Areas of contention between the Sunni Arab Tribes and the Shi’ite militias of Iraq

The continual harmony and cooperation between the Sunni Arab Tribes and the Shi’ite militias of Iraq, both key components of Iraqi security, is essential for the suppression of an ISIS resurgence. In June 2014, the Iraqi military, trained and equipped by the US, collapsed in the face of ISIS, enabling them to conquer Mosul. In response, Grand Ayatollah Sistani issued a fatwa calling for all Iraqi citizens to voluntarily join the security forces to fight ISIS; over 60,000 fighters volunteered. A new influx of militias, reflecting a plethora of command structures, and variations of coercive, financial, political and socio-religious power, joined under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU). These groups, including Sunni Arab tribal mobilisations, diversified the hybrid military institution that was initially made up of Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias and legitimised by former PM Nouri al Maliki. These forces, working with the international coalition and the Sunni Arab tribes, helped to defeat ISIS territorially in 2017.

However, history has shown us there has been a cycle of cooperation, which is then followed by alienation, of Iraq’s Sunni Arab Tribes. Under the “Sons of Iraq” program, for example, the tribes, initially paid by the US, operated alongside the Shia dominated security apparatus in Anbar and ethnically mixed areas such as Diyala and Baghdad. Cooperation began to take root between Sunni and Shia forces against the common foe of Al Qaeda. However, this was thwarted by the actions of Maliki, who had failed to integrate the “Sons of Iraq” into the Iraqi Security Forces. By 2012, he had stopped paying the salaries of the tribal forces and completely marginalised its leaders. At the same time, Sunni Arabs continued to be disenfranchised and discriminated against in harsh de-baathification projects and anti-terror measures. Eventually, their continual alienation and the weakening of the “Sons of Iraq” contributed to the rise of ISIS.

However, once again united against a common enemy, the tribes were brought back into the fold of Iraqi politics as 2014 saw their mobilisation grow rapidly in response to ISIS. By 2017, approximately 30,000 to 45,000 Sunni Arab forces had been mobilised in different forms under the PMU umbrella. These groups worked closely with the Shi’ite militias in the PMU, as well as tribal forces outside the institution, as logistics, intelligence and sacrifices were shared, representing cooperation free from tribal and sectarian inhibitions.

Nevertheless, despite this progress, several areas of contention remain and risk the recurrence of alienating the Sunni Arabs. These are predominantly caused by provocations from Iran-backed PMU militias, ranging from extortion to extrajudicial killings.

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Checkpoints are a key point of contention. Both the PMU and the tribes use them for profit as well as to acquire territory, legitimacy and links with the local population. However, in some cases, the lucrative enterprise takes extortionate proportions due to the extremely high checkpoint fees and levying of goods. Asaib Ahl al-Haq, for example, reportedly generates $300,000 per day through checkpoint fees across Diyala. Furthermore, visibility has had an adverse effect in Sunni Arab neighbourhoods, whereby residents find checkpoints of Shia militants intimidating, often stigmatised by the fear of killings at checkpoints that were

prominent a few years ago. At the al-Razzaza checkpoint, for example, controlled by Kataib Hezbollah since 2014, around 2,200 Sunni Arab men and boys had been abducted there, with only 65 reappearing. A similar situation happened to the Mehemda tribe from Saqlawiya; during the fleeing of 6000 IDPs, in 2016, 1,300 of the men and boys had been abducted, tortured and some killed. Hence, the treatment of young men of fighting age and of returning IDPs at checkpoints is a huge cause for concern. In Diyala and across Anbar, some PMU militias prevented them from returning to their homes and thousands are detained on suspicion of affiliation to ISIS. Returning IDPs often have to bribe security forces to return, sometimes as high as $500-1000. However, this problem is not confined to the militias, with some tribal Sheikhs even found to be exploiting members of their own tribe.

While abductions at checkpoints have been decreasing, targeted assassinations continue. For example, towards the end of last year, October 2020, 8 men, of a group of 12 that were kidnapped, were found shot. This occurred in the Farhatiya area of the Balad region of Salahaddin; most of the local residents believe that Asaib Ahl al-Haq are responsible. This is despite the fact that the Jabouri tribe of the area maintain good relations with the group. According to one local, they had wanted to set up a checkpoint nearby and an argument broke out about the electricity they wanted from the village. Though under different circumstances, these assassinations contribute to the worrying trend of increasing killings of journalists, academics and hundreds of protesters since October 2019. Many hold the Iran-backed PMU militias responsible.

Security sensitive border areas are also an area of contention. In Qa’im, for example, according to local council members Salmani and Rawi, Kataib Hezbollah have converted 1,600 farms into a military zone in the southern side of Qa’im, depriving the local farmers of work. Locals are also unsettled by the heavy presence of other Iran-backed groups, such as Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiyah and Saraya al-Khorasani, which are embroiled in the Syrian conflict .This produces a particularly volatile situation because communities across the Qa’im-Bukamal, Iraq-Syria border, have strong tribal and family ties, as well as pan-Sunni and pan-Arab feelings. Thus, any insensitive and provocative actions by the Iran-backed militias, could give ISIS the chance to exploit the disharmony.

Qa’im is also home to other forms of contention such as looting and extortion. According to locals, militias have been charging trucks around $2,000 a month, transporting limestone needed for construction in Qa’im, from the Akashat quarries south of Qa’im. They have also looted the local phosphate-processing company for profit and for armoured plating for their trucks. Similar patterns of illegality have occurred in Mosul, as residents complain that Shi’ite militias are taking possession of Sunni endowment properties. Hence, they have monopolised not only black-market networks left by ISIS, such as oil smuggling, but also lucrative properties in retrieved territory.

Oil smuggling is the most profitable illicit economic activity carried out by PMU militias. According to research by IISS, oil supply-chain economics are devoid of ideology as actors across the spectrum cooperate in order to extract, move, refine and sell the oil, which requires labour intensive expertise employing locals and skilled workers. However, the prospect of

increasing competition over smuggling networks is a cause for concern as militias seek to expand their profits.

Finally, cronyism amongst the ruling elites in Baghdad has led to the uneven distribution of pay of the militias, with the tribal mobilisations bearing the brunt. Many remain unpaid despite promises from the government, and they struggle to compete over resources with the regularly paid Iran-backed groups. The tribal mobilisation in Fallujah, for example, has had their number of fighters paid by state salaries reduced first from 1850 to 1500 and then to 1300 fighters. It is also estimated that as many as 16,000 fighters across Iraq receive only equipment and weapons without salaries; this includes Shia groups loyal to Sistani.

On the other hand, in some cases, the co-optation of tribes and their empowerment can exacerbate intra-Sunni Arab political divisions. Despite the opportunity of social mobility and the development of patronage networks, often tribes that have partnerships with powerful PMU militias take advantage to compete with other tribes that do not have affiliations. This can also create an environment of disharmony that ISIS could exploit.

The assimilation of Sunni Arabs into Shi’ite militias loyal to Sistani counterbalances the Iranian-backed militias and can stand as the best solution for security. For example, many Sunni Arabs have joined Shia-led groups in the PMU, loyal to Sistani. They make up 20% of the Ali al-Akbar Brigades and 10% of the Al Abbas Combat Division. The voluntary joining of these groups and their collaboration with local tribes offers the possibility of dialogue and positive interaction. This, along with greater assimilation of the PMU into the Iraqi Security Forces, would highly benefit the security situation, forcing the PMU to lose its hybrid status and work within the limits of institutions and legitimacy. This would impose more control and discipline over those more provocative groups.

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