserre et al., 2013). Instead it is a reinvestment into its coastline, which is necessary and a rational national interest. On the other hand,  there are highlighted concerns that it is challenging to determine the Kremlin’s real intentions (Folland, 2021). Some also suggest that military buildup has been removed from Arctic dynamics, as it was already underway before the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017).  

Environmental threat multipliers 

Despite concerns about the Council’s durability, research suggests that it remains resilient (Hansen, 2025). Climate change is acting as a “threat multiplier” in the region, which is rapidly exacerbating challenges (Knutsen and Pedersen, 2024). The temperatures in the Arctic are presently increasing at triple the speed of the rest of the world (Spence, Holdren and Ulmer, 2025). Since 1979, a turning point for accuracy in satellite measurements, the volume and late summer coverage of sea ice in the Arctic have declined by almost 75% and 50%, respectively (Spence, Holdren and Ulmer, 2025). Not only has this opened up for heightened use of sea routes, which have earlier only been accessible at specific points of the year, but it has also intensified effects on the climate in terms of maritime pollution and animal impacts from more traffic (Spence, Holdren and Ulmer, 2025). This presents a paradox, where the developments in the region call for boosted cooperation, despite the area being a catalyst for resource competition. The broadened access to resources in the region gives the area greater economic importance for states with national territory in the High North, such as Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Russia, and the United States (Palosaari and Tynkkynen, 2015). 

Russian tensions as a catalyst for uncertainty

When Russia commenced its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the country was in the middle of its chairmanship of the Council. The invasion resulted in the remaining states of the Council issuing a statement condemning the attack, which led to a pause in activities in the forum and supporting bodies (Andreeva and Rottem, 2024). Despite the unrest, Norway took over the chairmanship the following year, and internal informal dialogue eventually resumed, without Russia (Dyck, 2024). This period was critical for the council’s future, with discussions questioning its prospective legitimacy without Russia’s involvement (Andreeva and Rottem, 2024). At the time, the primary priority of the council was to promote productive collaboration and stability in the region – a point which was at the latest reinforced in the most recent transition of the chairmanship, and that also highlights a pattern of this objective (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023). In February 2024, the gradual resumption of most activities, involving all eight member states again, was in progress (The Arctic Council, 2024). This sequence of events demonstrates indications of the resilience of the Council. 

Conclusion 

Over the past decade, the Arctic Council has withstood mounting geopolitical and environmental pressures while maintaining a core of cooperation. However, with the slow erosion of its soft security foundation, the Council is confronted with the prospects of militarisation and resource competition. Climate change adds urgency, intensifying both the need for collaboration and the temptation of national self-interest. Nevertheless, the Arctic states continue to manoeuvre in a way that has only proven their resilience so far. Its continued stability will depend on its ability to balance competing objectives while preserving the foundation of shared interests. 

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