Russian Nuclear Policy – A Review of ‘The Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence’ 

The ‘Basic Principles‘ was an executive order published on 2 June 2020 by President Putin. It is noteworthy because it is the first stand-alone articulation of nuclear policy. The ‘Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’ published prior expressions on nuclear policy provisions in 2014. This document essentially reiterates previously held Russian positions and reifies some of the conditions for nuclear strikes, which were previously state secrets. Whilst the ‘Basic Principles’ clarifies vague prior points and provides a framework for foreign powers to interpret Russia’s nuclear posture, its ambiguity also raises many questions. Many analysts attribute the publication to the Kremlin’s desire to quieten Western debate on different interpretations of Russia’s nuclear posture. These moves fit in with a broader Kremlin strategy to counter western narratives of an ‘aggressive’ and ‘disruptive’ Russia. Prior interpretations of Russia’s security policies and posture has been the justification for deployments by the US and NATO that alarm Moscow.

The 2018 US Nuclear Policy Review (NPR) stipulated American articulations of Russia’s nuclear posture, labelling Moscow a ‘threat’. This prompted the Kremlin to publish the ‘Basic Principles’ as a conceptual response. The timing of publication is noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) and START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) both expire in 2021. Previously, on nuclear policy matters, Russia may have referred to its obligations in these legally binding international treaties. Trump cancelled the INF in 2019, and if he won re-election in November 2020, there was a fear he would not renew START in 2021 when it was up for renewal. Publishing the ‘Basic Principles’ before the US election signals Russia’s ability and resolve to maintain an active deterrence strategy in the wake of diminished viability of arms control agreements. The potential need to clarify positions in the nuclear deterrence realm is the second factor for this stand-alone nuclear publication. It is noteworthy because it is the first stand-alone articulation of nuclear policy. However, the publication of the ‘Basic Principles’ indicates that no other suitable document, like an update of the 2014 military doctrine, was in the pipeline to be released with the timeline required before START’s expiration.

There are four sections of the ‘Basic Principles’; 1. General Principles, 2. The essence of nuclear deterrence, 3. Conditions when Russia would switch to nuclear use, 4. Functions of government authorities. The most important conceptual theme is deterrence by punishment based on an ‘inevitability of retaliation’, a nuclear deterrence strategy with its foundations in Thomas Schelling’s seminal works. These concepts have underpinned Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy since the 1990s and remain prominent in this latest document. ‘Section 1: highlights the defensive nature of Russian deterrence policy, aiming to prevent escalation and reduce nuclear risk. Section 2: identifies the military risks that might evolve into threats for Russia with the critical wording specifying states that consider the Russian Federation a ‘potential adversary’. The section lists many potential military deployments as threatening, including missile defence systems and armed UAVs, yet only if a country has specified Russia as a potential adversary. This is another nod to the 2018 NPR and shows how Russia can differentiate between US military deployments as a threat but not Chinese deployments, as China has never specified Russia as an adversary. 

Next, Russia sets out its objectives in Paragraph 15, ‘The principles of nuclear deterrence’. First and foremost, Russia identifies compliance with international arms control commitments, illustrating the importance of these agreements in Russian deterrence calculations. This lexical ordering of priorities demonstrates Russia’s commitment to arms control. Russia showed its continued commitment to arms control with the New Start agreement’s unanimous ratification by the State Duma (2021). Concrete measures have also been introduced for Section F: ‘Rationalisation of forces and their maintenance at a level sufficient for implementing the tasks at hand’. Military modernisation has been at the top of the Kremlin’s agenda for the last decade. Putin himself has stipulated that Russia’s nuclear forces must reach an ‘equipment modernisation level of 88.3’. To achieve these aims, he stated Russia has ‘already done serious R&D groundwork on pieces of equipment that have no counterparts in the world’. The approaches proposed in this policy brief seem to be working, with Putin confidently declaring the success of particular objectives of the ‘Basic Principles’, namely Paragraph 16. In a December 2020 meeting of the Defence Ministry Board, Putin confidently declared that ‘Russia’s nuclear triad has reached the level that guarantees Russia’s security’. 

Another problematic feature that has caused debate on the ‘Basic Principles’ is whether Russia has an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ strategy. The 2018 NPR accused Russia of having this strategy, which its leaders flatly deny. The ‘Basic Principles’ did little to assuage these fears, with paragraph 4 discussing the ‘termination of conditions acceptable to the Russian Federation’. But most analysts agree that principles, especially paragraph 4, are vague enough for different actors to find confirmation for their entrenched positions. Yermakov (2020) argues that this ambiguity and opportunity for Russia’s adversaries to interpret this clause in such a way is the true weakness of the ‘Basic Principles’. 

Interestingly, the US used this ‘escalate to de-escalate’ strategy in a rhetorical sense. The publication of the 2018 NPR, and the subsequent labelling of Russia as an aggressive adversary, escalated tensions. It also served to push the Kremlin towards publishing a conceptual response and clarifying its nuclear deterrence policy. The increased clarity of Russia’s position on nuclear deterrence will help to de-escalate tensions. It will also prevent miscalculations from NATO powers based on incorrect assumptions of Russia’s moves regarding its nuclear posture. Specific prior interpretations of Russia’s nuclear posture led to the US deploying low-yield warheads to provide it with an ‘option of limited nuclear use in response to Russia’s perceived limited nuclear use principles’. This also highlights how the ‘Basic Principles’ can meet its objectives of ensuring Russian security. 

To conclude, the publication of this document alone will improve stability, but it will take time. As this is the first stand-alone document, one would expect the subsequent publication to be more precise, resolving some of the ambiguities and debates prompted by this publication. This document will not age well with the rapid technological advancements in the field. Emerging technologies like hypersonic and cyber capabilities will change the fundamental principles of deterrence. Nonetheless, I would say the basic principles meet its primary objective by clarifying intentions and conditions of use, which positively affects deterrence and minimise the risk of tensions escalating to nuclear conflict. 

References: 

• Bogdanov, K. , Yermakov, A. , Stefanovich, D. , Baklitskiy, A. , & Topychkanov, P. , Stepanov, A. , Kabernik, V. , Romashkina, N. (2020). Expert Opinions on Russia’s Basic Nuclear Deterrence Principles.
• Department of Defence . 2018. Nuclear Posture Review . [Online]. [3 February 2021]. Available from: https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF
• Oliker, O. 2020. New Document Consolidates Russia’s Nuclear Policy in One Place. [Online]. [2 February 2021]. Available from: https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/new-document-consolidates-russias-nuclear-policy-one-place.
• Putin, V. 2020. Expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board. [Online]. [1 February 2021]. Available from: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64684 
• Sokov, N. 2020. Russia Clarifies Its Nuclear Deterrence Policy. [Online]. [2 February 2021]. Available from: https://vcdnp.org/russia-clarifies-its-nuclear-deterrence-policy/
• State duma. 2021. The State Duma adopted the President’s bill on ratification of the agreement on extension of the New START Treaty.[Online]. [9 February 2021]. Available from: http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/50620/
• The President of the Russian Federation. (2014). The Military doctrine of the Russia. Available at: https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029 (Accessed: 6 February 2021).
• The President of the Russian Federation. (2020). The Basic Principles of State policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence. Available at: https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/disarmament/-/asset_publisher/rp0fiUBmANaH/content/id/4152094 (Accessed: 5 February 2021).
• Topychkanov , P. 2020. Russia’s nuclear doctrine moves the focus from non-Western threats. [Online]. [6 February 2021]. Available from: https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2020/russias-nuclear-doctrine-moves-focus-non-western-threats