The Stakes of Romania’s Election

A Nation Divided, A Continent Watching

Perhaps one of the most intense presidential election runs came to a conclusion in Romania on Sunday night. Romanians’ first attempt to elect their head of state was in November 2024, when the far-right populist independent candidate Călin Georgescu surprisingly won the first round. This sparked outrage that later resulted in an investigation into his source of funding and alleged Russian interference. Under these suspicions, the Romanian government accused Russia of meddling in the electoral process. Consequently, Romania’s Constitutional Court made an unprecedented move by cancelling the elections altogether (Fried and Șerban, 2025).

Meanwhile, for supporters of Georgescu’s movement, which gained even more traction after the elections were cancelled, his subsequent disqualification from the rerun election in May, announced by the Central Bureau of Elections, only reinforced their belief in a corrupt state mechanism. For the pro-European side, however, this came as a sigh of relief. While the state has not released clear evidence regarding Georgescu’s ties to Russia, speculation has been rampant, thus deepening the rift within Romanian society. Carmen Dumitrescu, in her article for Republica, underlined the social divide and the destabilisation as a clear sign of a successful Russian disinformation campaign.

Internationally, concern regarding Russia’s interference was reinforced by two major investigations. A report by the French outlet Mediapart revealed a large-scale hybrid operation led by Russia’s SVR. It involved coordinated cyberattacks on Romanian electoral infrastructure, social media manipulation via 25,000 TikTok accounts, and influencer campaigns that elevated Georgescu from political obscurity to frontrunner status (Suc, 2025). Additionally, Austrian cybersecurity expert Christian Granig corroborated these findings and has spoken about the network that ties Calin Georgescu to Russia and Elena Vladimirovna Shmelova, Vladimir Putin’s campaign manager in 2018 (Tăpălagă, 2025). He also underlined the importance of Calin Georgescu in Russia’s hybrid warfare mechanisms (Tăpălagă, 2025). Therefore, these revelations not only raise alarms about democratic resilience but also suggest possible repercussions from the EU and NATO should Romania fail to ensure electoral integrity in the upcoming runoff.

Călin Georgescu’s rise and the state’s reaction created a volatile environment. After the November elections were annulled, the President resigned and was replaced by an interim leader. Georgescu’s disqualification left George Simion, the leader of the far-right party AUR, to fill the vacuum and gain momentum on the back of public outrage. It is therefore important to examine the evolution of opinion polls since November and see how voters shifted in Georgescu’s absence.

The polls clearly show that Simion was able to consolidate much of Georgescu’s former voter base and consistently poll at over 30%. On the other hand, the battle for second place has been fluid, with various polls showing a back-and-forth between pro-European candidates Crin Antonescu and Nicușor Dan. Furthermore, there were also fluctuations in support of former Social Democrat and Prime Minister Victor Ponta, who rebranded himself as a ‘sovereigntist’ in the months before the first round. However, none of the polls predicted the full extent of Simion’s support.

After the first round of elections, which saw Simion leading the polls with over 40%, economists noted a market reaction that pushed the national currency to a historic low. A spokesperson for the Romanian National Bank officially acknowledged that “there is a pressure on the value market” that they are trying to control (Costea, 2025). Similarly, the European Central Bank confirmed the currency depreciation, which pushed the RON past the psychological limit of 5 lei/euro (Popovici, 2025).

Therefore, this blow to the national currency was being used as a political weapon. While many attribute it to Simion’s rise and the subsequent resignation of Marcel Ciolacu as Prime Minister. Furthermore, a country with both an interim president and prime minister understandably fails to inspire investor confidence. Looking back to November, a similar (albeit more contained) drop in the RON followed Georgescu’s first-round win. According to Economedia (2024), the National Bank responded by selling foreign exchange reserves to keep the euro below the 5 lei threshold. Furthermore, media outlets like Digi24 reported that BNR had to spend close to a billion euros at the time. Contrastingly, the current amount mentioned in media reports is said to be six times higher.

Romania’s presidential race, with all its unpredictable twists, is not an isolated case. It reflects a broader European trend of far-right parties gaining dangerous traction. However, what sets Romania apart is the rise of the pro-Russian Călin Georgescu, whose unexpected success pushed the state to take the unprecedented step of annulling an election. Whether that decision was justified has become less relevant as many citizens perceived it as an attack on their democratic right to choose.

Furthermore, a far-right victory would have eroded foreign trust, discouraged investment, and weakened Romania’s standing in Brussels. As projects like Neptun Deep aim to position Romania as a key gas producer in the region (Energy Connect, 2025), the economic stakes are high. Thus, whether the country can continue to attract foreign capital and maintain its European alignment is heavily dependent on the outcomes of the election.

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