From Intelligence Collection to International Security: The Strategic Value of GEOINT in Monitoring Dual-Use Infrastructure

Geospatial intelligence transforms the monitoring of infrastructure, revealing how civilian facilities can be rapidly repurposed for military use, but does this shift global security in unpredictable ways?

Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) has become one of the most decisive tools for modern intelligence collection. Defined as the exploitation and analysis of imagery, geospatial information, and associated data (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency [NGA], 2021), GEOINT provides a systematic way to monitor infrastructure that can serve both civilian and military purposes, the so-called dual-use infrastructure. Airports, ports, pipelines, energy facilities, and telecommunications hubs are routinely built for commercial needs but can be rapidly adapted for strategic or military operations (Laird, 2017).

The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent military buildup exemplify this dynamic. Civilian airports, ports, and transport networks in Crimea were transformed into military hubs, a shift exposed primarily through GEOINT analysis. This case highlights the quantitative and strategic value of GEOINT in international security, as satellite imagery and open-source intelligence provided early warnings of escalation years before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine (Kofman & Lee, 2022).

The Strategic Importance of GEOINT

The global space environment has transformed GEOINT into a data-rich discipline. As of 2023, there were more than 7,560 operational satellites, including 5,184 from the United States, 628 from China, and 181 from Russia (Union of Concerned Scientists [UCS], 2023). The Times of India (2025) reported that by mid-2025, the total number of satellites in orbit exceeded 12,900, with the United States operating 8,530, reflecting the dominance of U.S. commercial and military operators.

This orbital expansion has been paralleled by market growth. The global geospatial solutions market was valued at USD 626 billion in 2024 and is forecast to surpass USD 2.1 trillion by 2034 (Precedence Research, 2024). Similarly, the geospatial analytics market is expected to grow from USD 89.81 billion in 2024 to USD 258.06 billion by 2032 (Fortune Business Insights, 2024). According to Geospatial World (2022), the entire geospatial industry stood at USD 452 billion in 2022 and is projected to reach USD 1.44 trillion by 2030.

For intelligence agencies, this reflects both an opportunity and a challenge. The U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s budget is estimated at USD 5–6 billion annually (Best, 2011), but private-sector GEOINT providers such as Planet Labs and Maxar now offer near-daily global coverage. This democratization of intelligence means dual-use infrastructures are subject to continuous surveillance, reducing the space for secrecy or strategic deception.

Case Study: Crimea – Civil Infrastructure Transformed for Military Use

Crimea offers a textbook case of dual-use infrastructure and GEOINT’s ability to quantify its transformation. After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, ostensibly civilian airports such as Simferopol and Belbek were militarized. Commercial imagery revealed runway extensions, hardened aircraft shelters, and increased deployment of combat aircraft. The number of Russian aircraft observed at Crimean airfields rose from roughly 20 in 2014 to over 200 by late 2021 (Bellingcat, 2021).

Ports followed a similar pattern. Sevastopol, a historically commercial and naval port, was upgraded to support Black Sea Fleet operations, with GEOINT confirming submarine activity and naval exercises inconsistent with civilian use (ISW, 2021). Transport infrastructure also played a dual role: civilian railways and highways were used to deliver both tourists and heavy armor.

By late 2021, open-source GEOINT identified more than 100,000 Russian troops stationed around Crimea and eastern Ukraine, supported by imagery of tank convoys, helicopter deployments, and artillery staging areas (Kofman & Lee, 2022). Planet Labs’ daily revisits and Maxar’s sub-meter imagery allowed analysts to detect movements in near-real time. This evidence was published in dozens of open-source reports months before the February 2022 invasion, demonstrating GEOINT’s predictive capacity.

Quantitative Trends in GEOINT and Dual-Use Infrastructure

The Crimean case reflects a global trend: infrastructures are increasingly evaluated for their latent military potential. Between 2020 and 2023, the United States conducted more than 100 orbital launches, China more than 90, and Europe over 30 (Statista, 2023). The rise of private satellite constellations further reduced revisit times, in some cases to multiple passes per day.

Defense investments also reveal GEOINT’s growing weight. NATO increased its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) spending by 20% between 2014 and 2021 (NATO, 2021). Commercial GEOINT firms reported a 40% increase in demand in 2022, fueled largely by global monitoring of Ukraine (Payload, 2022).

The quantitative indicators are clear: the geospatial domain is expanding rapidly, and the ability to monitor dual-use infrastructures is no longer the monopoly of states but a shared capability across governments, corporations, and non-governmental actors.

International Security Implications

The strategic implications are profound. GEOINT has eroded the traditional advantage of concealment. Russia’s buildup in Crimea was documented in near real time, allowing NATO and allies to prepare diplomatically and militarily. NATO, for example, reported a tripling of GEOINT data sharing within the alliance after 2014, reflecting a new emphasis on transparency and collaboration (NATO, 2021).

At the same time, commercial GEOINT raises new dilemmas. While it provides resilience and redundancy, it also means adversaries can access the same imagery. Thus, while NATO leveraged commercial GEOINT for early warning, Russia and other states have also turned to commercial providers to track Western deployments (Weiss & Pomerleau, 2022).

Policy responses mirror these dynamics. The European Union invested €5.4 billion in the Copernicus Earth observation program (2021–2027) to enhance resilience (European Commission, 2021). Meanwhile, the United States increased NGA funding and formalized partnerships with private providers. Russia and China, aware of their lag in commercial GEOINT, accelerated state-backed satellite programs to narrow the gap (Brown, 2020).

The monitoring of dual-use infrastructure is now central to international security. GEOINT provides the ability to quantify infrastructural transformations and assess their security implications with unprecedented clarity. Crimea illustrates this vividly: civilian airports, ports, and rail lines were repurposed into military hubs, a shift documented by satellites and confirmed by quantitative analysis.

The expansion of satellites, the exponential growth of the GEOINT market, and the surge in open-source analysis all point to a future where dual-use infrastructures can rarely escape scrutiny. In international security, every pipeline, port, and runway is a potential flashpoint, and GEOINT is the critical tool that allows the world to see them for what they are.

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