January 4, 2026

The Russia-Ukraine Peace Framework is Shaping Up

By Angana Guha Roy

US-Ukraine peace efforts remain stalled as core disputes persist, while the war continues to reshape Europe’s security order, diplomacy and energy ties in deeply destabilising ways.


In the last week of December 2025, talks between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy concluded without a final peace deal breakthrough, though both leaders reported significant progress (The New York Times, 2025). Since the full-scale invasion began in 2022, several frameworks have been proposed as plausible peace plans. While the US pushes for resolution, the peace plans on paper remain aligned in non-concluded outcomes while Marco Rubio has framed the US role as uniquely indispensable but ultimately limited (US Department of State, 2025).

Non-Conclusive Talks between US-Russia-Ukraine

Despite reported progress in peace talks, significant disagreements persist in three-way negotiations between the United States, Russia and Ukraine over the future of Donbas and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (Euronews, 2025). Russia has reiterated its long-standing position, firmly rejecting the presence of any NATO-affiliated troops on the ground (Anadolu Agency, 2025).

Against the situational conflict and Europe’s open armed diplomatic and military support for Ukraine, the United States under the Trump administration has stated its commitment to “re-establishing strategic stability with Russia” while enabling post-conflict reconstruction of Ukraine (The White House, 2025). At the same time, unverified media reports have fuelled speculation regarding Russia’s broader ambitions, including claims that Moscow seeks to seize all of Ukraine and reclaim parts of Europe once under Soviet control (Reuters, 2025).

Beyond territorial disputes and competing efforts to secure the most favourable peace deal, both Ukraine and Russia are grappling with war-induced economic instability. According to Western media reports, Russia is dealing with a staffing crisis caused by stagnant low salaries and inflation (Kyiv Post, 2025). Ukraine, meanwhile, is contending with large-scale corruption allegations amid delays to presidential elections, developments that have sparked public protests on the domestic front (TASS, 2025; RFE/RL, 2025).

Ukraine, as President Volodymyr Zelensky puts it, strives for dignified peace guaranteed beyond agreement on paper (Euronews, 2025). Russia, by contrast, continues to justify its “special military operation” on the grounds of “demilitarising” and “denazifying” Ukraine, while pressing its long-standing demand that Ukraine distance itself from NATO in order to secure Russia’s borders against what it perceives as NATO-led military encroachment (OSCE, 2024).

Seismic Shifts in the Transatlantic Security Order

The Russia-Ukraine war has marked a series of firsts in the transatlantic security order. Most importantly, it pushed Europe to strategize and prepare itself for long term security challenges in the region on its own cost and effort. Central to this shift has been the reconfiguration of Europe’s strategic and operational depth for territorial defence, reflected in the re-securitisation of NATO and the rearmament of national defence industries across the continent.

In early 2025, the European Union launched the “Rearm Europe Plan”, later rebranded as Readiness 2030, aimed at strengthening Europe’s military capabilities and preparedness by 2030, mobilizing investments for joint procurement, innovation, and infrastructure to counter territorial threats and reduce reliance on EU supplier (European Parliament, 2025). Washington’s increasingly pronounced distance from NATO has further reinforced the urgency for Europe to reassess its approach to security. The recently published US National Security Strategy categorically stresses on “ending the perception of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance” (The White House, 2025).

Following the conflict, Europe’s defence powerhouses, Sweden and Finland (sharing borders with Russia), joined NATO, in consonance with domestic public support, abandoning decades long policy of neutrality and non-alignment (NATO, 2024). While their accession did not provoke immediate diplomatic retaliation from Moscow, President Vladimir Putin warned of Russian countermeasures should NATO deploy additional military contingents or infrastructure along Russia’s borders. Moscow maintains that the expansion of NATO’s military footprint is intended to consolidate allied forces against a perceived common adversary (Anadolu Agency, 2022).

EU’s Push for Enlargement and Supply Chain Diversification

Europe’s high-stakes diplomacy is increasingly anchored in expanding the European Union as a means of building a defensive buffer capable of safeguarding territorial security against external threats. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has ended decades of EU’s balanced ties with Russia, leading to a “neighbourhood-first” policy that prioritizes pulling countries like Ukraine and Moldova into the European orbit.

Despite internal disagreements among member states, largely linked to Ukraine’s ongoing war and reconstruction challenges, Kyiv has held official EU candidate status for more than three years. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has labelled EU membership a “key security guarantee in its own right”, arguing that Ukraine’s long-term prosperity and security are inseparable from the Union (Euronews, 2025). The so-called “Ukraine effect” has also injected momentum into previously stalled accession processes for other candidates, including Moldova, Albania and Montenegro (ECFR, 2025).

Meanwhile, despite the trade and supply chain diversification push, the EU, Russia, China triangle remains a diplomatic leakage point in the EU’s re-securitization policy. The US National Security Strategy released in December 2025 highlighted concerns that German chemical companies continue to rely on Russian gas to support processing operations in China, illustrating the persistence of complex interdependencies (The White House, 2025).

Russia’s pipeline gas exports to Europe fell by 44% in 2025, reaching their lowest level since the mid-1970s. This decline followed the closure of transit routes through Ukraine and the EU’s accelerated efforts to phase out Russian fossil fuel imports. The EU has committed to eliminating these imports entirely by 1 January 2027, marking a decisive break with its previous energy relationship with Moscow (Yahoo Finance, 2025).

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Transactional Diplomacy

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has become central to an increasingly transactional form of diplomacy. First, reports suggest that the proposed US-Ukraine natural resources deal is framed as an economic incentive for Washington to sustain investment in Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction, while also addressing domestic concerns over the scale of US assistance already provided (BBC, 2025). Second, the approval of a €90 billion interest free loan for Ukraine, funded by the EU’s common budget, was followed by internal disagreements that stalled a plan to use the principal of immobilised Russian central bank assets. Russia recently condemned the potential use of its frozen assets as “daylight robbery” (Reuters, 2025).

Beyond continental Europe, the war has had wide-ranging spill-over effects. Following the Covid-19 pandemic, the full-scale war contributed to renewed global economic volatility, fundamentally altering trade routes, energy security, and financial systems. It significantly impacted India’s economy causing inflationary pressure and supply chain disruptions, leading to a strategic shift in India’s energy imports to manage domestic inflation amid volatile global prices.

Irrespective of multifaceted peace frameworks in action the future of Ukraine in international alliances remains unclear. Several questions will shape the conflict’s trajectory: can the EU assume full responsibility for delivering timely and sustainable military and economic support to Ukraine? Are current peace proposals sufficiently balanced, including in relation to the provisions of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act (NATO, 1997)? And, as President Putin has argued, given the economic costs associated with Europe’s re-securitisation, is there still space for Russia and the EU, as continental neighbours, to identify a viable diplomatic middle ground (Xinhua, 2025)?

Bibliography

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