From Paradise with Jihad

Maldivian foreign fighters and challenges for national security

Ever since the first reported case of Maldivians attempting to travel to Syria in October 2013, the Maldives has experienced a steady outflow of radicalized citizens heading towards the Middle Eastern battlegrounds of global Jihad. Estimates suggest that one out of every 1.500 Maldivians has sought to join insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq, a figure that positions the Maldives as the country with the highest rate of foreign fighters (FFs) per capita in the world (Counter Extremism Project 2020). Official sources indicate that, of the approximately 380.000 Maldivian citizens, at least 423 have attempted to reach the Middle East, with 173 documented cases of Maldivian FFs successfully reaching their final destination (EFSAS 2020). This opinion piece proposes a detailed overview of the phenomenon and assesses the principal threats that returning FFs pose to the security of local residents and foreign tourists.

Key traits of Maldivian foreign fighters

Although there is no such thing as a ‘typical’ FF, the Maldivian batch displays several key characteristics. Maldivian FFs are mostly young men in their mid-to-late twenties, with a smaller pool aged 30 and above fighting under the banners of Jihadi groups across the Middle East (Rilwan 2014). While it is not uncommon for FFs to leave their countries in small groups of friends and relatives, kinship ties play a role of primary importance for the collective mobilization of Maldivian kinsmen. Evidence shows that the decision to become FFs is often taken by individuals belonging to the same social group, with reported cases of relatives travelling together to Syria and bringing along their mothers, sisters, wives and children (Swami 2014; Burke 2015a). This pattern of collective mobilization finds its origins in the anthropological configuration of the Maldivian society, organized in tight-knit groups typical of small and isolated atolls.

The mobilization of FFs from across different Maldivian islands is an indicator of the pervasive presence of radicalizing actors operating within the archipelago (Sultana 2015: 26). Considering that the population is almost entirely Sunni Muslim (around 99 per cent), Jihadi recruiters can potentially find in any Maldivian island a small group of disenfranchised young men vulnerable to radicalizing material (RISSC 2010). The recruitment of FFs occurs especially within prisons, as the lack of segregation of inmates in overcrowded jails favors the spread of Jihadi ideology. Imprisoned gang leaders are the preferred targets of Jihadi recruiters, as once released they are likely to encourage their subordinates to follow them into Syria and Iraq (Burke 2015b: 265).  Other data is less conclusive. The violent mobilization of Maldivian citizens cuts across social class, level of education, and occupation, suggesting that the grievances triggering the radicalization of Maldivian FFs rest on deeper socio-cultural dynamics and find common roots in the widespread dissatisfaction towards the state and its institutions (Zelin 2015).

From the Maldives to the Middle East: Pathways to Global Jihad.

According to an obituary published by a Jihadi website for a Maldivian FF killed in action, the trip from the Maldives to the Middle East can be a long tiring journey (Rilwan 2014). Yet, it can often be a surprisingly fast one. Maldivian FFs have been reportedly arrested in Turkey just two days after leaving the Maldives (Wadhwaney 2016). Based on the available data, the journey of a Maldivian FF can be broken down into three phases.

Phase 1: Leaving the Maldives

The journey of a Maldivian FF starts from the capital Malé. Here, recruits exit the country via the international airport (Roul 2014: 18). The relative ease with which Maldivian FFs obtain a passport and successfully travel abroad is striking. In certain cases, individuals even managed to take direct flights to Turkey and disappear from the radars without raising suspicions (Al Jazeera 2019). The ineffectiveness of the Maldivian security apparatus has two plausible explanations. On the one hand, sending Maldivian FFs to the Middle East might be the deliberate choice of a government seeking to get rid of its most dangerous citizens, following a line of action already tested by other countries facing the threat of homegrown Jihadism (Chatham House 2015: 18). On the other hand, experts suggest that several government officials might actually share the Jihadi ideology and thus facilitate the outflow of FFs: ‘everyone wonders why Jihadists aren’t stopped at the airport…Partly, the government wants to avoid a clash, but to some extent it actually shares certain ideas’ (Borri 2017).

Phase 2: Reaching Turkey

Once out of the Maldives, the majority of Maldivian FFs aims at reaching Istanbul, from where local Jihadi networks will help them crossing the Turkish border into Syria and Iraq. The majority of Maldivian FFs start their journey in Sri Lanka, Malaya, or Singapore. From there, new recruits make their way into India, where Jihadi organizations have long established a dense network of logistical hubs. Most of those who travel via Sri Lanka head towards the city of Kerala, in Southern India. Sources report the presence of several full-time Maldivian Jihadists in charge of arranging the fastest and most secure way for new FFs (Haindava 2015). From India, Maldivian FFs travel via airplane to Istanbul or to other transit countries. Maldivian FFs have been detected in airports across Qatar, whereas others exploit the Jihadi networks operating in Pakistan to make it into Turkey (Zaidi 2016; Dharmawardhane 2015: 63).

Phase 3: Crossing into Syria and Iraq

Once in Istanbul, Maldivian FFs are particularly vulnerable to being identified and stopped by the Turkish security forces. Media outlets have often reported cases of Maldivians intercepted just before crossing the border into Syria, often captured in joint operations with the Maldives Police Service (Shaany 2013). Those who successfully cross the border, however, are met by Jihadi screeners and taken to training camps before being sent into battle (Thorat 2018).

Assessing the threat of returning foreign fighters to the Maldives

With the Islamic State (IS) having lost most of its territories, many FFs have opted for returning to their home countries. Maldivian FFs are no exception. Although the government has taken concrete steps to keep returning FFs out of the Maldives, the presence of even a small group of battle-hardened veterans poses a top-priority national security threat. Maldivian FFs return to a country in which many residents consider Jihadi fighters as their ‘heroes’ (Visham 2016; Borri 2017). In 2017, the local Commissioner of Police confirmed the presence of around 1.400 Maldivians across the country who have fallen into extremist ideology to the point they would not hesitate to take the life of the person next to them. As for today, the lack of a defined leadership precludes the Maldivian Jihadists from setting up an organized resistance movement. However, the presence of a committed cadre of indigenous Jihadists experienced in guerrilla warfare and enjoying widespread popular support could rapidly change the situation. Considering that the government has little experience dealing with grassroots insurgencies, Maldivian FFs would find favorable conditions for waging a protracted campaign of guerilla warfare.

The return of Maldivian FFs poses noticeable security threats to both residents and tourists. Although private travel agencies downplay the threat posed by local Jihadists, Western governments have raised the risk levels for citizens travelling to the Maldives, with the U.S. Government warning that terrorist attacks could be indiscriminate, including in places visited by foreigners and the Canadian Government underscoring that assaults against foreigners could occur at any time. These concerns find confirmation in the trail of (attempted) terrorist attacks carried out by Maldivian Jihadists in recent years, of which the stabbing of three tourists in February 2020 constitutes only the latest episode (Taylor & Safi 2020). Considering that the majority of the resorts are placed in isolated atolls with little to no protection, the threat posed by Islamic radicals to the security of foreigners is substantial. Additionally, many returning FFs have lost friends and relatives during Western-led military operations in Syria and Iraq and are likely to bring their anti-Western sentiments back home. As remarked by the U.S. Department of State, returning FFs might consider isolated resorts populated by American tourists as tempting targets for terrorist attacks (U.S. Gov. 2019). The threat that returning FFs and local Jihadists pose to tourists is significant, and American citizens should exercise extreme caution when travelling to and through the region.

Conclusion

In the Maldives, deep-rooted grievances incentivize young men to embrace the path of Jihad and join insurgent groups across the Middle East. Maldivian FFs embark in a long and dangerous journey to reach their destination, often transiting through Sri Lanka, Malaya India, Qatar, Pakistan and other countries before reaching Turkey and crossing into Syria and Iraq. The return of battle-hardened FFs poses significant security threats to the Maldives. Returning Maldivian FFs have acquired abroad the skills necessary to coordinate local Jihadi networks and potentially organize a grassroots rebellion. Because returning Maldivian FFs might be particularly interested in launching terrorist attacks against places visited by Western tourists, the threats posed to American citizens are significant and should not be underestimated.

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