Drones and Diplomacy: Nordic Divides in Responding to Hybrid Threats
At the end of September 2025, multiple airports across the Nordic region were forced to close after a series of unexplained drone sightings. Copenhagen Airport (Kastrup) halted flights for four hours on 22 September following reports of two to three drones in its airspace (Jacobsen, 2025). Less than 24 hours later, Oslo Airport temporarily shut down after a suspected drone sighting (Jacobsen, 2025). Possible sightings were also reported at two other Norwegian airports and an oil platform in the weeks following (NRK, 2025a). Despite the similarity of the incidents, Danish and Norwegian authorities responded in markedly different ways. Their contrasting reactions illuminate two philosophies in managing hybrid threats, one favouring rapid attribution and deterrence, the other prioritising caution and stability. Danish officials swiftly linked the sightings to Russian hybrid activity, while Norwegian authorities remained cautious, avoiding direct attribution. This article examines what these contrasting responses reveal about each country’s approach to managing hybrid threats and the political risks associated with acting under uncertainty.
Hybrid threats can be defined as “non-military practices for the mostly covert manipulation of other states’ strategic interests” (Bergaust and Sellevåg, 2024). To name a few, these threats can be actions such as sabotage, disinformation campaigns, cyber operations and economic pressure (NATO, 2024). As actors become more technologically sophisticated and adaptive, hybrid tactics evolve, yet their goal remains constant: to disrupt daily life and erode public trust (Schuurman and Leiden University, 2024).
Danish responses and alliance engagement
Denmark’s response to the drone sightings sends firm signals to the executing actor, as they quickly labelled the incidents a hybrid activity and attributed them to a state actor, with multiple people pointing at Russia as the most likely aggressor (Kjell Persen, 2025). Although a spokesperson denied the allegations, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen called on NATO to intensify its response ( NRK, 2025b; Foy and Milne, 2025). Danish intelligence also reported Russian warships having sailed on collision courses with Danish naval vessels in the straits of Denmark (Reuters, 2025). These have reportedly disrupted navigation systems and aimed weapons at air force helicopters. The developments have led to the country’s intelligence service affirming that Russia is conducting hybrid warfare against Denmark (Reuters, 2025). The violations of Nordic airspace have happened in a context where NATO fighter jets recently shot down Russian drones over Poland, which signifies an escalation in Russia’s “unconventional war on Europe”(Charlie Edwards, 2025). It is clear that the developments have prompted the need for a stronger response within the NATO alliance, and more broadly in Europe. MEPs at the European Parliament are calling for a unified response to the hybrid activities (Call for a unified EU response to Russian violations and hybrid warfare threats | News | European Parliament, 2025). While Denmark’s approach reinforces deterrence through attribution and alliance alignment, Norway’s response highlights a different strategic logic rooted in caution and de-escalation. This framing allows Denmark to project deterrence through attribution, turning uncertainty into a rallying point for allied cohesion.
Norwegian restraint
Norway’s handling of the drone incidents reflects a contrasting philosophy of restraint. It has still not been officially verified whether the sightings on September 23rd were drones, and the Police Security Services (PST) have not attributed any of the incidents to any state actors as of October 10th, 2025 (NRK, 2025a). Traditionally, Norway has remained cautious when it comes to attributing incidents reminiscent of hybrid activity to Russia. Russian research vessels moving questionably, trawlers keeping radio equipment on board, and the disruption of cables between the Norwegian mainland and Svalbard are all examples of incidents where evidence points to Russian hybrid activity (Østhagen, 2025). While the media hypothesises about Russia’s involvement, there is little public attribution from the government. In 2018, Bowers claimed that Norway had refrained from revealing the extent to which it perceived Russia as a threat, further exemplifying how the country attempts to avoid attribution (2018, 5). With the recent drone sightings, the country’s approach remains the same. The Norwegian Minister of Defence stated in response to the incidents that “Norway is not under attack” but reaffirmed the country’s capability to shoot down drones if need be (Vemund Sveen Finstad, 2025).
The country’s cautious stance must be considered in relation to its geographical proximity to and long-standing relationship with Russia (Berdal and von Hlatky, 2022). This shapes the Norwegian response, as avoiding strong attribution maintains regional stability and prevents escalation. Hybrid threats are challenging to attribute because they often exist in a grey zone where they may be concealed as harmless activity. This was highlighted in the previous paragraph. Yet excessive caution risks normalising hybrid interference and encouraging further provocation (Frantzen, 2020), thereby placing the Norwegian authorities in the middle of a strategic dilemma. To complicate the issue, Oslo also needs to align itself with its allies, as NATO remains its most important aspect of deterrence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Utenriksdepartementet), 2023). Therefore, when Copenhagen calls for a strengthened allied response, which fundamentally opposes Oslo’s traditional approach, Norway’s communication dilemma intensifies. This balancing act underscores the political risk embedded in attribution decisions. Every statement or silence carries strategic weight in shaping Norway’s security posture.
Conclusion
The Danish and Norwegian responses to the September drone incidents illustrate two distinct approaches to managing hybrid threats amid uncertainty. Denmark’s assertiveness contrasts with Norway’s restraint, each reflecting a calculated balance between deterrence and stability. Together, they underscore the complexity of responding to grey-zone activity in a region where escalation risks are high. As hybrid tactics evolve and Russia grows bolder, the politics of attribution will remain a defining feature of Nordic and European security policy.
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