Delivering the Blow: Deep Precision Strikes for Europe
The recent trend of long range weaponry and how we should understand why deep-strike matters, what it entails, and how Europe should build it.
Strikes beyond the frontline, critical infrastructure damaged, supply chains disrupted… Not a week goes by without news of the latest exploits of long range weaponry: Israeli strikes on Doha, the unveiling of Ukraine’s Flamingo missile, Russian missile attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, far from the contact zone.
Besides unmanned systems, Deep Precision Strikes (DPS) have become the latest symbol of modern warfare. As observed in Ukraine, the inability of each side to break through the enemy’s defenses and to secure a decisive edge against the enemy in the drone war, led them to seek alternative solutions. Eliminating high-value targets and disrupting enemy supply chains by attacking ammo dumps, roads and railways, or concentrations of officers and commanders, is a way to gain a significant advantage on the battlefield. Few weapons systems allow for such precision, but those that do are becoming more commonplace, and are now at the forefront of a very modern arms race.
Defense Alone is Not Enough
Holding ground or protecting supply lines matters, but it will not by itself win a high-intensity war. To impose effects in depth you must be able to deliver strikes that destroy or neutralize high-value targets and to do that you must first be able to defeat the opponent’s air and missile defenses.
Those defenses come in many forms and layers. “AD” usually denotes short-to-medium range air defense; “IAMD” refers to integrated air and missile defense that links sensors and shooters across ranges and domains; “A2/AD” (anti-access/area denial) describes a posture that makes it costly for an opponent to operate in a zone; and “BMD” is ballistic-missile defense. Each one has been designed to deny airspace at different ranges and altitudes. Short-range, high-rate systems also matter: Germany’s Gepard anti-aircraft guns and modernized short-range missiles have been critical in countering loitering munitions and mass drone attacks in Ukraine.
This explains the importance of such capabilities in the context of the European Defense white paper, Readiness 2030, which identifies it among the seven Critical Defense Capability Areas. Deterrence and the ability to project effects beyond the immediate front are central to the paper’s diagnosis of Europe’s current security needs.
What Matters at Depth: Targets and Effects
“Deep-strike” is not a metonym for “long-range”, it is a concept in itself: the ability to reach targets whose destruction reshapes the adversary’s operational calculus. Those targets are typically command-and-control centers, reinforcement staging areas, logistics depots and stockpiles, dual-use infrastructure (power grids, rail hubs, shipyards), weapons production facilities or terrorist sanctuaries. Taken together, hits in depth can paralyze movement, slow reinforcement, and produce political effects beyond the battlefield.
In the context of the war in Ukraine, EU Commissioner for Defense and Space Andrius Kubilius has pushed for Europe to give greater DPS support to Ukraine. “Sometimes we only think about how to defend ourselves from provocations, but Ukraine is now waging a real war and is capable of returning that war onto Russian territory using deep-strike capabilities. In my view, we could now do much more to support Ukraine’s capabilities in this area. If Putin does not want to stop the war, we need the war to move onto Russian territory. Ukraine is doing this work very effectively, reducing oil production in Russia,” he said. His argument underlines the will for political effect provided by DPS.
Recent examples have proven the effectiveness of this as mentioned by Kubilius. Ukrainian long-range strikes and large drone raids have hit depots, energy facilities and transport nodes inside Russia and occupied Crimea; Russia’s counter-campaign has struck Ukrainian energy and railway infrastructure aimed at undermining resilience before winter. The September 2025 Doha strike by Israel also shows the political potency of DPS.
Available Solutions
Public debate often treats “drones,” “cruise missiles,” and “ballistic missiles” as interchangeable terms, when in reality they are complementary tools within a broader strike ecosystem. Each brings different trade-offs in cost, precision, survivability, and political risk, and an efficient strategy relies on a consistent effects/effectors assignment throughout the campaigns.
Regarding drones, their limited range, payload and vulnerability make them ill-suited to penetrate heavily fortified high-value targets; hitting those objectives instead calls for weapons that deliver the required effects while minimizing munition expenditure. Ballistic and hypersonic weapons have a decisive role to play, but conventional ballistic missiles are often vulnerable to interception, as demonstrated during the 12 days war between Iran and Israel. Unless they use ICBM-level countermeasures such as maneuvering re-entry vehicles or multiple warheads—solutions that are very expensive and therefore reserved for strategic targets, the same constraint that currently limits wide deployment of advanced hypersonic glide vehicles.
Heavy cruise missiles and ground-launched strike systems remain the backbone of DPS: they fly low, can perform aggressive terminal maneuvers and—on newer designs—incorporate stealth features, benefits that grow when paired with very high speeds. Planners can therefore mix and match capabilities to create attack profiles that force defenders into difficult trade-offs, especially when strikes are synchronized across land, air and sea domains, as frequently observed in recent conflicts. They are designed to deliver substantial warheads with high accuracy against hardened or high-value targets.
The FP-5 “Flamingo” missile, a domestically produced long-range cruise missile, underscores Ukraine’s drive to multiply indigenous options, even as allied long-range supplies and political decisions shape how that arsenal is actually used. Kyiv continues to push for Western systems such as Tomahawk missiles while also receiving fresh deliveries of European cruise weapons like Storm Shadow/SCALP to sustain long-range operations. The example of the Tomahawks that the United States might have supplied, but only under very restrictive conditions, is a clear reminder that it is useless for a country to possess a full range of strike capabilities if it is not free to use them in ways that might displease its foreign provider.
Because of that, European countries with the most advanced defense industries have launched ELSA (European Long-range Strike Approach) a multilateral initiative to identify the best sovereign solutions and avoid buying off-the-shelf systems. Among the projects underway, the Land Cruise Missile (a 1,000+ km range candidate for a European Tomahawk) could be operational as early as 2028, while others are being developed with the late 2030s in mind.
Conclusion: A Window for Europe
As Europe sets out to address its capability shortfalls, having identified DPS as a priority, two realities must be taken into account.
First, policymakers must accept that high-intensity war cannot be won with defensive systems only. A “Drone Wall” must be matched by robust offensive forces or it will simply turn into a modern Maginot Line, with similar strategic effects. Second, decision chains and sufficient technological maturity to meet urgent needs should be prioritized.
For Europe, the strategic question is simple: do we want the capacity to strike where it matters on our terms, and will we back that choice with industrial policy, joint procurement and the political will to deploy it? If the answer is yes, then the next step is pragmatic: pick the capability mixes that maximize effect per round, build production lines that secure supply in crisis, and retain sovereign decision-making over use. The best system is seldom the most spectacular. Political impetus is paramount if the strategic effects are to be felt.
