Assessing the 2021 Heightened American Troop Deployments to Taiwan

Amid China’s growing militarization and diplomatic coercion in the Taiwan Strait, the United States has spent the past two decades reassessing its Indo-Pacific containment strategy. Starting with former President Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’policy, successive administrations have attempted to put an American focus back onto the region, and Taiwan is at the epicenter of the Asian Pacific endgame.

Former President Joe Biden, who served as Obama’s Vice President, expanded the Asia refocus strategy, especially by doubling a contingent of U.S. troops to Taiwan and expanding advising and assisting missions. With Taiwan’s military, the ROC Armed Forces, going through a period of stagnation, proficiency, readiness, and bolstering defense is a key focus of U.S. military advisers to Taipei.

China’s Cross-Strait Ambitions

The ‘One China’ policy is enshrined in Beijing’s constitution, which the international community has recognized. Despite several Taiwan Strait crises, Beijing seldom made openly provocative gestures or actions between the late 90s and early 2000s that alluded to forcefully unifying Taipei. However, that is now changing under CCP Chairman Xi Jinping.

Under the administration of Xi Jinping, China has rapidly increased its defense spending, become the world’s largest navy, and expanded its missile arsenal. Forward operating bases were established in the South China Sea by enacting aggressive grey zone tactics such as ship ramming, disrupting fishing rights, underwater cable sabotage, and employing a disguised maritime ‘civilian’ militia.

Similarly, China’s Navy (PLAN) and Coast Guard (CCG) have enacted similar methods in the Taiwan Strait. Aerial and naval drills by the PLA near Taiwan have increased in the past several years. Hybrid and informational warfare is also a direct security threat to Taiwan, which has uncovered Chinese government-sponsored spy rings and recorded undersea cable disruptions.

Furthermore, Beijing has enacted coercive diplomacy against any state that attempts to legitimize Taipei and its legislature, as seen with condemnations against Lithuania and Czechia and threats of withholding economic aid against African countries that allow Taiwan’s President to use their airspace.

America’s Response in 2021

The United States initially had a mutual defense pact with Taiwan under the Chiang Kai-shek administration. However, after opening China to the global market along with improving relations, Taiwan’s partnership with the U.S. was diminished, with the mutual defense pact being severed. U.S. bases in Taiwan were also dismantled. Still, with Taipei being crucial for the First Island Chain strategy, a transformative democracy that ended the Kuomintang autocracy, and a major global trading partner, American military personnel maintained a low-level presence.

Prior to the Biden administration, approximately 20 to 30 military personnel were stationed in Taiwan, including Marine security guards and attachés in diplomatic compounds. Biden would greatly increase this number to approximately 500 military personnel by the time he left office.

The 500 troops signify an increase in the current advisors who oversee advice and assist missions to the ROC military, which faces stagnation due to older doctrinal warfare, critical manpower shortages, over-centralization, and lack of modernization of equipment due to stalled defense procurements. One location of the additional U.S. troop deployment is on the strategically important Kinmen island, where Green Berets are teaching various warfare methods to the ROC Armed Forces, only 10 kilometers away from China’s mainland.

Concurrently, deploying and embedding additional advisors, trainers, and attachés to Taiwan helps Taipei with an additional deterrent posture against Beijing. A larger U.S. troop garrison around Taiwan and its islets helps mitigate a direct amphibious assault through the Strait, as China risks engaging American military personnel, which would directly bring about foreign intervention.

Divergence in Policies Between Washington and Taipei

Though defensive partnerships have been enhanced between the U.S. and Taiwan, both American and Taiwanese legislation has fluctuated due to internal politics in each respective country. In the U.S., the second Trump administration has pushed Taiwan for increased defense spending but has used Taiwan’s $14 billion military arms sale as a negotiating chip against China.

During the second Trump administration, America has been embroiled in a trade war with China and due to waning U.S. soft power, Chinese Premier Xi Jinping has turned himself into a more powerful position. Simultaneously, some of the inventory from Taiwan’s military procurement wish list is currently backlogged as the U.S. military expended much of its inventory in the 2026 Iran war.

Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao would confirm the delays in a congressional hearing, and upgraded mutual defense partners such as Japan, Estonia, and Lithuania also face backlogs, such as Tomahawk cruise missiles and air defense systems.

Concurrently, Taipei faces internal gridlock by the Kuomintang (KMT) opposition party, which wishes to enhance relations with Beijing due to its mainland heritage ties. Furthermore, weakening the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) helps the KMT gain more legislative influence, as the former originally promoted a $40 billion defense spending bill that grew the ire of the Chinese government. While Beijing continues to expand its defense and industrial base rapidly, Taipei now faces a political standstill through its pro-unification factions and Washington’s realpolitik with Beijing.

Further Bolstering Taiwan’s Defence in 2026 and Beyond

Outside of the ongoing advise and assist rotary force the U.S. has deployed to Taiwan since 2021, more than ever, Taipei will need the full diplomatic backing that has slowly waned in Washington. Political gridlock and arms sales as leverage will not change China’s calculus on forceful unification policies, but a militarily well-defended Taiwan with diplomatic backing and stable domestic governance will.

Against the backdrop of the KMT winning the 2024 legislative elections, the opposition has blocked several critical measures of the DPP that not only stabilize Taiwan but also negate attempts at promoting sovereignty and a distinct national identity away from mainland China. U.S. soft power strategy in the Taiwan Strait should include informational attempts at reinforcing democratic principles of self-determination while maintaining the One China Policy, to not overly inflame tensions with Beijing.

America can also provide advice and analytics on potential remedies to the ROC’s military recruitment problem. Currently, the U.S. Armed Forces are meeting their recruitment goals after years of stagnation, and the Pentagon’s sending top military recruiting advisers to Taiwan can help the ROC with analytics and strategies.

Importantly, delaying Taipei’s arms sales for ‘leverage’ only further undermines the Taiwanese government, which plays into Beijing’s hands. China, having an advantage in rare earth minerals and influence amongst America’s adversaries, can now try to leverage future weapons exports to Taiwan, which will only hinder the defense of the island.

Instead, the U.S. should not cave to pressure from the Chinese government, which can see the policy as a sign of weakness, which would only further a positive calculus for Beijing to conduct a forceful military action against Taipei in the future.

The U.S. has been increasing its military advisers and trainers in rotational deployments since 2021, helping to revamp Taiwan’s stagnant military posture. Still, there are initiative-taking measures that need to be taken between Washington and Taipei, such as recruitment, retention, and fully backing Taiwanese democratic institutions to combat Beijing’s cross-strait soft power influence.