The Central African Republic: Inside the Vortex
The Central African Republic’s (CAR) upcoming election unfolds amid deep insecurity. This article provides an assessment of the overlook of the election and the CAR’s present conditions.
Political Outlook
Since independence, the Central African state has been marked by institutional fragility and dependence on external economic and military support, primarily from France. Violence sharply escalated when predominantly Muslim Seleka rebels seized the capital Bangui in 2013, ousting President François Bozizé and disintegration of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA). Sectarian violence perpetrated by the Seleka and predominantly Christian anti-Balaka rebels plunged the CAR into a prolonged crisis that continued beyond Seleka’s withdrawal from Bangui and Touadéra’s election in 2016. Since then, Touadéra has consolidated power and, in 2021, repelled a rebellion with support from Russia’s Wagner Group and the Rwandan Defence Force (CPA, 2024).
Uncertainty has plagued the run-up to the presidential election. Touadéra amended the constitution in 2023 to allow himself to run for a third term and in November the CAR’s electoral body barred several opposition candidates from standing (TRT Afrika, 2025). The campaigning activities of parties other than Touadéra’s United Hearts Movement are heavily restricted. Gains toward political tabilisation and the inclusion of former rebel groups in formal politics could be reversed if the result is disputed (Siegle and Wahila, 2025). In addition, former president Bozize’s party is offering support to the opposition to sow unrest and weaken Touadéra’s position (Africa Intelligence, 2025).
Higher political risk is likely to further strain an already difficult security environment. The 2019 Khartoum agreement created a framework for integrating NSAGs into the FACA, but implementation has been slow; the disarmament of the 3R and Union for Peace groups only began in July 2025 (RFI, 2025). Touadéra has relied on the Wagner group to reestablish territorial control, but violence against civilians perpetrated by Wagner and ex-NSAGs merged into the FACA has aggravated localized violence (IISS, 2025, P. 220). The FACA’s position as a neutral arbiter is undermined by its mismanaged efforts to resolve intercommunal conflicts between competing NSAGs (Crisis Group, 2025).
Economic Outlook
Cameroon, China, France, India and the United Arab Emirates are among the CAR’s largest trading partners. As a landlocked state, the CAR relies heavily on Cameroon’s port of Douala for most imports and commodity exports (OEC, 2023). Unpaved roads, poor infrastructural coverage and insecurity outside Bangui greatly limit the movement of goods within the CAR. Disruption to Bangui’s fuel supply has persisted since 2023 because of the oil distributor Tamoil’s financial issues, with government intervention failing to resuscitate the energy sector (Ecofin Agency, 2025). More broadly, public finances have weakened amid reduced demand for government bonds and sustained high security expenditure (Coface, 2025).
Longstanding political instability has left the CAR’s mining sector relatively underdeveloped, accounting for only around 7% of GDP. The decline in diamond exports after the 2013 Seleka rebellion, the dominance of artisanal mining, and the presence of NSAGs have deterred large scale investment (Mitchell, 2024). In exchange for the Wagner Group’s support, Wagner-linked companies have received long-term mining concessions and generate up to $1 billion anually through exports of unprocessed minerals and timber (Doxcee et al, 2023). Despite such issues, legal clarity surrounding the sector has been enhanced by the CAR’s new Mining Code and the lifting of the Kimberly Process diamond embargo in 2024 (EITI).
Geopolitical Outlook
Touadéra is struggling to mitigate the CAR’s dependence on its Russian security patron, but options remain limited. Moscow is pressuring Touadéra to replace the Wagner Group with the state-controlled Africa Corps. The Africa Corps’ prioritization of training and economic dealmaking over frontline operations, in tandem with the severing of the deep ties between the CAR’s government and Wagner, could exacerbate the country’s insecurity (ADF, 2025). At the same time, the constrained capabilities and mandates of Rwandan and United Nations forces leave Touadéra with limited alternatives (IISS, 2024). He will have to accept the transition to secure his government, with the Africa Corps likely intending to use the CAR as a platform for anti-Western disinformation and for consolidating Russia’s interests in Cameroon (Dragonfly Intelligence, 2025).
Touadéra has recently maintained close ties with Russia whilst engaging other international stakeholders. A rapprochement with France saw it pledge the CAR £10.8 million in budgetary support in November 2024. At the same time, discussions between the CAR and the US private military company Bancroft indicate a cautious re-engagement with Western actors (IISS, 2025, p. 220). The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has allegedly offered to pay Touadéra’s monthly $15 million Africa Corps bill in return for the CAR acting as a logistical hub for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces. Such alignment could strengthen the CAR’s fiscal position and raise its regional profile, but it would also risk drawing the country further into Sudan’s internationalised civil war (Agenzia Nova, 2025).
Forecast
Touadéra is likely to be re-elected, although youth protests or increased NSAG activity could raise short-term political risk. reater regulatory clarity and the implementation of economic reforms could boost growth, improve revenue collection and increase confidence in the extractives sector. In neighbouring Cameroon, the CAR’s access to global markets could be threatened by prolonged anti-government unrest or the spread of its Anglophone conflict towards Douala.
As with the previous war in Sudan’s Darfur region, the ongoing Sudanese Civil War has driven tens of thousands of refugees into the CAR’s unstable Vakaga region and contributed to violence along the CAR-Sudan border (ReliefWeb, 2025). Internal conflicts in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan may spillover into the CAR’s remote eastern hinterland. Should Touadéra agree to the Emirati proposition, the CAR will become exposed to geopolitical competition originating from the spiralling regional and humanitarian crises in Sudan.
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