The Evangelical–Populist Nexus and Democratic Risks in Brazil

Over the past four decades, there have been profound changes in the religious and political spheres of Brazil. The explosive growth of Pentecostal and evangelical Christianity, particularly through the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (IURD) and other denominations, has reshaped Brazil’s religious landscape and, in recent years, its political culture. Evangelicals now represent more than a quarter of Brazilian voters and an even greater proportion of politically engaged constituents (Datafolha, 2022; Chesnut, 2014).

The Convergence of Evangelical Power and Right-Wing Populism

Religious and institutional leaders have transitioned from pastoral work to direct engagement in electoral politics. Their participation has manifested in various forms: confessional parties such as Republicanos, parliamentary caucuses like the Evangelical Bench, and informal electoral endorsements from churches (Cerqueira, 2021). Evangelicals have constructed a national political architecture centred on church congregations, radio and television broadcasting, and conservative social values. Their success is evident in parliamentary representation—evangelicals had comprised nearly 20% of the Brazilian parliament by 2014 (Oualalou, 2019).

This religious mobilization has been accompanied by a specific form of populism promoted by Jair Bolsonaro. His 2018 presidential campaign actively targeted evangelical voters, blending biblical imagery with political rhetoric. The campaign slogan, “Brazil above all, God above everyone”, mirrored evangelical nationalist ideology, and his victory address quoted John 8:32: “You shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free” (Albernaz, 2019). Bolsonaro habitually invoked divine leadership, gendered roles, and the family as the pillar of Brazilian society, closely echoing evangelical positions.

This consistency aligns with what scholars refer to as right-wing populism. According to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017), populism divides society into two camps—the righteous masses and the corrupt elite—and posits that politics should represent the unified “general will.” In Brazil, this paradigm has taken a religious turn: “the people” are depicted as morally upright believers, while the “elite” includes liberal politicians, secular institutions, and human rights advocates. In this narrative, populist leaders—claiming divine legitimacy—become perceived as national saviours.

Institutional Fragility, Political Volatility, and the Role of the Media

The intersection of populist politics and evangelical religion poses acute threats to Brazil’s democratic institutions. Political authority is redefined in moral and religious terms, undermining the legitimacy of institutions tasked with upholding secular governance, such as the judiciary, media, and regulatory agencies. These institutions are stigmatized as corrupt or “un-Brazilian,” positioned in opposition to a popular will constructed by religious-political elites (Urbinati, 2019).

Bolsonaro’s presidency exemplified how this dynamic operates. His administration routinely undermined institutional norms, discouraged accountability, and weakened ministries that did not align with his religious or political agenda. When his Minister of Health resisted his COVID-19 denialism, the minister was dismissed—part of a broader pattern of politicizing public administration based on ideological conformity rather than technical expertise (Layton et al., 2021).

Meanwhile, evangelical churches continued to expand their political influence. A significant level of them provided direct voting guidance to congregants. Statistics from the 2022 elections show that 28% of evangelicals received voting suggestions directly from their churches, compared to 13% among Catholics (Datafolha, 2022). Bolsonaro received disproportionate support from evangelical voters—nearly half of the demographic—while his left-leaning opponent, Lula da Silva, received greater support among Catholics (Carreirão, Borba & Ribeiro, 2016).

The media was instrumental in enabling this religious-political project. Bolsonaro’s administration spent over R$30 million in public funds on evangelical media outlets, particularly on radio and television stations owned by supportive pastors (Fonseca & Correia, 2020). These platforms blended religious programming with political propaganda. Televangelists championed Bolsonaro’s leadership, portraying him as divinely appointed while vilifying opposition figures.

Social media amplified these messages. Bolsonaro’s online presence regularly invoked themes of God, country, and family, constructing a nationalist-religious identity that resonated with evangelical audiences. According to Mendonça and Duarte Caetano (2021), his visual and discursive strategies employed three tactics: presenting himself as a man of the people through displays of simplicity; projecting exceptionality through military imagery; and co-opting state authority via ceremonial displays of presidential power.

This intersection of state coffers, religious authorities, and mass media has reshaped the public sphere in Brazil. Instead of being a forum of ideas, media became an arena of ideological consolidation and exclusionary messages. Political rivals are characterized as menaces to national salvation or foes of Christian civilization, constraining pluralism and subjecting democratic debate to risk.

Erosion of Democratic Norms and Regional Repercussions

The greatest danger posed by the evangelical-populist alliance is the erosion of democratic norms. While populism and religion can serve as powerful political mobilization tools, their combination—when rooted in moral absolutism—can foster authoritarian tendencies. Religious populism demands loyalty not merely to a political agenda but to a hierarchical moral order, wherein outsiders are depicted as illegitimate or evil (Roberts, 2021).

This dynamic has produced tangible consequences in Brazil. Following Bolsonaro’s electoral defeat in 2022, many supporters—the majority of whom were of evangelical background had refused to accept the results. Encouraged by conspiratorial narratives and religious rhetoric, they staged protests and participated in violent invasions in Brasília, including attempts to storm government buildings in Praça dos Três Poderes (Foley, 2019). These events illustrate how populist rhetoric, when imbued with theological certainty, can legitimize anti-democratic actions as righteous resistance.

This phenomenon is not unique to Brazil alone. Comparable evangelical-populist alliances have emerged elsewhere—for example, Donald Trump’s support from white evangelical voters in the United States, and Nayib Bukele’s religiously inflected populism in El Salvador (Staley, 2021). Brazil thus exemplifies a broader pattern of moralized populism that threatens liberal democratic norms across the Americas.

The risks extend beyond electoral outcomes. Populist leaders who undermine institutional checks and balances shift the political center toward exclusionary values. Evangelical populism is often marked by hostility toward multiculturalism, indifference to minority rights, and advocacy for religion-based legislation. These tendencies erode Brazil’s constitutional commitment to secularism and inclusive citizenship.

Populist ideology, when mixed with religious certitude, produces a mode of governance that is resistant to compromise, champions the demonization of its opponents, and champions the primacy of charismatic authority over institutional continuity. The longer such a political-religious coalition holds sway, the harder it is to revive trust in democratic institutions or consolidate an inclusive civic culture.

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