Challenges and Obstacles Facing the US Military in the Iran War
The United States and Israel launched a joint military operation on 28 February, 2026, designated “Epic Fury”, targeting a wide array of Iranian military infrastructure and eliminating several senior military commanders as well as high-ranking political figures. The Trump administration, relying on an optimistic assessment of the campaign’s trajectory, characterised the conflict as a “short-term excursion”, and two weeks into the operation stated that the war was “going to be finished pretty quickly.”
Yet, nearly 90 days after the onset of hostilities, the joint US–Israeli forces failed to achieve any of its major strategic objectives vis-à-vis Iran. The political system in Tehran remains intact, Iran’s missile capabilities and uranium-enrichment infrastructure continue to function, and its network of regional proxy relationships has not experienced any significant disruption. These developments indicate a substantial gap between the strategic objectives articulated by the United States and the operational realities unfolding on the battlefield.
This discrepancy is not the result of a single tactical miscalculation but rather stems from a constellation of structural constraints and operational challenges faced by US forces throughout the conflict. These challenges can be analysed across four principal domains.
The Absence of NATO and US Strategic Allies in the War
Donald Trump expected that, with the expansion of the conflict and the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the United States’ strategic allies – particularly NATO members – would announce their direct and active participation in the war effort. In this context, amid escalating tensions and the growing scope of naval confrontations, he emphasised the need to establish an “international maritime coalition aimed at securing the Strait of Hormuz.” Accordingly, Trump called on NATO member states, as well as countries that import oil through the Strait, to contribute and take part operationally in this coalition.
Despite these calls, none of the United States’ key allies confirmed or undertook direct military involvement in the conflict. The leaders of three major European powers – French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer – issued a joint statement on 28 February, 2026, rejecting any participation alongside the US military in the operation, stressing: “We did not participate in these strikes.” This restrained stance among NATO members provoked a sharp reaction from the US president, who described NATO’s position as contrary to American expectations and called it “a very foolish mistake.”
This lack of allied engagement deprived Washington of the political, military, and logistical support of its longstanding partners – support that could have significantly mitigated the erosion of US defensive and offensive capabilities in a protracted, attritional conflict. In major US wars over the past three decades -including Operation Desert Storm (1991), the Iraq War (2003), and the Afghanistan War (2001) – an average of around 40 countries supported US military operations. Similarly, during the 2011 military intervention in Libya, nearly 20 countries took part directly.
In this latest conflict, however, the United States was not only deprived of such broad international support, but several European governments also restricted military cooperation, including by refusing to provide bases and airspace, effectively adopting a critical stance toward the Trump administration’s war policy. For example, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez described the US and Israeli strikes on Iran as an “unjustifiable military intervention,” “dangerous,” and contrary to international law, and refused to allow the use of Spain’s Rota and Morón air bases.
Misjudgements Regarding Iran’s Military and Political Situation
Misjudgments by the United States regarding Iran’s political and military situation also constituted one of Washington’s major challenges in this operation. Much of this misperception was shaped by Benjamin Netanyahu, who sought to persuade Donald Trump to undertake military action and to leverage the capabilities of the US military in pursuit of his own objectives.
According to some reports, 48 hours before the attack on Iran, Netanyahu, during a phone call with Donald Trump, described military action against Iran as a historic opportunity, stating that, “Iranians might even take to the streets, potentially overthrowing the theocratic system that has governed the country since 1979,” according to Reuters.
In general, the US decision-making structure was confronted with three major miscalculations during this operation.
The first concerned Iran’s political command-and-control system. It was assumed that by implementing a “decapitation strategy” and eliminating the first or second tier of Iran’s military and political leadership, the political system would become destabilised and collapse. However, this did not materialise, and Iran’s political and military command structure was quickly able to recover and reorganise during the course of the conflict.
The second miscalculation related to expectations of popular support for the joint US – Israeli military operation. Pre-war protests created the assumption that domestic opposition to the government would return to the streets in support of foreign strikes. This assessment also proved incorrect, as the Iranian political system managed to contain the unrest through firm measures.
Finally, significant misjudgments were made regarding Iran’s military capabilities. The US military expected to achieve its objectives within two to three weeks, an expectation further reinforced by what it perceived as a swift American victory in Venezuela. However, Iranian forces managed to sustain resistance for 90 days while maintaining their operational response capabilities throughout the conflict. Mass production of low-cost suicide drones, extensive deployment of cruise and ballistic missiles, use of mobile launch platforms, and the deep underground and mountainous placement of missile facilities significantly enhanced Iran’s military resilience in the war.
Iran’s Timely Utilisation of Its Geopolitical Capabilities
In this conflict, Iran effectively leveraged its geopolitical position by closing the Strait of Hormuz and regionalising the war. The closure of the Strait not only reduced the operational freedom and manoeuvrability of the US naval fleet in the Persian Gulf, but also disrupted regional trade and blocked the daily transit of approximately 20 million barrels of oil, thereby creating conditions for increased international pressure on the United States.
Moreover, by regionalising the war, the conflict evolved into a costly and protracted war of attrition for the United States, putting significant strain on its defense systems deployed across Arab countries. Through this strategy, the Islamic Republic of Iran also reduced the readiness of US European allies to enter the war, as Tehran demonstrated in practice its capability to expand the conflict beyond the immediate region.
Iran has repeatedly warned that it possesses the ability and readiness to extend the battlefield further if necessary. For instance, Majid Takht-Ravanchi, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, explicitly stated that “any European Union country participating in US and Israeli attacks against Iran will be considered a legitimate target for Tehran’s response.”
China and Russia’s Covert Role
Military and logistical support from China and Russia – referred to as “covert military assistance”- also created significant challenges for the United States military on the battlefield. According to available reports, this support included the transfer of drone and missile components, missile propellants and fuels, and, most notably, satellite intelligence regarding US military bases, facilities, and naval assets in the region.
The primary objective of China and Russia in providing such support was to turn Iran into a strategic trap designed to bog down the US military and thereby weaken its hegemonic power, at least at the regional level in the Middle East. This “trap” was designed to transform the conflict into a prolonged war of attrition and divert the United States from its strategic objectives, a development that in turn could have led to the gradual degradation of US military capabilities, the decline of American international credibility and prestige, and the weakening of its allies’ confidence in Washington’s security umbrella.
