Drought, Displacement and the Rise of Armed Non-State Actors in the Horn of Africa

A Climate Crisis Becomes a Security Collapse 

As the Horn of Africa experiencing its fifth consecutive failed rainy season, more than 23 million people are now facing acute food insecurity and the threat of displacement (Danish Refugee  Council, 2023). What initially emerged as a climate-related crisis has evolved into a complex  security emergency. In a region marked by fragile governance, persistent poverty, and political  instability, environmental collapse has opened critical power vacuums. Armed non-state actors,  most prominently Al-Shabaab, have moved to fill these gaps by providing water, food, and basic  services in return for allegiance. As formal institutions weaken under the strain of climate  pressures, these groups are transitioning from insurgent movements into parallel systems of  authority.

The shift from insurgent group to de facto local authority is not incidental; it reflects a calculated  political strategy. Armed non-state actors are increasingly leveraging climate-induced emergencies  to establish their presence in areas where the state is absent or ineffective. In some regions, they  remain the sole providers of humanitarian assistance. By delivering essential goods and services,  these groups not only gain public support but also construct an alternative form of governance  rooted in militant control. Over time, this process can entrench their role within local administrative structures, complicating future efforts at stabilization and peacebuilding.

Threat Multipliers: When Drought Sparks Displacement and Conflict 

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has described climate change as a “threat  multiplier,” particularly in regions characterized by weak governance and socioeconomic  vulnerability (IPCC, 2021). This dynamic is acutely evident in the Horn of Africa. Pastoralist  communities that once relied on seasonal migration to access grazing land are now confronted with  barren terrain and vanishing water sources. Repeated crop failures have undermined rural  economies, forcing millions to relocate, not due to conflict, but in response to an increasingly  inhospitable environment. These shifts have intensified tensions between migrating pastoralist  groups and sedentary farming populations, resulting in localized disputes over diminishing natural resources.

While often localized in nature, these conflicts are indicative of deeper structural vulnerabilities  within the state. In the absence of sustainable land governance, equitable resource distribution, and  effective mechanisms for conflict resolution, such tensions tend to intensify. What may begin as  intercommunal disputes can rapidly escalate into broader national instability, particularly when  armed actors intervene as self-appointed mediators or protectors. In such contexts, the lines  between environmental stress, ethnic rivalry, and political fragmentation become increasingly  indistinct.

Filling the Void: How Armed Groups Gain Power Through Climate Crises 

These institutional gaps have been systematically exploited by armed non-state actors. In Somalia,  Al-Shabaab has capitalized on the absence of state authority in areas most affected by climate stress. By controlling access to water sources, food supply routes, and trade corridors, the group  consolidates both strategic power and community reliance. In certain regions, it is Al-Shabaab, not  the Somali government, that delivers emergency drought assistance. This erosion of clear state  functions weakens governmental legitimacy and transforms humanitarian emergencies into arenas  of contested authority.

Similar dynamics are becoming visible across the Sahel and East Africa. In Mali and South Sudan,  armed groups have adopted comparable strategies: occupying areas abandoned by the state,  providing basic goods, and exploiting the social fragmentation intensified by climate stress. This  behavior is not simply opportunistic; it reflects a calculated adjustment to the geopolitical  conditions emerging in a warming world. In many cases, these groups are demonstrating a capacity  to function within climate-disrupted environments more effectively than the formal governments  they contest.

Climate as a Weapon: Coercion Through Scarcity 

Environmental scarcity is increasingly instrumentalized as a means of coercion. Armed groups  exploit control over essential resources, such as water and food, not only to recruit supporters but  also to punish dissent and enforce compliance. Communities that resist their authority may be  deliberately denied access to these life-sustaining goods. In such contexts, climate stress ceases to  be a peripheral factor; it is transformed into a strategic weapon of conflict.

The weaponization of environmental resources fosters a cycle of dependency and fear. Civilians  are rendered vulnerable, positioned as pawns in the strategic calculations of armed groups vying  for control. When humanitarian aid routes are obstructed or manipulated for political gain, the  influence of non-state actors becomes further entrenched, as affected populations are left with  limited alternatives. In this way, environmental degradation functions not only as a consequence  but also as an instrument of asymmetric warfare.

The International Lag: Why Aid Is Not Enough 

The international response has been marked by fragmentation and delay. Although institutions  such as the United Nations and the African Union acknowledge the link between climate change  and security, their interventions often remain reactive rather than preventative. Development  assistance continues to prioritize immediate relief efforts over strategies aimed at building long term resilience, leaving affected communities exposed to recurring climate shocks such as  droughts and floods.

Moreover, global security institutions continue to lag behind evolving climate realities. Military  alliances such as NATO have only recently begun to integrate climate considerations into their  strategic frameworks. However, a persistent gap remains between climate adaptation strategies  and traditional counterinsurgency doctrines. Greater investment in renewable infrastructure,  climate-resilient agriculture, and participatory water governance may ultimately prove more  effective in undermining extremist recruitment than prolonged reliance on kinetic military  operations.

Redefining Security: From Military Might to Climate Resilience 

Reframing security in the age of climate collapse requires a new vocabulary. Threats are no longer  defined solely by guns and borders but by the absence of rainfall, the degradation of soil, and the  failure of institutions to adapt. Armed non-state actors thrive in these gaps, and unless those gaps  are addressed, the cycle of drought, displacement, and disorder will persist.

Security policy must move beyond deterrence and embrace prevention through sustainability.  Resilient ecosystems and empowered local governance are not just environmental goals. They are  national security imperatives. This approach demands coordination between climate scientists,  development agencies, and military strategists, forging a new kind of peace architecture suitable  for a warming world.

The Horn of Africa as a Climate-Security Test Case 

In conclusion, the Horn of Africa is not only suffering the effects of climate change but also  offering a view of the kinds of conflict zones we may see more frequently in the future, places  where environmental breakdown and armed violence go hand in hand. Recognizing this overlap is  a crucial first step. We must start building responses that are both resilient and fair, and that  understand climate not as a distant context for conflict, but as a driving force behind it.

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