An Arab Alliance: A New Hope?

Middle Eastern politics have been haunted by the idea of a “Arab NATO” for more than fifty years. When the brutal reality of power struggles are faced, it fades away, a repeated ideal of collective authority in a fractured area that arises at the times of crises. However, the ghost re appeared in September 2025. With the release of the new “Regional Security and Cooperation Framework” coordinated by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, the debate over whether a single Arab military alliance will ever exist after years of unsuccessful efforts has been brought back to reality. 

A History of False Starts 

The idea of Arab collective defense is not something fresh. Although the Joint Defense Pact of the Arab League was created in 1950, it never evolved to a strong, operational military force like NATO. The Trump administration’s 2017 campaign for a “Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA)” was the most significant effort in the recent period. This anti-Iranian alliance of Sunni Arab nations was regarded as the definitive “Arab NATO.” 

Before it ever launched, it failed catastrophically. The fatal fault of the project came to light by the 2017 Qatar crisis which the UAE and Saudi Arabia, two potential MESA members, blocked fellow participant Qatar. The situation demonstrated that the internal conflicts within the group extended beyond a common antipathy against Iran. The member states remained extremely unsure of each other’s objectives, differed on goals and were reluctant to sacrifice sovereignty. In an extended tale of bold plans without a political basis, MESA became merely another episode. 

The New Calculus in 2025 

This time, according to supporters of the current 2025 framework, is different. For them, the prior calculus has changed because of three major changes in the geopolitical setting. 

The first one is an awareness that there is an imminent and obvious threat. Although there has always been anxiety about Iran, its effective ballistic missile and drone technologies, nuclear developments and the military triumphs of its proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen has provided Arab capitals a sense of urgency and collective danger. In contrast to prior, more abstract obstacles, the continual danger to vital facilities and trade routes has brought the public attention. 

The second is the evolving American influence. The present effort is seen as a locally owned reaction to a considered U.S. retreat from Middle Eastern security in contrast to MESA which was seen by many as the American-backed effort. A shift towards Asia and contradictory policies have disrupted years of trust on Washington security framework. An appealing new tale of independence has been formed as a consequence. The objective has shifted from merely satisfying Washington to surviving in the Middle East after America.

Third, an updated geopolitical map of the region has been created by the Abraham Accords. As the outcome of Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain repairing their relations, a de facto anti-Iranian coalition has been formed. The agreements have facilitated a more transparent strategic alignment based on the collective danger posed by Tehran by transforming the dispute between Israel and Palestine from a major barrier to a contentious issue for prominent Gulf countries. A large amount of political baggage that prevented earlier attempts has been eliminated as a result. Thus, the present effort is being constructed on an established basis of implicit security collaboration. 

The Ghosts of the Past: Why It Still Might Fail 

Even with these strong motivators, the ghosts of previous failed attempts have not been eliminated. It’s already starting to show the identical foundational problems that crippled prior attempts. 

The leadership controversy is still the key barrier. There is still a core competition between Saudi Arabia, with its economic power and religious authority and Egypt, with its significant, traditional army and historical importance. The d iplomatic circles started to hear rumors regarding disagreements about if the joint headquarters should be in Riyadh or Cairo during the days of the September 15 declaration. This goes beyond simple logistics; it is a matter of who ultimately holds the authority and control within the alliance. 

Furthermore, while Iran represents a common threat, threat perceptions diverge. The main threat to the Gulf monarchs is Iranian proxy and missiles. The instability created by Libya and counterterrorism in the Sinai may be Egypt’s more pressing concerns. It is Jordan’s border with Syria. Similar to how an Egyptian general could be reluctant to become involved in the challenges of the Persian Gulf, a Saudi commander might be unwilling to commit the alliance’s resources to a North African crisis. 

Lastly, there is a general absence of trust. It takes more than one declaration to end years of political rivalry, proxy wars and rooted distrust between states. Even though there is a strong political will to work together now, it is fragile and may quickly collapse under the burden of an actual catastrophe. 

Imperative and Reality 

Can an Arab NATO be formed? In terms of strategy, it is currently essential. It makes sense to combine resources to combat common challenges in a time when superpowers are unpredictable. To date, there has been no more serious and naturally motivated endeavor to make this effort a reality than the 2025 “Regional Security and Cooperation Framework”. 

Political circumstances, not strategic logic, will ultimately determine the effort’s fate. Its effectiveness depends on whether the obvious and immediate threat from outside sources can ultimately drive Arab leaders to put aside their long-standing conflicts and divides. The

upcoming months are going to demonstrate whether this fresh effort is the latest, most advanced vision in the long history of the Arab NATO ideal or the cornerstone of an entirely new regional security architecture. 

References 

•  Atlantic Council. (2024). The Abraham Accords and the New Middle East Security Architecture. Accessed September 21, 2025, from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ 
•  Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). (2023). Why the ‘Arab NATO’ Failed to Launch. Accessed September 21, 2025, from 
• https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-arab-nato-failed-launch 
•  Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). (2024). U.S. Strategy in a Changing Middle East. Accessed September 21, 2025, from https://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north africa 
•  Reuters. (2024). U.S. still seeking integrated air defense for Mideast allies, official says. Accessed September 21, 2025, from https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us still-seeking-integrated-air-defense-mideast-allies-official-says-2024-03- 05/ 
•  The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. (2025). Riyadh and Cairo: The Strained Partnership Shaping the Middle East. Accessed September 21, 2025, from https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/