The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and Russia’s Geopolitical Power
In September 2020, the frozen conflict of Armenia and Azerbaijan’s contention over the Nagorno-Karabakh (or Karabakh) region was once again inflamed as war broke out following a series of clashes in July. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh itself was not unprecedented, but the 2020 incident may be able to shed light on the Russian Federation’s foreign policy and possible new geopolitical influencers in the region.
The Ethnic Make-up of Nagorno-Karabakh
The origins of this territorial dispute can largely be traced to the USSR’s designation of Nagorno-Karabakh as an ethnic Armenian enclave within the Azerbaijan SSR in 1921 (Kavbyuro, 1921). According to a series of all-Union population censuses conducted by the USSR, ethnic Armenians substantially and consistently outnumber other ethnicities inhabiting the region, including Azeris. For example, in 1926, out of 125,300 residents in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in Azerbaijan SSR, 111,694 (89.1%) were Armenian while 12,592 (10%) were “Turkic” (a collection of ethnic groups which includes Azeris). In 1959, there were 130,406 citizens in the autonomous oblast, and 110,053 (84.4%) were Armenian and 17,995 (13.8%) were Azeri (Ethno-Kavkaz, 2005). As the Soviet Union progressed, this approximate ratio remained consistent (see figure 1). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Nagorno Karabakh Republic census in 2005 showed that out of 137,737 Karabakh residents, 137,380 (99.7%) were Armenian while only 6 (0.1%) were Azeri.
Number of Armenians and Azeris populating Nagorno-Karabakh as reported by censuses over the years
The Previous War
In the midst of Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika (openness and restructuring), there was a significant increase in voiced dissent from Karabakh Armenians regarding Nagorno-Karabakh being part of Azerbaijan SSR. In 1988, the Karabakh Armenians called for transferral of Karabakh to Armenian SSR through demonstrations and repeated petitions. As predicted, these attempts to integrate with Armenia SSR were denied by Azerbaijan SSR and the USSR’s central government. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Karabakh Armenian population voted for secession from the newly independent Azerbaijan, in the process forming the internationally unrecognised Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, also known as Artsakh. Full scale war broke out between Azerbaijan, Artsakh, and Armenia in 1992, where Artsakh managed to capture the strategic Lachin corridor, a mountain pass to Armenia. In 1994, the war ended through a Russian-brokered ceasefire (Kuznets and Kartsev, 2020). A Nagorno-Karabakh Line of Contact was established at the eastern edge of Nagorno-Karabakh, separating the Armenian forces from the Azerbaijani troops. However, there was never peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Most notably, heavy artillery was used by both nations against each other in 2016 along the Line of Contact (ibid.).
The 2020 War
On July 12, 2020, one of the most deadly border skirmishes between Armenia and Azerbaijan took place. Pro-war sentiment rose up in Azerbaijan in the form of civil protests in Baku while Turkey publicly declared support for Azerbaijan, claiming that “Yerevan would pay for the recent escalation” (Stronski, 2020). In recent decades, Azerbaijan has consolidated its alliance with Turkey, leading to Turkey basing several F-16 fighter jets in Azerbaijan in October 2020 as a show of strength against Armenia (Gressel, 2020). Meanwhile, Armenia showcased shot-down Israeli-made drones allegedly used by Azerbaijani forces for surveillance and attack during the July conflict (Stronski, 2020). Given the abruptly heightened tensions, both countries were ready for full-scale war.
On September 27, 2020, serious clashes broke out at the Line of Contact, involving Azerbaijani artillery and rockets striking deep into the de-facto Armenian-controlled Karabakh region. Possessing Turkish and Israeli military technology, Azerbaijan seemed emboldened and certain of victory in this war. Multiple Turkish Bayraktar TB2 combat-capable drones were used in the war, and it is not clear whether the operators were Azerbaijani or Turkish (Kofman, 2020). Being outpowered in terms of technology and support, Armenia implored Russia to honour the stipulation of mutual military support of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, of which both Armenia and Russia, but not Azerbaijan, are part of. However, Russia was adamant on not providing direct military support, as Nagorno-Karabakh is not internationally recognised as Armenia’s sovereign territory. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “Russia will provide Yerevan with all necessary assistance if the clashes are transferred directly into Armenian territory” (mid.ru, 2020). Eventually, a Russian-brokered peace treaty was signed on November 9, to be effective from November 10. It was agreed that Azerbaijan would keep the Karabakh territories which were seized during the war while Armenia would cede several areas. Moreover, Russian peacekeepers would establish a presence in Karabakh and temporarily control the Lachin Corridor (bbc.com, 2020).
Implications on Russia and Geopolitics
Being part of the former Soviet Union, the South Caucasus region including Armenia and Azerbaijan is very much within the traditional Russian sphere of economic and political control as demonstrated by multiple organisations, treaties, and commerce between nations. What does it mean when Russia allowed Turkey to play a semi-decisive role in a regional geopolitical conflict? Some could view the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War as a sign that Russia’s control over the region is weakening. Allowing Turkey, a growing power from a non-post-Soviet area, to sway a war that could affect regional economic or political dynamics could mean that Russia is willing to give up its traditional sphere of influence to other powers. However, this is a precarious conclusion to draw.
The most memorable instance of Russia acting militaristically to maintain control over surrounding nations was the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU following the annexation were the “most extensive” since the Cold War (Borger, Lewis, and Mason, 2014). Perhaps Russia has learned the art of subtlety of accomplishing its aims in geopolitical conflicts. In the case of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, while Russia had a security pact with Armenia, it also had a growing commercial reliance on Azerbaijan, especially regarding the gas/oil pipelines (pgitl.com, 2020). At the same time, Russia has been selling S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems to Turkey (Barkey,
2020), gradually driving a wedge between Turkey and NATO. It seems that in the situation of the Karabakh War, Russia’s interests lay mostly in maintaining good relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey while hoping the clashes would not push into Armenia’s sovereign territory. At the end, Russia managed to call for peace talks before the war could reach Armenia, secure land for Azerbaijan, and establish military presence in the strategic Lachin Corridor. Provided the context of Russia’s possible agenda, it appears that the regional giant managed to maintain control over its interests and even start to strengthen relations with the emerging power, Turkey, from the Middle East. If anything, this course of action renders Russia an even more powerful, and maybe dangerous, force to be reckoned with.
References:
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