From Exploration to Escalation: the Challenges of Space Weaponisation

Space is becoming a critical theatre of geopolitical rivalry and preserving its sustainability is a pressing international priority.

Space, once viewed primarily as a domain for scientific discovery and exploration, is increasingly becoming a theatre of military competition. The ‘weaponisation’ of space, defined as the use of military assets beyond Earth’s atmosphere, is no longer a speculative threat. From anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons to satellite jamming, major powers are racing to dominate the ultimate high ground, intensifying risks of global escalation.

Space as a Strategic Domain

Space has transitioned from a passive environment for surveillance and communication to a contested strategic domain. Satellites now underpin modern military infrastructure, including navigation, early warning, intelligence gathering and secure communications. As reliance on space-based assets has grown, so too has interest in defending, and potentially disrupting, them.

The United States, Russia, China and India have all tested ASAT capabilities. In 2019, India’s ‘Mission Shakti’ destroyed a satellite in low-Earth orbit (LEO), marking its entry into the group of space-capable military states (Chow, 2019). Meanwhile, the US Space Force, launched in 2019, institutionalises the concept of space as a warfighting domain.

Emerging Technologies

The distinction between civilian and military space technologies is increasingly blurred. Emerging technologies such as space-based lasers, co-orbital satellites capable of close-proximity operations and cyber-attacks on satellite systems represent new frontiers in space militarisation (Weeden and Samson, 2022). Russia’s suspected deployment of a ‘space stalker’ satellite near a US reconnaissance satellite in 2020 raised alarms about orbital espionage and sabotage (CSIS, 2023). These activities highlight the dual-use nature of space technologies and the inadequacy of current legal frameworks to address these issues.

Institutional Gaps

The existing legal regime, anchored in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit. However, it remains silent on conventional weapons, dual-use systems and non-kinetic attacks such as jamming and cyber intrusion. Furthermore, there is no enforcement mechanism for regulating space conduct. Institutions such as the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) lack binding authority. Efforts like the proposed Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT), led by China and Russia, have stalled amid geopolitical mistrust.

International Rivalry

Space is now fully integrated into national military doctrines. The US Space Force prioritises ‘space superiority’ as essential to modern deterrence while China’s People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force coordinates space, cyber and electronic warfare operations. Indeed, the risk of escalation is increasing, with a kinetic strike on a satellite able to generate debris clouds capable of damaging other orbital assets, a scenario known as the ‘Kessler Syndrome’ (Kessler and Cour-Palais, 1978). This cascading effect could render parts of space unusable for decades, threatening the global satellite infrastructure.

Deterrence or Destabilisation?

While some argue that space weaponisation deters hostile action, others warn of a destabilising arms race. Unlike nuclear deterrence, space deterrence lacks a well-defined strategic balance. The rapid entry of private actors and dual-use commercial technologies exacerbates this uncertainty. Moreover, low- and middle-income countries increasingly depend on shared satellite services for navigation, communication and development. A space conflict would disproportionately impact these countries, which often lack representation in governance frameworks.

Importantly, the militarisation of space is no longer a hypothetical threat. From kinetic ASAT weapons to satellite-targeting cyberattacks, countries are preparing to project force beyond Earth. Yet the legal and institutional framework remains outdated and insufficient for addressing these realities. International treaties must be updated to address conventional and non-kinetic weapons in space. Effective verification and enforcement mechanisms should be established through multilateral institutions to ensure compliance. Transparency and communication between spacefaring countries must be improved to reduce the risks of miscalculation and accidental escalation. Emerging spacefaring and reliant countries must be included in norm-setting processes to ensure a more inclusive and equitable governance structure. Indeed, as space becomes a critical theatre of geopolitical rivalry, preserving its sustainability and peaceful use is a pressing international priority.

Bibliography

Chow, D. (2019). India’s ASAT test: Space weaponisation and deterrence. Journal of Strategic Studies, 42(6), pp.749–763.

Weeden, B. and Samson, V. (2022). Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment. Secure World Foundation.

CSIS. (2023). Space Threat Assessment 2023. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Available at: https://aerospace.csis.org

Kessler, D.J. and Cour-Palais, B.G. (1978). Collision frequency of artificial satellites: The creation of a debris belt. Journal of Geophysical Research, 83(A6), pp.2637–2646.

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) (2023). Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space.