The Discreet Rise of Chinese Private Security Companies: Implications for Africa
China has built a state-linked network of private security companies across 14 African states, protecting over $700 billion in BRI assets and reshaping regional security while skirting its non-interference doctrine. Operating in legal grey zones, these PSCs blend commercial protection with strategic influence, offering Beijing deniability even as their footprint grows.
While Western attention has largely focused on Russian mercenary activity in Africa, China has developed a parallel but distinct model: a network of state-linked security contractors now operating across 14 African countries. These firms project an estimated $700 billion in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments and employ thousands of former People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel. Officially prohibited from carrying weapons, they have nonetheless become the custodians of China’s expanding economic presence across the continent. Their rise represents a new model of overseas security providing, circumventing Beijing’s non-interference doctrine while fundamentally reshaping African security architecture.
Strategic Context and Operational Framework
Chinese Private Security Companies (PSCs) provide defensive services such as personnel protection, site security and risk assessments, distinguishing them from Private Military Companies (PMCs) which conduct offensive operations and combat support. This distinction matters in China’s context: Beijing explicitly forbids PMCs while permitting Chinese PSCs under regulations introduced in September 2009 (Markusen, 2022).
However, Chinese PSC entities are not completely private. All Chinese PSCs operating abroad must maintain majority state ownership (at least 51% government ownership), operate under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Security, and comply with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) directives (Markusen, 2022). As Paul Nantulya observes, “The term ‘private security company’ is misleading in the Chinese context. As a party state, China requires all enterprises to obey party directives” (Military Africa, 2023).
The launch of the BRI in 2013 transformed China’s security framework overseas. Africa became crucial to its expansion: 52 of 55 African Union member states joined the BRI, receiving over $700 billion in Chinese contracts between 2013 and 2023 (Brookings, 2024). Between 2000 and 2022, China extended $170 billion in loans to 49 African countries, financing over 12,000 kilometers of infrastructure (Africa Center, 2024). As investments grew, so too did risks. Chinese companies suffered 350 serious security incidents between 2015 and 2017 (Africa Defense Forum, 2023), with devastating recent attacks including nine Chinese nationals dead in the Central African Republic (March 2023) and another nine in the Democratic Republic of Congo (July 2024).
For Beijing, PSCs offer multiple advantages over PMCs like: deniability to domestic audiences, geopolitical deniability, circumvention of legal constraints on PLA deployment and substantial cost savings (Markusen, 2022).
Major Operations and Geographic Deployment
Estimates suggest that 20 to 40 Chinese PSCs operate internationally, employing roughly 3,200 security professionals overseas (Markusen, 2022). However, actual figures in Africa likely exceed official figures as they are difficult to verify.
Beijing DeWe Security Service, established in 2011, is the most visible operator. It employs approximately 2,000 contractors protecting Kenya’s $3.6-4 billion Standard Gauge Railway and Ethiopia’s $4 billion natural gas project (Military Africa, 2023; Jamestown Foundation, 2020). DeWe’s most remarkable operation came in July 2016 when it evacuated 330 Chinese CNPC oil workers from South Sudan during the civil war, while Chinese UN peacekeepers remained confined to their bases (Carnegie Endowment, 2020).
Frontier Services Group (FSG) represents a unique hybrid model. Founded in 2014 by Blackwater’s founder and now fully owned by the CITIC Group, China’s largest state-owner conglomerate, FSG generated around $100 million in revenue between 2024 and 2025; operating across the DRC, Kenya, Nigeria and South Sudan. In June 2023, the US Department of Commerce added FSG to its Entity List for providing training and support to the PLA (Africa Defense Forum, 2023).
Hua Xin Zhong An, founded in 2004, became the first Chinese PSC to receive the International Code of Conduct certification in 2019. The company holds rare government authorization for armed maritime escorts, maintaining a near monopoly on security for China Shipping Container Lines and COSCO vessels, with sea marshals permitted to use lethal force in self-defense (Jamestown Foundation, 2019).
Chinese PSCs currently operate in 14 African countries, including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, DRC, CAR and Mali (Africa Center, 2024). The combined scale already surpasses China’s 2,500 PLA soldiers stationed on the continent (Markusen, 2022).
Operational Models and Accountability Challenges
Chinese PSCs adapt their operations to host-country regulations. In North Africa’s regulated environments, firms emphasize cooperation with local security companies and government forces (Kharief, 2022). In East Africa, companies like DeWe train local guards, provide supplementary fundings and equipment, as well as share intelligence directly with host ministries (Africa Center, 2024). The most permissive environments exist in conflict-affected states such as Sudan and South Sudan, where PSCs accompany local forces on operations and work directly with local armed personnel (Kharief, 2022). Since Chinese law prohibits PSC personnel from carrying weapons abroad, companies can circumvent restrictions by collaborating with local armed groups, creating accountability concerns as armed groups answer to foreign commercial interests rather than legitimate government authority (Arduino, 2022).
As a result, these arrangements blur the line between state and private authority, making PSCs operate in a legal gray zone (al-Badawi, 2024). They are effectively hired by the Chinese government, albeit not officially. Domestic Chinese law covers PSC activities within China but makes no provisions for international operations. No bilateral agreements specifically govern PSC operations in African states, and only three major Chinese firms have achieved international certification (Jamestown Foundation, 2020).
The Business and Human Rights Resource Center documented 181 allegations against Chinese companies in Africa between 2013 to 2020, with only 24% responding to allegations of human rights violations (BHRRC, 2020). Recent examples include Chinese contractors arrested in Zambia (2018) for illegally training local security forces and a mine manager in Zimbabwe (2020) charged with attempted murder after shooting two workers (Africa Defense Forum, 2023).
China’s PLA Support Base, established in July 2017, now serves as the logistical and intelligence hub for PSC operations across East Africa (Military Africa, 2023). The facility houses between 1,000-2,000 personnel and provides forward logistics for PSC maritime operations, intelligence collection platforms, and coordination with PLA Navy anti-piracy missions, representing a military-civil fusion that maintains plausible deniability (Markusen, 2022).
Comparative Analysis: Three Distinct Security Models
Chinese PSCs differ fundamentally from both Russian and Western counterparts. Wagner Group, renamed as Russia’s “Africa Corps” after founder Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in 2023, engages in direct combat operations with heavy weapons and functions as an overt tool of Russian foreign policy (VOA News, 2023). Wagner maintained offices in 20 African countries by 2019, with UN reports citing mass executions, rape, and the use of banned landmines (The Diplomat, 2023).
Western PMCs, such as Blackwater/Academi, operate under market competition and legal accountability mechanisms, including the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct. Their operations focus on training and logistics rather than combat (Arduino, 2022).
Chinese PSCs position themselves in between: they are partially state-controlled entities serving party-directed objectives through passive security, while maintaining low profiles and avoiding direct combat (Military Africa, 2023). They work through local partners for armed operations, emphasize surveillance technology and cost roughly one-tenth of Western equivalents. Accountability remains minimal, Chinese law does not apply abroad, and many host nations lack the regulatory capacity to enforce accountability (Kharief, 2022).
Implications and the Future Trajectory
Recent developments provide inflection points. The July 2024 DRC attack that killed nine Chinese nationals renewed discussions about protection capabilities (Military Africa, 2023). China’s November 2023 national standard for overseas security operations represents an effort to establish a regulatory framework, though international operations still occupy legal gray zones (Eurasia Review, 2025).
At the September 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Summit, Beijing pledged $140 million in military grants, training for 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 police officers, signaling deeper institutionalization of its security presence (Brookings, 2024). Meanwhile, the transformation of Wagner into the Africa Corps, the political transitions in the Sahel and Western military withdrawals from the region all create opportunities for China to expand its securitizing role in Africa.
Analysts emphasize the urgent need for agreements governing Chinese PSC operations. Alessandro Arduino argues that a proper integration of foreign private security services will benefit host governments but requires bilateral agreements on codes of conduct, oversight, regulation, and cooperation, as present for Western PMCs (Arduino, 2022). Proposed frameworks include: clear use-of-force protocols, to establish in which specific cases the use of force is allowed (despite that Chinese PSC do not usually carry out offensive operations), accountability mechanisms, mandatory transparency, and requirements for international certification.
After becoming one of the largest economic partners of many African countries, China needs to preserve its investment in turbulent conflict-prone areas. The PRC uses a hybrid approach, blending training, surveillance and indirect support — an approach that differs from the traditionally interventionist West. In this landscape, the recent French exit from Sahelian defense agreements and the US drawdown in Chad and Niger provides Beijing with an opening to assume a more visible role, not only as a security provider but also as a political and diplomatic actor that shapes the narrative of the Global South.
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