How Rwanda Undermined the Multi-National SADC’s Peacekeeping Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo
Amid the Democratic Republic of Congo’s rapid rebellion, how did Rwanda sabotage a regional peacekeeping mission to the embattled country in favour of a proxy militant group?
In May 2023, due to the failure of the East African Regional Force (EACRF) to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the deteriorating humanitarian and political climate in the DRC, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – of which DRC is a member country – decided to deploy a peacekeeping mission to the conflict hotspots in eastern DRC (SADC, 2023). The new mission, named the SADC Mission to the DRC (SAMIDRC), would be taking over from the EACRF whose mandate had been terminated by the Congolese government.
EACRF had been expelled due to its perceived inaction and failures against the March 23 Movement (M23). This was evident in a presidential Communication by Ugandan president Yoweri K. Museveni, who stressed that “the EACRF was neutral in the fight against M23” (Yoweri K Museveni, 2025). SAMIDRC was authorised following the SADC Mutual Defence Pact of 2003, which requires member states to cooperate in countering perceived threats to regional peace and security. SAMIDRC deployed to the DRC on December 15, 2023, and was composed of troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi with support from the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) (Rene`, 2024).
Though much attention has been focused on the conflict relationship between the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) and local armed groups such as M23, little attention is given to the role of Rwanda in its use of both diplomatic and non-diplomatic means in undermining FARDC and SAMIDRC operations in eastern DRC. This article relies on UN reports, press releases, official statements and links both the diplomatic opposition and covert cross-border operations with the M23 which led to the collapse of SAMIDRC in eastern DRC.
Rwanda’s Opposition
The deployment of SAMIDRC troops was met with a strong response from Rwanda. On February 12, 2024, the Government of Rwanda – through their foreign affairs ministry – wrote a letter to the President of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) protesting the deployment of SAMIDRC troops and the decision by the UNSC regarding the provision of logistical and operational support to the SAMIDRC troops through the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) (UNSC, 2024, pp. 182–185). In the same letter, the Rwandan government stressed that “SAMIDRC is not a neutral force in the current crisis. Its mission is to support the government of DRC’s belligerent posture, which bears the potential for further escalation of the conflict and increased tensions in the region.” The Government of Rwanda stated that the Congolese army, local armed groups such as Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) and SAMIDRC were engaged in selective operations against the M23.
When diplomatic pressure and opposition at the UNSC failed, Rwanda changed tactics and turned to military action in eastern DRC. Rwanda started moving troops across its border with the DRC and engaged in cross-border military support of armed groups. Both the June 2023 and June 2024 Reports of Experts on the DRC showed evidence of Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) supporting M23 activities while simultaneously engaging rival local armed groups in South Kivu (UNSC, 2023; UNSC, 2024). The RDF had been covertly attacking FDLR positions, and this had increased the total area under the management of the joint M23/RDF alliance in the eastern DRC.
In the June 2023 report, the experts noted that M23 was already controlling access roads toward the Ugandan and Rwanda Borders and was increasing its attacks in Goma, Minova, and Sake, all which lie along the border with Rwanda (UNSC, 2023). The actions of both M23 and RDF were met with force from the Congolese army backed by MONUSCO and the new troops under SAMIDRC. The inability of Rwanda to influence SAMIDRC diplomatically had resulted in direct confrontations as armed groups allied to Rwanda started attacking SAMIDRC positions in eastern DRC. The increased engagement between SAMIDRC/FARDC and M23/RDF marked a turning point as the peacekeeping mission, which was focused on stabilisation, devolved into direct military confrontations against regional powers with their proxies.
Confrontation
In January 2025, due to heavy fighting between SAMIDRC and M23/RDF, thirteen South African, two Tanzanian and three Malawian troops died. The death of SAMIDRC troops and the subsequent takeover of Goma by the M23, backed by the RDF, was met with condemnation and further threats of war. On January 29, 2025, the President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, in an X (formerly Twitter) post stated that “The fighting is the result of an escalation by the rebel group, M23 and Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) engaging the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) and attacking peacekeepers from the SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC)” (The Presidency, 2025). Furthermore, the president stressed that the deployment was not a declaration of war on any country as it was a peacekeeping mission.
The statement from the South African President was met with a strong response from the Rwanda President, Paul Kagame. Kagame in an X post reiterated that: “SAMIDRC is not a peacekeeping force, and it has no place in this situation. It was authorized by SADC as a belligerent force engaging in offensive combat operations to help the DRC Government fight against its own people, working alongside genocidal armed groups like FDLR which target Rwanda, while also threatening to take the war to Rwanda itself.”
President Kagame in the same post mentioned that the presence of the SAMIDRC troops were contributing to the failure of negotiations in the DRC and Rwanda would manage further confrontations in any way South Africa opted for. The diplomatic exchange regarding the death of peacekeepers set a stage for further confrontation as the South Africa’s Defence Minister Angie Motshekga noted that any further attacks or shooting at South African peacekeepers would be seen as a declaration of war on South Africa (Khanyisile, 2025). The increased confrontation reshaped regional relations as DRC and SADC blamed the fall of Goma on Rwanda and its proxies.
Fallout
The Congolese government, which was the host country and had suffered casualties in the takeover of Goma by M23, severed diplomatic ties with Rwanda as it accused it of backing the M23 and directly engaging in the fight in eastern DRC (Reuters, 2025). The DRC government through a note verbale requested for an emergency UNSC session to pile more diplomatic pressure on Rwanda (UNSC, 2025a). The UNSC responded by passing Resolution 2773 which called for the withdrawal of all external forces in the DRC and the halting of Rwanda’s support to the M23 (UNSC, 2025b). The same resolution called for return to diplomacy by Rwanda and DRC to support the peace and negotiations process.
The diplomatic fallout did not stop at the regional level as both the European Union (EU) and the US Government imposed sanctions on members of the Rwandan government accused of supporting the M23 (Council of the EU, 2025; US Treasury, 2025). The Rwanda government accused Belgium of mobilising, interfering and taking sides in the conflict which led to the severance of diplomatic ties as both countries expelled each other’s diplomats (Government of Belgium, 2025; Government of Rwanda, 2025).
After the takeover of Goma, the Rwanda government offered amnesty and safe passage to both SAMIDRC troops retreating from the fighting and mercenaries who had surrendered to the M23/RDF in Sake and Goma (Ashimwe, 2025). President Kagame, in a July 2025 address, stressed that: “What happened was only a fraction of what actually we could do. The same people you have been seeing, after making sure that they cannot to do any harm to us, and they gave up, we gave them passage through here to go back home. We gave them passage, we gave them security, we made sure they went back home. But they could have perished if they really put up a fight, there is no question about it” (Paul Kagame, 2025).
On March 13, 2025, SADC decided to start the formal withdrawal of SAMIDRC troops from eastern DRC, which led to the end of a politically sensitive mission (SADC, 2025). The mission that had begun as response to violence in eastern DRC by SADC had ended when there was no peace and more territory had been taken over by the M23, which now directly threatened to take the war to Kinshasa (Martina, 2025).
SAMIDRC’s collapse shows how regional interests, rivalries, regional political support, and the presence of strong armed groups can lead to the failure of a peacekeeping mission. As Rwanda pursued its national interests in eastern DRC using both diplomatic means, such as protests at the UNSC, and non-diplomatic means, such as alleged support for the M23 and cross-border military action against local armed groups, it compromised SAMIDRC’s neutrality and credibility as a peacekeeping force were tested. Rwanda’s use of M23 against SAMIDRC and FARDC shows how national objectives can be achieved effectively through the use of proxies.
Bibliography
Ashimwe, E. (2025, January). DR Congo: European mercenaries surrender to M23, get safe passage through Rwanda [News]. Retrieved 2025-12-13, from https:// www.newtimes.co.rw/article/23641/news/africa/dr-congo-european -mercenaries-surrender-to-m23-get-safe-passage-through-rwanda (Section: News)
Council of the EU. (2025, March). Democratic Republic of the Congo: EU lists further nine individuals and one entity [Government]. Retrieved 2025-12-13, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/17/ democratic-republic-of-the-congo-eu-lists-further-nine-individuals-and-one-entity/
Government of Belgium. (2025, March). Belgium reacts to Rwanda’s disproportionate decision to cut diplomatic ties and declare Belgian diplomats persona non grata in Kigali | FPS Foreign Affairs – Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation [Press release]. Retrieved 2025-12-13, from http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/news/ belgium-reacts-rwandas-disproportionate-decision-cut-diplomatic-ties-and-declare-belgian-diplomats-persona-non-grata-kigali
Government of Rwanda. (2025, March). Rwanda Severs Diplomatic Relations with Belgium [News]. Retrieved 2025-12-13, from https://www.minaffet.gov.rw/ updates/news-details/rwanda-severs-diplomatic-relations-with-belgium
Khanyisile, N. (2025, January). South Africa and Rwanda go head-to-head over DR Congo war. Retrieved 2025-12-13, from https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ c78w1ze7v25o
Martina, S. (2025, October). Congo: Are M23 rebels really advancing toward Kinshasa? – DW – 10/10/2025 [News]. Retrieved 2025-12-13, from https://www.dw.com/en/ congo-are-m23-rebels-really-advancing-toward-kinshasa/a-74287422
Paul Kagame. (2025a, July). Kwibohora31 Reception | Remarks by President Kagame | Kigali, 4 July 2025 – Paul Kagame [Government]. Retrieved 2025-12-13, from https://www.paulkagame.rw/kwibohora31-reception-remarks-by-president-kagame-kigali-4-july-2025/
Paul Kagame. (2025b, January). Presidential Communication [Tweet]. Retrieved 2025-12-13, from https://x.com/PaulKagame/status/1884711263327887849
Rene.` (2024, February). South Africa contributes troops to SADC mission to the DRC [Government]. Retrieved 2025-12-12, from https://dirco.gov.za/south-africa-contributes-troops-to-sadc-mission-to-the-drc/
Reuters. (2025, January). Congo severs ties with Rwanda as eastern conflict escalates. Reuters. Retrieved 2025-12-13, from https://www.reuters.com/world/ africa/congo-repels-overnight-rebel-advance-goma-city-say-sources-2025-01-25/
SADC. (2023, May). Communique´ of the extra-ordinary organ troika summit, plus SADC troika and force intervention brigade (FIB) troop contributing countries (TCCs) [Government]. Retrieved 2025-12-12, from https://www.sadc.int/latest-news/communique-extra-ordinary-organ-troika-summit-plus-sadc-troika-and-force-intervention
SADC. (2025, June). SADC CONTINUES PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF SAMIDRC FORCES FROM GOMA AND SAKE, EASTERN DRC | SADC [Government]. Retrieved 2025-12-13, from https://www.sadc.int/document/ sadc-continues-phased-withdrawal-samidrc-forces-goma-and-sake-eastern-drc
The Presidency. (2025, January). Statement by President Cyril Ramaphosa on the recent developments in the eastern DRC and deaths of South African soldiers | The Presidency [Government]. Retrieved 2025-12-13, from https:// www.thepresidency.gov.za/statement-president-cyril-ramaphosa-recent-developments-eastern-drc-and-deaths-south-african
UNSC. (2023, June). Letter dated 13 June 2023 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council. United Nations. Retrieved from https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/123/80/pdf/n2312380.pdf
UNSC. (2024, May). Letter dated 31 May 2024 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council. United Nations. Retrieved from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4053693?ln=en&v=pdf
UNSC. (2025a, January). Note verbale dated 21 January 2025 from the Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. UN. Retrieved 2025-12-13, from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4073282 (Num Pages: 2 Place: New York)
UNSC. (2025b). Resolution 2773 (2025). Retrieved from https://docs.un.org/en/S/ RES/2773(2025) (UN Doc. S/RES/2773 (2025))
US Treasury. (2025, February). Treasury Sanctions Rwandan Minister and Senior Militant for Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [Press release]. Retrieved 2025-12-13, from https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/ sb0022
Yoweri K Museveni. (2025, February). Presidential Communication [Tweet]. Retrieved 2025-12-12, from https://x.com/KagutaMuseveni/status/1892941326074724755
