Russian Interference in Norway’s National Elections

Russia’s increasing use of  information operations seeks to undermine democratic resilience and embed new narratives into European public discourse.

In September 2025, the Norwegian parliament will be holding its national elections. Despite Norway’s strong democratic traditions, high trust in government and deeply rooted openness, Norwegian security services have emphasised an increased risk of election interference from Russia (National Threat Assessment 2025, 2025). Over the past few years, countries across Europe have witnessed a surge in a diverse range of interference activities aimed at influencing public opinion. For Norway in particular, this constitutes a threat against the inherent values of Norwegian society. A strong democracy and a trusting society are listed as core security interests in the 2025 National Security Strategy (Office of the Prime Minister, 2025). The upcoming election could therefore become the next target in Russia’s ongoing cycle of hybrid operations aimed at undermining trust in European democratic processes.

Evolving Russian tactics

NATO holds that hybrid threats ‘combine military and non-military as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyber-attacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups and use of regular forces,’ (NATO, 2024a). These are methods that ultimately also attempt to sow doubt and destabilise populations (NATO, 2024a). Conversely, the Russian conceptualisation hones in on the non-military means, emphasising the purpose of disrupting political stability through cyber warfare, psychological operations and internal subversion, to name a few (Fridman, 2018). In a study for the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Buvarp and Sivertsen monitored developments in election interference in 2023 and 2024. They found that not only have interference operations become more complex than they used to be by incorporating new types of technology, such as AI, but actors now operate over longer timeframes to more deeply penetrate public narratives (Buvarp and Sivertsen, 2025). Leiden University conducted a study tracking Russian hybrid operations in Europe since 2022, which found a significant increase over two years, as exemplified by the following visualisation (Schuurman and Leiden University, 2024).

Hybrid threats across Europe

To understand the broader pattern, it is helpful to examine how Russia has approached similar targets elsewhere in Europe. Russia is currently navigating NATO deterrence by operating in a grey zone adapted to the alliance’s strategy (Eggen, 2024). This means that it can act below the threshold of conflict, which complicates attribution and maintains plausible deniability. In 2023 and 2024, Russia or Russian proxies targeted at least 16 NATO allies with information operations, where multiple of these were directly associated with national elections (NATO, 2024b). Elections in Europe have been targeted in actions such as the Macron leaks in France, disinformation campaigns in Moldova, Croatia and Bulgaria, and a range of narratives in Georgia, Czechia and Turkey (Buvarp and Sivertsen, 2025). This illustrates a pattern of Russian-linked actors attempting to steadily shape perceptions and weaken democratic resilience across Europe. Furthermore, it exemplifies Russia’s ability to adapt its campaigns to local contexts (Lukasz Olejnik, 2025). It also remains a fact that the overall aim of this type of interference is not necessarily to rig elections in support of specific candidates or parties, but rather to change discourse and narratives, thereby provoking a long-term destabilising effect on populations and altering narratives to ensure a lasting impact. Nevertheless, the EU and NATO remain resilient and have, in response to Russia’s activities, been implementing task forces, strategic communication initiatives, and joint investigations in order to mitigate the effects of influence operations (Reuters, 2024; European External Action Service, 2025).

Why Norway may be next

Norway is a likely target for Russia due to multiple factors. Russia maintains that it is in an active information war confrontation with the West, where the manipulation of public opinion is a necessary tactic on the unconventional battlefield (Ivana Karásková, Una Aleksandra Bērzina-Čerenkova, and Kara Němečková, 2023). Regarding the upcoming election, this may manifest itself through the dissemination of narratives, smear campaigns against candidates or strategically timed leaks designed to appear as if they originated domestically. Given Russia’s doctrine of targeting states it perceives as strategically important within NATO, Norway’s geopolitical role makes it a logical candidate for influence campaigns. Norway is effectively NATO’s ‘eyes and ears’ in the North (Friis, 2018). With the shift from an unproblematic neighbouring relationship to the perception of Norway being an unfriendly country, the likelihood of the latter being a target is increasing (Eggen, 2022). Russia has already executed other attempts at sabotage in Norway. However, these have been more conventional, such as attacks on gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea in 2022 or GPS jamming targeting air traffic (Eggen, 2024). In 2020, a cyberattack targeted the Norwegian parliament, compromising the email accounts of several employees. This was publicly attributed to Russia by the Norwegian government and highlighted as a threat to democracy (Reuters, 2020). Nevertheless, in this light, and considering the emphasised risks as stated by Norwegian intelligence services, the risk of Russia adapting its strategies to target the information environment preceding the election directly is not to be dismissed.

Based on recent studies, it is clear that Russia’s increasing use of hybrid and information operations seeks to undermine democratic resilience over time and embed new narratives into European public discourse. These interference strategies are becoming increasingly sophisticated making them more challenging to detect and counter. Norway, where openness and trust form core parts of national identity, is therefore particularly vulnerable to such campaigns. With national elections approaching and considering the broader pattern of election interference across Europe, the Norwegian authorities must remain vigilant and proactive in safeguarding democratic institutions, protecting public discourse, and preventing attempts to sow distrust and polarisation.

Bibliography

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