Environmental Security: The Cases of Kiribati and Tuvalu

‘Since the end of the Cold War, environmental concerns have been an important part of the discussions of global security in North America and Europe. Whether under the rubric of environmental security, as part of a broader human security agenda, or one among a number of new global dangers, environmental themes are now part of the calculus of international politics and part of the scholarly debates in international debates’ (Dalby, 2002, p.xix).

Climate change is one of the most discussed global problems. This can be seen especially in two countries: Kiribati and Tuvalu. These small pacific states are expected to disappear in the coming decades, as the ocean, with its rising sea levels, reclaims the narrow islands and atolls where dozens of thousands people live (DW Documentary, 2017). 

In the multilateral arena, the issue has been discussed since the 1970s when the first international conventions on climate change were made (Castro, 2013, p. 37) but became a central theme for international relations in the 1990s (Dalby, 2002, p. xix).

Since then, both scholars and politicians have discussed the environment as not only a single subject of transnational responsibility but also as part of a broader security concept which would surpass the traditional state-centric view (Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p. 187). 

Consequently, climate change is a national security threat for an increasing number of countries and a central theme of environmental security which addresses this transnational phenomena as a global security issue (Hough, 2015, p. 219).

The enlargement of the security concept 

Security, according to a general definition in the field of international relations, denotes ‘the absence of threats to scarce values’ (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 490). According to Evans and Newnham, traditionally, security analysis in a foreign policy context usually focuses on the military dimension. Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has undergone an enlargement process, which included ideas such as the environment, as well as military issues.

One example of an attempt to bring environmental concerns to the security field, still heavily influenced by Cold War era thinking, was the discussion of a ‘nuclear winter’ and its impact on the globe. This thesis also proved that environmental issues are transnational phenomena that should be dealt with collectively (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 491). As such, Evans and Newnham argue that ‘strategies based upon narrow state-centric views are ultimately self-defeating in environmental policy-making’.

The process of incorporation of the environment into security discussion was itself part of the emergence of environmental politics into the world stage. It was first addressed in 1972, during the United Nations Conference on Human Environment, based in Stockholm, followed by the Brundtland Report (1987), which confirmed the environment on the political agenda for the coming decades (Castro, 2012, pp. 37-38). In 1992, the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as Rio Summit, inaugurated international negotiations for climate change (Lucena and Schaeffer, 2012, p. 40). From the 1990s onwards, the environment has definitely emerged as one of the areas of international relations (IR) studies, arising from low politics to high politics (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 149).

According to Dalby (2013, p. 163), two pivotal reasons for environmental concern – and, subsequently, the insertion of the environment in world politics – are climate change and environmental degradation. As the author argues (p. 163): ‘the disruption of the relatively stable climate system in recent decades has been caused by the use of abundant fossil fuels by the global economy that has spread into most parts of the planetary biosphere. The scale of human activity in the biosphere and the rapidly growing scientific understanding of these processes have both changed our understanding of humanity’s role in the biosphere and made clear the need for policies to deal with our rapidly changing circumstances (Steffen et al. 2011). This is necessary to ensure that we don’t endanger the key conditions necessary for human civilisation to exist.’

The nexus between environment and security has been built under these concerns. Together with the ‘nuclear winter’, the global atmosphere became a focal point of environmental discussions in the 1980s. Once the global climate data was carefully studied, it became clear for researchers that the rising levels of carbon dioxide were going to warm the global climate significantly. Thus, according to Dalby (2013, p. 166): ‘putting these concerns with acid rain, ozone depletion and then concerns about climate change together raised awareness and political concern about global environmental matters with enough urgency to get them considered as a matter of global security’ (Dalby, 2013, p. 166). 

Finally, Buzan and Hansen (2009, pp. 128-129) conclude, under security studies view, that: ‘the broader constitution of environmental security as threatened through climatic changes or through the degradation of land, biodiversity, the atmosphere, water, forests, coastal areas and rivers arose mainly from overlapping scientific and political agendas that had the internal dynamics of debates in peace research little to do with the superpower military rivalry (Brundtland Commission, 1987; Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1988; Nye, 1989; Mathews, 1989; Buzan et al., 1998: 71–72). In terms of the driving forces, this happened mainly as a response to events in the slow-moving sense: a generally rising concern about the (in)stability of the ecosphere. But processes of institutionalisation, such as the joint organising of a programme on environmental security in the 1980s by PRIO and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) also worked to situate environmental security as one of the first sectoral expansions of national security beyond the military.’

While progress has been made to include environmental issues, such as climate change, in the security and international agenda, some countries have been dealing with this phenomena already for decades. They are at the frontline of a battle for their own survival. Nonetheless, this war has no guns, but those responsible for this are humans. In a struggle against the fury of nature, powered by human action, two tiny states, archipelagos in the middle of the ocean, fight for their right to exist while they still can (DW Documentary, 2017).

The cases of Kiribati and Tuvalu

Kiribati and Tuvalu are two archipelagos composed of dozens of islands and atolls in the Pacific Ocean. Besides these similar characteristics, they have – unfortunately – one element in common: both are expected by scientists and researchers to disappear in the near future. Kiribati is one of the lowest lying countries on earth, with an average height of only two meters above sea level. The rising sea levels threaten the islands by reclaiming the land for the sea. Flooding is common during storms. However, climate change is increasing this frequency (DW Documentary, 2017).

As a result, climate change has been seen as a matter of national priority for the Kiribati government. According to government officials, apart from the higher sea levels, the rising frequency of floods can generate sanitation problems, such as contamination of the drinkable water. The fate for the people of Kiribati is almost sealed, as the government has already purchased land in neighbouring Fiji for future evacuation of its population (DW Documentary, 2017).

Similarly, Tuvalu is the fourth smallest country in the world, with only 26 square kilometers of area, and has a population of only 13,000 citizens. The highest point is only four meters above sea level, and the main island, Funafati, has an extension of only ten kilometers. Scientists believe Tuvalu is going to be the first country that is going to disappear from the world. This ‘paradise on extinction’ faces the same rising sea levels as Kiribati, although Tuvalu is a smaller and much less populated country, subsequently with fewer resources to fight against its slowing death as a nation. It is thought that when the ocean finally submerges the archipelago, its population will have to migrate for either Australia or New Zealand. Tuvalu’s culture and beaches will cease to exist like a modern Atlantis (Fran, 2013, pp. 152-154).

According to Hough (2015, p. 218), climate change’s menace to these nations is direct and powerful: liquidation by sea. As a consequence, Kiribati and Tuvalu face rising sea levels as a grave threat to both their state and human security. In other words, their national security is threatened even in the absence of state actors or military force. As Hough explains, their diplomatic efforts are focused on urging the international community to act on a global problem that is already having devastating impacts. This is done regularly via international forums and media. For instance, former Prime Minister of Tuvalu, Saufatu Sopoanga, made a speech as early as 2002 to raise awareness of his country’s plight: ‘We want the islands of Tuvalu, our nation, to exist permanently forever and not to be submerged underwater merely due to the selfishness and greed of the industrialised world’ (Sopoanga, 2002).

However, the dispute on whether the environment is part of security is yet to be resolved. After all, is the environment – and, consequently, climate change – a valid part of security?

Climate change as a security issue

Security in international relations is traditionally associated with a militarised and state-centric view (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 490). However, since the 1990s, this perception has been changing to include the securitization of other topics, such as the environment, into the security discussion. Yet, there is no consensus about what security actually means, thus remaining a problematic concept (Hough, 2015, p. 215; 219). As a result, debate on environmental security can easily oppose different international security schools of thought, going as far as the definition of its basic term. Therefore, it becomes crucial to adopt a definition of security before proceeding.

Security definition provided by Evans and Newnham (1998, p. 490), as quoted previously, has as basic idea the absence of threats to scarce resources. As we have seen, Kiribati and Tuvalu are under threat of rising sea levels, which are slowly submerging their lands due to climate change (DW Documentary, 2017; Fran, 2013, p. 152). Hence, obviously, it can be argued that these countries are directly menaced by climate change, resulting in a national security threat for these states.

In this case, scarce resources would be land, being now faced with the loss of their already small landmass, as well as degradation of their water supply, which by its turn, affects its population (DW Documentary, 2017). Nevertheless, this threat, as it is not human – nor from a state – can not, for traditionalists, constitute a national security threat, and even for some, a security menace since the threat does not come from a state nor a clearly defined enemy.

Buzan and Hansen (2009, p. 129) noted that environmental security represented ‘one of the first sectoral expansions of national security beyond the military’, admitting both that environmental security is part of a more broad and amplified concept of national security, as well as part of security studies.

Homer-Dixon has gone as far as to state that ‘environmental scarcities are already contributing to violent conflicts in many parts of the world. These conflicts are probably the early signs of an upsurge of violence in the coming decades that will be induced or aggravated by scarcity’ (Homer-Dixon, 1994, p. 6, cited in Hough, 2015, pp. 213-214). Although it is unlikely that the specific case of Kiribati and Tuvalu can cause conflict, it is important to note that the nexus between security and scarcity, as well as national security and environment, is well-acknowledged in general by scholars, such as Hough (2015) and Dalby (2002; 2013).

Apart from scholars, this line of thought can also be seen in international organisations, especially the United Nations. In 1980, the Independent Commission on International Development Issues supported the securitization of the environment. Two years later, UN Commission on Disarmament and Security considered moving beyond collective security to common security, bringing subjects such as environmental degradation and scarcity to the table (Hough, 2015, p. 218).

In 2004, a UN High Level Panel made a report setting a new vision of enlarged security, which was composed of six clusters of incoming threats which should be addressed in the near future – including environmental degradation. Three years later, the UN Security Council discussed climate change in its meetings. Finally, in 2009, the General Assembly produced the resolution ‘Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications”which called for all UN agencies to focus on climate change (Hough, 2015, pp. 218-219). This proved that the UN not only considered environmental security a valid part of national security, but also of collective security.

Other political institutions followed the United Nations perspective on environmental security. Surprisingly, NATO is one of them. Its new extended security concept incorporated concerns shared by the UN: ‘Based on a broad definition of security that recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors, NATO is addressing security challenges emanating from the environment. This includes extreme weather conditions, depletion of natural resources, pollution and so on – factors that can ultimately lead to disasters, regional tensions and violence’ (NATO, 2013, cited in Hough, 2015, p. 219).

Other governments have also played their part besides Kiribati and Tuvalu. The government of Bolivia, for example, fearing the damage of climate change to agriculture, created the first Ministry of Sustainable Development in the 1990s. Bolivian authorities also attempted to link environmental security to responsibility through the concept of ‘climate debt’ (Pettiford and Hughes, 2015, p. 413).

Climate change is a direct menace for its population which makes it a matter of human security. Human security, although complex and wide, can be defined, according to UN General Assembly resolution 66/290 as ‘an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people’ (UN Documents, 2020, p. 1).

As Pettiford and Hughes (2015, p. 413) argue, climate change threatens human security in multiple ways. Kiribati’s case illustrates how oceanic flooding can contaminate freshwater supplies — a particularly scarce resource in Pacific archipelagos where rivers are rare and water is sourced almost exclusively from underground aquifers. The scarcity or contamination of drinking water can lead to the spread of diseases and increased mortality especially in tropical climates. Furthermore, considering the likely displacement of Kiribati’s population to Fiji in the future, it is clear that their dignity and livelihoods are also at risk. These individuals will be forced to abandon their properties and homeland to start a new life in another country (DW Documentary, 2017) which can easily lead to poverty (DW Documentary, 2017). Therefore, Dalby (2013, p. 165) argues that it is important to make people rather than states the referent object of security which is basically the main idea of human security as launched by the United Nations (Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p. 203).

‘Few threats to peace and survival of the human community are greater than those posed by the prospects of cumulative and irreversible degradation of the biosphere on which human life depends’ (ICIDI, 1980, cited in Hough, 2015, p. 218).

Climate change is a real transnational phenomena that is directly threatening countries such as Kiribati and Tuvalu (Fran, 2013, pp. 152-154; DW Documentary, 2017). Therefore, the environment becomes a security issue not only for those directly threatened under the form of national security, but also collectively since it will, given enough time, affect all countries directly e.g. rising sea levels and soil degradation or indirectly e.g. environmental conflicts (Dalby, 2012, p. 171; DW Documentary, 2017; Hough, 2015, p. 218).

This is especially the case if we consider the definition of security related to scarcity of resources following the Evans and Newnham (1998, p. 490) definition. In fact, as early of 2007, the British delegation to UN ‘cited the following security implications of climate change: border disputes due to the melting of ice sheets and rising sea levels; increased migration with ‘the potential for instability and conflict’; conflict over energy supplies; conflict due to scarcity; conflict due to poverty; and conflicts related to extreme weather events.’ (UNSC, 2007, cited in Hough, 2015, p. 222)

The cases of Kiribati and Tuvalu represent convincing evidence of the future ahead. As climate change becomes more intense, other low-lying countries will have to face the consequences of human action in the biosphere (Hough, 2015, p. 218; Dalby, 2013, p. 165). As Dalby (2013, p. 173) notes: ‘In these new circumstances global security now means keeping the planetary climate system within the parameters that we have known for the last millennia, that is, close to the conditions that have risen to human civilisation in the first place.’

Strong cooperation, especially in multilateral forums, is needed. As Lucena and Schaeffer (2012, p. 49) argue, UN Climate Change Conferences (COPs) are needed to bring climate change to the forefront of international discussions, being a necessary condition for a successful green economic transition.

Global action is needed in order to fight climate change. Kiribati and Tuvalu’s lonely voices against climate change – and, ultimately, against their countries’ extinction – must be heard and transformed into action before it is too late. This transnational phenomena will affect the whole world in the near future. What is at stake is not only the future of these two pacific states, but that of the whole of humanity. The question now is: are we going to wait to act until it is too late?

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