Tajikistan: Between the Bear and the Dragon

As Central Asia undergoes rapid geopolitical change, Tajikistan faces a defining question: how can one of the region’s smallest and poorest states balance the competing interests of its two most powerful neighbors? This article explores Tajikistan’s delicate act of hedging between Russia, its long-standing security partner, and China, its fast-rising economic benefactor. 

Intro

Tajikistan is a minnow in the Central Asian pond. The poorest country in the former Soviet Union (USSR) unenviably falls inside the geopolitical backyards of both China and Russia, and shares a volatile 843 mile long border with Afghanistan. Despite the internal calm ushered in by President Emomali Rahmon following the Tajik Civil War (1992-97), the country has long been regarded as a regional powder keg because of its poverty and susceptibility to Islamic fundamentalism (Rotar, 1996). The constancy of Tajikistan’s peace depends on its ability to balance the interests of long-term security partner Russia and emerging commercial partner China.  

Tajikistan’s oldest friend?  

Post-independence Tajikistan’s frail government required external support to restore internal stability. As the successor state to the USSR, Russia kept troops inside Tajikistan to maintain its interests, using its military to intervene on behalf of the government in the civil war and guard the Afghan-Tajik border (USIP, 1995). Russia’s military presence aims to prevent narcotics and Islamist extremism spreading from Afghanistan into Central Asia and subsequently Russia. Remittances from Tajik migrants in Russia are vital to Tajikistan’s economic stability. Persian-speaking Tajikistan also uses the Russian relationship to hedge against Türkiye’s pan-Turkic engagement with its neighbouring states (Olimov).

But Russia’s shifting international position creates long term issues for the Russo-Tajik relationship. Russian credibility as the regional power in Central Asia is undermined by the draining of its military resources by the Russo-Ukrainian War, plus its non-intervention during the Third Karabakh War and collapse of Syria’s Assad regime (Melkonian, 2024). Following the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Russia (perpetrated by Tajiks alighted with Islamic State Khorasan Province), anti-Tajik racism and deportations of migrant workers strained Tajikistan’s remittance-dependent economy and increased the global perception of Tajikistan as an incubator of religious extremism (Reuters, 2024). 

Tajikistan on the Belt and Road

China offers Tajikistan an alternate bilateral partner as the asymmetric Russo-Tajik relationship wobbles. Tajik exports to and imports from Russia in 2023 were $137.4 million and $1.580 billion respectively, with exports to and imports from China that same year totaling $313.8 million and $1.189 billion, reducing its economic dependence on Russia (Tajikistan Trade Portal). Chinese corporations are viable investors in Tajikistan’s commodity sector because of their higher risk-tolerance compared to their European counterparts, in addition to their access to state-backed funds from Chinese banks unavailable to their Russian counterparts (Dayar, 2025).  

Tajikistan is significant to China’s Belt and Road (BRI) initiative, sitting on the Middle Corridor route that transports Chinese goods through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea and Caucasus, and into Türkiye and Europe (Aguiar, 2025). The route bypasses Iran and Russia, creating a pathway for the Central Asian states to sell energy and commodities to Europe without relying on Russian infrastructure (Valansi, 2025). Benefits from the BRI include proximity to infrastructure developments in Kazakhstan- allowing Tajikistan to efficiently move its exports to European and Chinese markets- plus enhanced telecommunication and mass surveillance technologies (IISS, 2022, P. 91).

The Reliability Question: Costs of Closer Ties with Beijing

Deepening Sino-Tajik relations also pose several issues. Many of Central Asia’s large scale BRI projects threaten to reduce Tajikistan’s geopolitical significance by side-stepping the mountainous country in favour of trade routes through flatter Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The impact of Chinese investments in Tajikistan may also be unsustainable; in terms of debts incurred on large-scale infrastructure, a perceived loss in national sovereignty, local resentment towards Chinese workers and ecological damage from mining projects (Deng, 2022, P. 70; RFE T, 2024).

China has established small military installations in eastern Tajikistan to monitor the Taliban (Goble, 2024) but has yet to provide as much assistance as Russia. The Tajik government has eagerly invited Chinese personnel to train and support its own military (Lemon and Norov, 2025). A stable Tajikistan would reduce the potential for Islamist groups to infiltrate China’s restive Xinjiang province. The multilateral Chinese-initiated Shanghai Cooperation Organisation initiative supports Tajikistan’s counterterror activities, but cannot replicate the scale of Russia’s bilateral commitments and is purposefully limited to allay Russian fears of Chinese encroachment into its Central Asian sphere of influence (Dittmer and Yu, 2017, P. 235).

Beyond Russia and China: Regional Balancing Acts

Tajikistan could reduce its dependence on Russia and China through a multi-vector foreign policy. Iran, with whom Tajikistan shares Persian cultural ties, also perceives Afghanistan’s Taliban government as a security threat and wants to use Tajikistan to counterbalance against Turkish influence in Central Asia (Fanger, 2023). Alternatively Tajikistan could follow Russia’s lead in recognising the Taliban regime to ease bilateral tensions as Afghanistan gradually stabilises (IISS, 2024, P. 288). 

Afghan-Tajik acrimony contrasts with Tajikistan’s outreach to other stakeholders in Central and South Asia. One example is its rapprochement with Kyrgyzstan, culminating in this year’s groundbreaking border demarcation agreement (Khassenkhanova, 2025). Through constructive relations with Kyrgyzstan and emerging regional power Uzbekistan, Tajikistan reduces the potential for military confrontation over water rights and the fertile Fergana Valley (Pannier, 2025). An economically ascendant India also creates new geopolitical opportunities. Tajikistan has utilised this budding relationship to diversify its trade partners and deter Taliban aggression via India’s military presence at the Farkhor Air Base (Deb, 2021).   

The Bear or the Dragon?

As Russia’s military credibility and grasp on Central Asia decline, Tajikistan moves closer to China’s economic orbit. However, despite their alternative visions for Central Asia both China and Russia view President Rahmon as a beacon of stability. The alternatives to Rahmon would be strategically unacceptable- either a power vacuum that foments regional instability or a democratic regime that sympathizes with the United States and competes with China and Russia’s autocratic governance model. Thus, Tajikistan’s paradox is clear: too small to dictate its fate, yet too strategic to be ignored. As Russia’s military grip weakens and China’s economic clout rises, Dushanbe’s survival depends on walking a careful tightrope — a balancing act that may define Central Asia’s future.

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