Strategic Shifts in the Arctic: AI, UK Strategy, and the Decline of Multilateral Governance
The Arctic climate is continuing to warm at an alarming rate, AMAP’s new Arctic climate report for 2024 reveals (Hansen, 2025). The report concludes that the region is now characterised by extreme weather events, widespread wildfires, melting permafrost, and accelerating ocean acidification (Hansen, 2025). These environmental transformations have significant global implications, but effective multilateral climate cooperation in the region remains elusive. The geopolitical landscape, marked by renewed great power competition and the sidelining of climate action under the Trump administration, has stifled coordinated responses to these challenges. The deepening intersection between the Arctic environment and rising geopolitical tensions has caused the UK to recalibrate its Arctic strategy in response to Russia’s growing assertiveness, the role of AI, and the weakened position of the Arctic Council.
The Militarisation of the Arctic and Russia’s Strategic Posture:
Russia increasingly defines the Arctic as a core national and strategic interest, a perspective reinforced by Washington’s assertive stance over Greenland. Moscow’s ambitions are underscored by its continued expansion of military infrastructure, control of over half the Arctic coastline, and possession of the world’s largest fleet of nuclear powered icebreakers (Komin and Hosa, 2025). Central to this posture is Russia’s deployment of a substantial portion of its nuclear arsenal in Arctic-based submarines, which form the backbone of its second-strike deterrence strategy. The melting of Arctic sea ice, a direct consequence of climate change, has heightened Russian anxieties about the visibility of its strategic assets. Easier navigation and surveillance capabilities due to ice melt have compromised the shielding of its nuclear submarines, weakening what was once a natural defensive barrier (Komin and Hosa, 2025). In response, Moscow has intensified militarisation efforts in the region, viewing Western surveillance as a direct threat to its deterrent capability.
In parallel, Russia’s economic motivations further entrench its Arctic strategy. Russian officials have quantified that 80% of the country’s natural gas and 17% of its oil reserves are located within the Russian Arctic zone (Wahden, 2024). However, these ambitions have been curtailed by extensive Western sanctions, beginning with the 2014 restrictions imposed after the annexation of Crimea and intensifying following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The EU’s 17th sanctions package, adopted in May 2025, continues to target Russia’s Arctic energy projects, which the Kremlin interprets as an attempt to weaken its economic sovereignty (Christie, 2015; Komin and Hosa, 2025).
The UK’s Strategic Reorientation Toward the High North
The UK has responded to these evolving dynamics by strengthening its defence and diplomatic engagement in the High North. A key development is a new joint project between the UK and Iceland, backed by £554,000 in UK funding to explore how AI can be utilised to enhance monitoring of Russian activities in the Arctic (Devlin, 2025). This effort reflects the UK’s broader commitment to enhancing national security through technological innovation and increased regional presence. Foreign Secretary David Lammy, has emphasised the importance of Norway and Iceland’s involvement in this strategic realignment, characterising them as Britain’s closest Arctic neighbours and NATO allies. During a recent visit to the Archipelago of Svalbard (Lammy, 2025), he inspected how British and Norwegian ships can jointly patrol the high seas of the Arctic to detect and deter the increasingly sophisticated subsea threats to security posed by Russia’s northern fleet. This engagement aligns with Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s broader security strategy, which includes the largest sustained increase in defence spending since the Cold War – raising it to 2.5% of GDP by 2027, with an ambition to reach 3% in the following Parliament (Lammy, 2025). Demonstrable advances include UK contributions to NATO maritime surveillance via Rivet Joint and P-8 Poseidon aircraft, and deeper interoperability with Norwegian forces. Norway has even committed a frigate to join the UK’s Carrier Strike Group deployment to the Indo-Pacific, underscoring the breadth of bilateral military cooperation (Healey, 2025). Beyond hard security, the evident emerging role of AI in playing a role in Arctic security shows the UK’s evolving posture in Arctic defence.
AI and the Digitalisation of Arctic Surveillance:
Artificial intelligence is notably reshaping defence operations in the Arctic, particularly in the domains of surveillance, monitoring, and risk assessment. Devlin (2025) highlights the critical role AI plays in detecting hostile state activity and protecting vulnerable subsea infrastructure, including energy pipelines and internet cables. These are targets of growing importance in modern hybrid warfare. Given the Arctic’s harsh environment and limited human presence, AI enables persistent, cost-effective monitoring across vast maritime spaces. The UK’s integration of AI into its Arctic operations marks a significant shift toward anticipatory defence, aimed at identifying threats before they materialise.
However, the use of AI in such contested spaces also raises critical questions about transparency, accountability, and unintended escalation. Caruso (2024) cautions that the over reliance on opaque systems, wherein technical errors and biases could prompt a misinterpretation of actions. While AI is a valuable tool for enhancing the UK’s Arctic posture, its use must be governed by clear oversight mechanisms and embedded within a broader political and ethical framework.
The Decline of the Arctic Council and the Future of Regional Governance:
Alongside this technological shift, the Arctic’s institutional landscape has experienced a dramatic breakdown in multilateral cooperation. The Arctic Council was established in 1996 as a platform for environmental and Indigenous cooperation, and has faced significant disruption since 2022 (Fella, 2025). The council was formed in the spirit of protecting the environment and the people of the North, representing a network of science, policy, and diplomacy (Simpson, 2023). However, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the remaining seven Arctic states suspended all joint activities with Moscow, leading to a near paralysis of Council operations (Humpert, 2022). The timing was especially fraught, as Russia held the chairmanship of the Council during this rupture. The institution, once praised for facilitating peaceful dialogue and environmental governance, now faces a credibility crisis. Russia’s withdrawal from joint research projects has also resulted in substantial data gaps, particularly in climate monitoring (Canova and Pic, 2023). Despite these setbacks, some member states remain hopeful. As the current chair, Norway has expressed optimism about reviving cooperation and reintegrating Russia under a renewed structure that reflects present geopolitical realities (Høglund, 2023). However, without structural reform, the Council may struggle to regain its former relevance amid rising militarisation and strategic competition.
Conclusion:
The Arctic has entered a new strategic era, defined by the convergence of environmental transformation, great power competition, and technological innovation. As Russia doubles down on military expansion and resource control, the UK is repositioning itself as a proactive actor in the region – bolstering alliances, investing in AI surveillance, and enhancing maritime capabilities. While these efforts mark a robust defence of national and regional interests, they also highlight the erosion of cooperative governance in the High North. The disruption of the Arctic Council exemplifies the challenges of sustaining multilateralism in a securitised environment.
References:
Canova and Pic (2023) “The Arctic Council in Transition: Challenges and Perspectives for the New Norwegian Chairship” online: The Arctic Institute <thearcticinstitute.org/arctic council-transition-challenges-perspectives-new-norwegian-chairship/>.
Caruso, C. (2024). The Risks of Artificial Intelligence in Weapons Design. [online] Harvard.edu. Available at: https://hms.harvard.edu/news/risks-artificial-intelligence weapons-design.
Christie, E. (2015). Sanctions after Crimea: Have they worked? [online] NATO Review. Available at: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2015/07/13/sanctions-after-crimea have-they-worked/index.html.
Devlin, K. (2025). UK turns to AI in bid to tackle Putin’s threat in Arctic. [online] The Independent. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/bulletin/news/ai-arctic-uk-russia ukraine-b2758281.html [Accessed 28 May 2025].
Fella, S. (2025). What is the Arctic Council? [online] House of Commons Library. Available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10261/.
Hansen (2025). Arctic Council Working Groups Must Persist Despite Putin and Trump, Says Researcher. [online] High North News. Available at:
https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/arctic-council-working-groups-must-persist-despite putin-and-trump-says-researcher [Accessed 28 May 2025]
Healey (2025). UK and Norway kickstart new defence agreement in boost for European security. [online] GOV.UK. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and norway-kickstart-new-defence-agreement-in-boost-for-european-security.
Humpert, M. (2022) “Control over the Arctic Ocean Top Priority of New Russian Naval Doctrine.” online: High North News <highnorthnews.com/en/control-over-arctic-ocean-top priority-new-russian-
Komin and Hosa (2025). The bear beneath the ice: Russia’s ambitions in the Arctic. [online] ECFR. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-bear-beneath-the-ice-russias ambitions-in-the-arctic/ [Accessed 28 May 2025].
Lammy, D. (2025). UK announces new action to detect hostile state activity using AI, on visit to the Arctic. [online] GOV.UK. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk announces-new-action-to-detect-hostile-state-activity-using-ai-on-visit-to-the-arctic [Accessed 28 May 2025].
“Q&A with Morten Høglund, the New Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials” (15 May 2023), online: The Arctic Council < https://arctic-council.org/news/q-a-with-morten-hoglund-chair of-the-senior-arctic-officials/>.
Simpson, B. (2023). The Rise and Sudden Fall of the Arctic Council. [online] Foreign Policy. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/31/arctic-council-russia-norway/.
Wahden (2024). Reassessing Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Beyond the Partnership with China. [online] Russiapost.info. Available at: https://russiapost.info/politics/arctic_strategy [Accessed 28 May 2025].
