How Turkey and the Syrian Interim Government Outmaneuvered America and the SDF on Syria
As the conflict between Syria’s new interim government and the country’s Kurdish militias comes to an apparent close, how did Ankara and Damascus corner the SDF?
During the Syrian Civil War, US-Turkish relations descended to a near low over diverging policies in Syria. Washington, not having a clear policy against the Assad regime, focused more on combating ISIS, whereas Ankara feared spillover as Turkey took in the brunt of Syrian refugees.
Avoiding a full-scale invasion of Syria to defeat ISIS, both due to domestic pressure and the potential fears of a wider engagement with Russian and Iranian forces, the US banked on Syrian Kurdish militias to defeat and degrade ISIS. With the base of ISIS in Syria, the US emphasised Syrian Kurds to help form the base of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Kurds having long been marginalised by the Assad regime, and their militias steadily consolidated territory as the civil war expanded.
However, partnering with Syrian Kurdish militias came with a price as the main force (YPG and YPJ) are directly linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which both Turkey and the United States designate as terrorist organisations. An immediate rift between Ankara and Washington took place, and the Turkish government would enact a policy of patience to finally solve the SDF question.
Turkish-SDF Conflict and Split in Turkish-American Relations
Rebranding the YPG and YPJ as part of the command of the SDF, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) would gradually recruit Arab tribal fighters West of the Euphrates River to join as well. Turkey saw no difference between the SDF and YPJ/YPG, which historically fought against Turkish forces, and thus, Ankara gradually reduced cooperation with Washington over Syria.
America was restricted from using the Incirlik Airbase for anti-ISIS operations, and in the same period, Washington halted a patriot missile system sale to Ankara. Turkey would then procure the Russian-made S400 system, which is incompatible with NATO due to spyware allegedly incorporated in its systems.
The relations deteriorated to the point where the US would ultimately rescind Turkey’s role in the F-35 and F-16 Block-C, in which the latter would be revoked. Still, the tensions did not stop or influence Turkey’s military operations in Syria, which were aimed at weakening both the Assad regime and SDF with their own proxy militia, the Syrian National Army (SNA).
Turkey would conduct multiple offensives against the SDF, both in Afrin and Northeast Syria, in which the latter offensive ultimately led to the then US Secretary of Defence, Jim Mattis, resigning due to signs of future SDF abandonment by the Trump Administration.
Furthermore, Turkey took a lead in deploying the Turkish Armed Forces around the Idlib enclave, which blocked the Ba’athist army and Russian forces from further offensives against the battered rebel opposition and Islamist HTS fighters. That respite allowed Ankara to help the opposition build a base with Ahmed al-Sharaa, ultimately becoming the de facto face of armed anti-Assad forces.
Utilising Patience and Exerting Influence over Syria
Ultimately, the SDF, with American air cover and special forces, dislodged ISIS from its key strongholds in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. However, the latter factor was the most crucial part, as even with American air power, the SDF suffered 11,000 killed with tens of thousands wounded during the counterterrorism operations.
Ahmed al-Sharaa, then under his nom de guerre Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, distanced himself from al-Qaeda and turned HTS into a purely Syrian liberation organisation. Al-Sharaa would fight al-Qaeda’s remnants in Idlib and ISIS, which the US and Turkish governments quietly helped and backed.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also raised Turkey’s geopolitical standing as the Turkish government fought Russian-backed mercenaries and forces both in Syria and Libya, which made Washington realise any solution to end the war would have to go through Ankara. The Biden Administration would allow Turkey back into the F-16 block-c program, and a looming Second Trump presidency was crucial for Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan to maneuver in Syria.
Russia overextended itself in Ukraine and could not fully commit assets to Syria. Troops and air defence systems would be relocated from Syria to Ukraine as Russian forces accumulated heavy losses. Meanwhile, al-Sharaa built numerous institutions in Idlib from 2019 to 2024 and consolidated control over numerous militias with Turkish support, and the factions would strike the Assad regime in a lightning offensive in late November that year.
The 2024 HTS-led Syrian rebel offensive successfully toppled Assad, and both the Turkish-backed SNA and the SDF moved to take and consolidate more positions. Al-Sharaa would become interim President with the second Trump Administration, making a priority of Syria’s stability.
SDF Miscalculations with Syrian and Turkish Gains
Against the backdrop of the collapse of the Assad regime, the new Syrian interim government (STG) under Ahmed al-Sharaa faced numerous hurdles. There were still remnants of Assad loyalists in the Alawite strongholds of Latakia and Tartus, and brewing separatism grew in the Syrian Druze of Suwayda province. Meanwhile, the SDF were in no hurry to integrate as joint patrols with US forces continued to curb an ISIS resurrection.
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan saw a key opportunity to disengage the US from the SDF, and together with Mohammed Bin Salman, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, both leaders would vouch for al-Sharaa as a capable partner and anti-ISIS leader to Donald Trump. On May 14th, 2025, President Trump met al-Sharaa in Riyadh, after which the former would state he was impressed with the Syrian interim President.
Simultaneously, Trump would give credit to Erdogan for Assad’s ousting as Turkey’s role in patrolling frozen contact lines allowed rebel groups to recuperate losses. Under orders from the President, US Ambassador to Turkey and Middle East envoy Tom Barrack would oversee negotiations on full SDF integration into the new Syrian army.
However, the SDF were not in a hurry to integrate for several reasons. First, some of the Kurdish militias within the organisation fought against al-Sharaa when he originally led the al-Qaeda Syrian branch of al-Nusra that later rebranded to HTS.
Secondly, ethnic massacres in coastal and southern Syria against the Alawites and Druze, respectively, led to fears of the same retaliation. Lastly, then being in control of Syria’s oil fields, the leadership of the SDF under Mazloum Abdi hoped to use it as a negotiation tool for autonomy.
However, the current Trump Administration did not openly scathe or apply sanctions upon the Syrian interim government, as historically America has backed strongmen in the Middle East. A key turning point was the removal of the Caesar Act sanctions, which had for years devastated the Syrian economy. With the sanctions lifted, al-Sharaa’s government opened up to international investments and more American trust.
Lastly, the bulk of the SDF was Arab tribal fighters who are Sunni Muslims, who are also al-Sharaa’s power base as Sunnis were long marginalised in the Alawite-led Assad regime. With al-Sharaa’s interim government attracting Sunni Muslims who felt repressed, this gave the opportunity for Damascus and Ankara to plant the seeds for defections against a Kurdish-led organisation.
Convincing the US Towards its Strategic Interests
During the post-Assad transition period, Turkey moved to align the U.S. with its strategic interests in Syria. Aforementioned, the first Trump Administration planned to withdraw from Syria, which caused a rift with his first Secretary of Defence. Turkey and al-Sharaa would notice this policy to solve the SDF question.
Ankara has built its own influence in the Middle East and North Africa region, which has impressed Trump. It played a significant role in conflicts in Libya, Somalia, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Gaza, and Syria, which would be no exception.
Syria’s interim government dramatically increased raids against ISIS cells in the country, which impressed US CENTCOM and Washington. Simultaneously, Turkey pushed for an integration agreement between the SDF and Syrian interim government in which the Kurdish-led forces came under pressure for ‘stalling.’
US envoy Tom Barrack reportedly became angry at the SDF for perceived stalling, as armed conflict was inevitable unless integration took place. Mazloum Abdi’s red line was full Kurdish rights, including protection of language, culture, and rights to serve in high echelons of the new Syrian government.
Al-Sharaa would answer in kind by making Nowruz a Syrian national holiday and establishing a curriculum for Kurdish education. Still, tensions arose as both the Syrian army and SDF accused each other of provoking tensions in the Aleppo city neighbourhood of Sheikh Maqsood, which would lead to inevitable armed conflict as the deadline for agreement passed.
Collapse of the SDF
Some of the first major combat operations against the SDF took place in autumn of 2025 as the STG moved to cordon off the Kurdish-held Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafieh neighbourhoods in Aleppo. Sporadic clashes took place in October and December 2025, which ended with U.S. mediation, but al-Sharaa and Turkey would truly test America’s Syria policy in early 2026.
On January 6th, 2026, the STG conducted an offensive to dislodge the SDF from the Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafieh neighbourhoods, which Damascus achieved with relatively low casualties and a deal to evacuate Kurdish fighters from Aleppo city towards the countryside. Several days later, the STG forced the SDF to withdraw West of the Euphrates River, as their positions became untenable. With little US mediation, Damascus saw the inaction as a green light to force the SDF into a deal.
Only a week after the Aleppo clashes, al-Sharaa’s forces, backed by Turkey, launched a major offensive against the SDF West of the Euphrates. The offensive was widely seen as successful, as many of the Arab tribes of the SDF defected to the STG and helped dislodge the Kurdish fighters from Sunni-Arab majority lands such as Raqqa and Deir Ezzor.
The Kurdish-led SDF had overestimated the loyalties of Arab tribal fighters and how much they were willing to stay inside the organisation. In late 2023, there were heavy armed clashes between the Arab-led Deir Ezzor military council and the SDF, which saw dozens of deaths. Arabs and Kurds historically have had turbulent relations in the modern Middle East, and the SDF was bound for combustion if a charismatic leader in Damascus could sway tribal fighters to defect.
Lastly, the SDF overestimated how long the US government would be willing to see them as a viable partner. The SDF was the bulwark for counterterrorism options against ISIS, but as the Islamist militant group weakened, so did the American-led mission in Syria.
The US emphasised the Syrian interim government’s cooperation to dismantle ISIS cells along with joint patrols with the STG. As al-Sharaa’s profile grew, Abdi’s hesitance to integrate became precarious to growing joint American-Turkish interests, especially as the second Trump Administration has grown relations with Erdogan’s Turkey.
In conclusion, with losing their core Arab tribal fighters, strategic terrain, and full backing by the US, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces have few options but to accept an unfavourable American-backed deal by Damascus. Despite ethnic tensions and massacres, the US has made its new Syria strategy clear—full centralization under Ahmed al-Sharaa, with growing defence partnerships with Turkey in the Levant, and the SDF’s miscalculated policies by different American administrations.
