El Salvador’s Security Crackdown: Model or Mirage?

El Salvador’s President, Nayib Bukele, has reduced the rate of crime across the country but democracy has seemingly fallen too.

From Murder Capital to Model State?

El Salvador has a long history of gang violence primarily attributed to MS-13 and Barrio 18. In 2015, the country was classified as the most violent in the world (Claesson and Alizadeh, 2024). The homicide rate at the time was of 103 per 100,000 inhabitants (Figure 1). However, this statistic began to decrease gradually after its peak in 2015. By the time President Nayib Bukele assumed office in 2019, it had fallen to its lowest point in 20 years.

Under the Bukele administration, the decline has accelerated, attributed to the president’s security plan initially called the Territorial Control Plan (PCT) (InSight Crime, 2023). According to the data, 2022 ended as the safest year in Salvadoran history, while 2023 was reported as the safest year since the end of the Salvadoran Civil War in 1992.

A key measure implemented by Bukele to address gang violence was the state of emergency, initially declared for 30 days on 27 March 2022, following a brutal weekend of gang violence (Wolf, 2024). This state of emergency expanded law enforcement powers and resulted in the arrest of over 73,000 suspected gang members (Kurylo, 2024). Research by Paradela-López and Ánton (2025) suggests that Bukele’s policies, specifically the PCT and the state of emergency, were directly responsible or a significant reduction in the annual homicide rate, accounting for almost 90 per cent of the decrease between the launch of the PCT and July 2024.

The Price of Peace: Democracy in Decline

However, despite this success in reducing the rate of homicides in the country, democratic backsliding in El Salvador has seemingly fallen under President Bukele too. This has involved the dismantling of constitutional checks on executive power and the undermining of the democratic apparatus (Broner, 2023). Bukele has demonstrated disregard for the separation of powers, including entering the legislature with armed forces (Hallock, Call, 2021), and replacing judges and the attorney-general with loyalists (Nilsson, 2022). Additionally, democratic rights and civil liberties have decreased (Gellman, 2022), with a frequently extended state of emergency, the suspension of constitutional rights and the permitting of arbitrary arrests (Kurylo, 2025). Furthermore, civil society is often excluded from policymaking and decision-making (Nilsson, 2022) while media independence is being attacked through the restriction of media access and the discrediting of media criticism (Wolf, 2024).

Bukele’s re-election in 2024, following the constitutional court’s decision in 2021 – which is dominated by his supporters – to allow the president to stand again despite it previously being against the constitution to do so, also increasingly points to a populist authoritarian regime (Broner, 2023).

Alongside this, El Salvador’s current lack of institutional transparency is a significant issue particularly during states of emergency when public information is withheld. Modifications to freedom of information laws have weakened them and authorities block access to public records by declaring information reserved or non-existent (Wolf, 2024). This lack of transparency helps limit the scrutiny of corruption (Kurylo, 2024), facilitates opaque spending (Labrador, 2023), masks an intention to increase political and economic influence for the associated elite and signifies the removal of safeguards against corruption.

The Regional Appeal of the Bukele Model

Nevertheless, the ‘Bukele Method’ in El Salvador has presented a model that other crime-ridden states in Latin America are looking to adapt. The core principle of this method is a distinctive mano dura (strong hand) practice that claims to solve insecurity and justifies the subversion of the democratic apparatus (InSight Crime, 2023). The apparent success in cracking down on gangs and the resulting decrease in homicides (Paradela-López and Antón, 2025) has created unprecedented appeal for this approach across the region. Leaders in countries facing persistent criminal violence, such as Honduras, Ecuador and Chile, are drawn to Bukele’s strategies, hoping to replicate his popularity and security achievements and appear tough on crime (Kurylo, 2025).

Enhanced security in the country under Bukele’s policies has had some positive effects on the economy particularly for domestic activity. The crackdown has created a more safe environment for business activity. This has led to an upswing in tourism, construction and the retail sector (Claesson, and Alizadeh, 2024) with increased investments from domestic companies. This safer environment can boost investor confidence and encourage business activity in certain sectors too.

Sanctions, Displacement and International Fallout

However, there is the significant threat of international isolation for El Salvador. Bukele’s authoritarian practices, and accompanying human rights violations, have drawn criticism from the international community (Paradela-López and Antón, 2025). Indeed, the shift from democracy to authoritarianism could have major implications for the country’s international relations. Specifically, the European Union could withhold foreign aid, discourage foreign investment and impose sanctions or other punitive diplomatic action against El Salvador. While some countries like China are increasing their influence in the country (Wolf, 2024), relations with traditional democratic allies have become strained due to concerns about democratic backsliding.

Widespread allegations of human rights abuses during the ongoing state of emergency, such as arbitrary arrests, ill treatment in detention and extrajudicial executions (Kurylo, 2025), directly contributes to the risk of damaged relationships with multilateral donors and democratic allies who often link aid to human rights standards and democratic norms (Gellman, 2022).

Moreover, despite the sharp decline in homicide rates under the present administration, internal displacement driven by violence remains high (Figure 2). Displacement surged in 2019 and peaked in 2021 and 2022, revealing a paradox in the government’s security narrative. The figures suggest that repression, disappearances and non-lethal forms of violence may persist under the surface. The continued flow of internally displaced persons undermines the perception of total security across the country while also highlighting the social costs of the ‘Bukele Method’ especially for vulnerable communities. If left unaddressed, this displacement crisis could erode domestic legitimacy, invite further international scrutiny and hinder sustainable peace in the country in the long term.

Bibliography

Broner, T.T. (2023). Countering El Salvador’s Democratic Backsliding. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/21/countering-el-salvadors-democratic-backsliding.

Claesson, J. and Alizadeh, M. (2024). How Democratic Backsliding Impacts Security and Development in El Salvador. [online] DIVA. Available at: https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1830335&dswid=-8294.

Gellman, M. (2022). The Democracy Crisis in El Salvador: An Overview (2019–22). Columbia University’s Center for Mexico and Central America’s Regional Expert Paper Series, 4.

Hallock, J.T. and Call, C.T. (2021). The Biopolitical president?: Sovereign Power and Democratic Erosion in El Salvador. Democratization, 28(8), pp.1583–1601. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1949295.

InSight Crime (2023). El Salvador’s (Perpetual) State of Emergency: How Bukele’s Government Overpowered Gangs. [online] Available at: https://insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/El-SalvadorsPerpetual-State-of-Emergency-How-Bukeles-Government-Overpowered-Gangs-InSight-Crime-Nov-2023.pdf.

Kurylo, B. (2024). Corrupción en El Salvador: el doble juego de Bukele. Nueva sociedad, (310), 4-15.

Kurylo, B. (2025). The Flawed Appeal of the Bukele Method in the Americas. Conflict Security and Development, 25(2), pp.1–41. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2025.2464604.

Labrador, G. (2023). Nueva Ley De Compras Habilita Gasto Discrecional De Más De $1,500 Millones En Megaobras. [online] @_elfaro_. Available at: https://elfaro.net/es/202301/el_salvador/26686/Nueva-ley-de-compras-habilita-gasto-discrecional-de-m%25C3%25A1s-de-.

Nilsson, M. (2022). Nayib Bukele: Populism and autocratization, or a Very Popular Democratically Elected president? Journal of Geography, Politics and Society, [online] 12(2), pp.16–26. doi:https://doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2022.2.03.

Paradela-López, M. and Antón, J.-I. (2025). Has the iron fist against criminal gangs really worked in El Salvador? Defence and Peace Economics, pp.1–16. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2025.2460457.

Wolf, S. (2024). El Salvador under Nayib Bukele: the Turn to Electoral Authoritarianism. Revista de ciencia política (Santiago), 44(2). doi:https://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-090×2024005000122.