The Arctic Council at a Geopolitical Inflection Point

I. Frozen Ambitions: Trump’s Greenland Gambit and Northern Visions

In August 2019, President Donald J. Trump publicly suggested that the United States consider purchasing Greenland—a self-governing territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, noted for its rare earth minerals and strategic position bordering the North Atlantic (BBC News, 2019). Although the proposal was never formally pursued, advisers reportedly evaluated potential acquisitions in Canada’s northern territories—including parts of Nunavut and Yukon—to secure emerging Northwest Passage shipping lanes and counterbalance Russia’s Arctic fleet. These discussions underscored projected gains in mineral supply chains critical to both defense and high-technology sectors, demonstrating an early convergence of economic and security rationales.

This “Greenland gambit” accelerated U.S. engagement in the High North. By October 2019, Washington had reopened its consulate in Nuuk and allocated significant funding for mineral exploration, climate-science projects, and infrastructure surveys (U.S. Department of Defense, 2024). Concurrently, Thule Air Base received upgraded early-warning radar systems and enhanced logistics support—strengthening continental defense against polar-vector threats and marking a shift from passive acknowledgment to an active Arctic posture (U.S. Department of Defense, 2024). These moves unsettled long-standing assumptions about Arctic engagement and signaled Washington’s intent to craft a more assertive, multidimensional strategy.

II. When Science Meets Strategy: Security Enters the Council

Prior to 2019, the Arctic Council was widely perceived as a forum for scientific collaboration and environmental protection—focusing on sustainable development, pollution control, and Indigenous rights within a consensus-based framework (Young, 2018). Trump’s “Greenland gambit” injected security and strategic competition into Council discourse. At the 2021 ministerial meeting in Reykjavík, the U.S. delegation successfully lobbied to include “security, stability, and resilience” alongside environmental objectives—a first in the Council’s formal communiqué (Arctic Council Secretariat, 2021).

Alarmed by U.S. interest in adjacent territory, Canada reinforced cooperative research initiatives and insisted on reaffirming the Council’s founding principle of non-militarization. Ottawa expanded its Arctic and Northern Policy Framework to bolster emergency prevention and resource-protection planning (Government of Canada, 2019). These adjustments underscored the delicate balance between sovereignty concerns and collective stewardship, compelling members to negotiate nuanced language that accommodated both security imperatives and environmental commitments.

III. Stormy Waters: Russia’s Exit, Indigenous Voices, and New Bilateral Paths

Following its suspension in 2022 due to the invasion of Ukraine, Russia—custodian of over 53 percent of the Arctic coastline—was effectively excluded from Council meetings and joint 2 scientific ventures (Cunningham, 2024). This suspension disrupted long-term research in Siberia, halted continuous data streams on sea-ice thickness and permafrost integrity, and deprived Indigenous communities of joint monitoring programs essential for subsistence planning (Cunningham, 2024).

In response, Moscow deepened its Polar Silk Road initiative with China, launching joint drilling operations in the Kara Sea and co-financing LNG projects along the Northern Sea Route (Cunningham, 2024). It also signed resource-sharing agreements with India, focusing on hydrocarbon exploration in the Barents Sea and collaborative Arctic logistics training. These bilateral arrangements have circumvented the Council’s multilateral platform, creating parallel governance structures in key Arctic sectors and complicating efforts to resume comprehensive data sharing.

Meanwhile, Indigenous organizations within the Council have stressed that any future governance model must center traditional ecological knowledge and ensure equitable participation. The Inuit Circumpolar Council, for instance, has called for a formal mechanism to integrate Indigenous expertise into climate assessments and to guarantee that resource development benefits local communities.

IV. Shattered Consensus or New Order? Three Future Scenarios

1. Strategic Rebalance: A reconstituted Council led by the United States, Canada, and Nordic states blends robust security frameworks with environmental mandates. Sustained funding expanded observer roles, and institutional reforms could preserve scientific collaboration despite reduced Russian participation, while safeguarding critical infrastructure and maritime routes.
2. Conditional Readmission: A geopolitical thaw allows Russia’s return under strict transparency protocols (e.g., third-party audits of military activities and sanctions-linked oversight). Comprehensive data sharing would resume, but new compliance burdens and phased reintegration would test the Council’s enforcement capacity and trust-building.
3. Selective Coalitions: Issue-specific coalitions (shipping regulation, Indigenous health, climate modeling) operate alongside a slimmed-down Council. Strategic interests drive minilateral pacts, reflecting a fragmented yet functional approach to shared challenges, with parallel bodies negotiating specialized agreements.

As great-power competition intensifies and climate change accelerates ecological shifts, the Arctic Council stands at a crossroads. The path chosen will determine whether the region remains a zone of cooperation or becomes an arena of contest. Dual imperatives—protecting fragile environments and safeguarding national interests—will shape the Council’s next chapter, with Indigenous voices and bilateral partnerships playing ever more pivotal roles.

References

Arctic Council Secretariat, 2021. Reykjavík Declaration. [online] Reykjavík: Arctic Council Secretariat. Available at: https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/2589 [Accessed 17 May 2025].

BBC News, 2019. Greenland: Trump warned that island cannot be bought from Denmark. [online] 16 August. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada49367792 [Accessed 11 May 2025].

Cunningham, A., 2024. Shifting Ice: How the Russian Invasion of Ukraine has Changed Arctic Circle Governance and the Arctic Council’s Path Forward. [online] Arlington, VA: The Arctic Institute. Available at: https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/shifting-ice [Accessed 12 May 2025].

Government of Canada, 2019. Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework. [online] Ottawa: Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada. Available at: https://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.882966/publication.html?wbdisable=true [Accessed 17 May 2025].

U.S. Department of Defense, 2024. 2024 Arctic Strategy. [online] Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jan/10/Arctic-Strategy2024.pdf [Accessed 17 May 2025].

Young, O.R., 2018. ‘Arctic environmental cooperation in transition’, Polar Record, 54(2), pp. 95– 107. doi:10.1017/S0032247418000219