Us vs Them: An International Law Perspective

How international legal regimes for minority protection resemble the civilizational discourse of the 19th century

The civilising discourse arose in the 19th century when European cultural and moral superiority was (self)conceived. This was because they were ‘civilized’ as compared to the ‘barbarous’ ‘other’, who lacked the common core of the civilised identity. In order to be civilised, the ethnic ‘other’ had to satisfy the ‘standard of civilisation’, which just meant they would have to adopt the European ‘way of life.’ Today, international regimes still imply that there is a cultural discrepancy between the ‘civilised’ majority and the ‘backwards’ minority. International law facilitates the civilisation of the ‘other’ by leaving the minorities in an assimilationist atmosphere, where their ‘less valuable’ culture is bound to disappear. I will take the reader through the two philosophies of liberalism and conservatism portraying the role of ethnicity in these two doctrines. This is warranted because liberalism is the dominant philosophy of international law, while conservatism is the way by which ethnic minorities construct their identity. These two philosophies were juxtaposed in the League’s minority regime. I will consequently move to the aftermath of the Second World War which represents the present era. In order to avoid repetition, I will tackle this question from a liberal doctrinal perspective instead of analysing every minority protection provision one after the other. I will first show how minorities are still perceived as the primitive ‘other’ by States. The following sections will show how this is translated into the international legal regimes which, being liberal tools, are unsympathetic towards minorities. Lastly, I will portray how ethnic accommodation has been reinstalled in the Post-Cold War only for pragmatic reasons and not due to a sympathy towards ethnic groups. Inherent in these sections will be my argument that the liberal doctrines are not suitable for the preservation of minorities.

Conservative Approach

Conservatism was a German philosophy characterised by a primordial understanding of ethnicity. When constructing the identity of the ‘self’, supreme importance is attached to ethnicity because it is seen as an intrinsic feature of the individual. This is conveyed by Herder when he defines a nation as an enlarged family composed of specific people with a unique national character (Shahabuddin, 2016, p.27). When referring to ‘family’ and ‘specific people’, Herder is referring to the ethnic affiliation of the people. Fichte concluded that the German ethnicity was sufficiently distinct from the other nations basing such an assertion on the host of invisible ties and the indivisible nature of Germans as a whole. These Conservative manifestations entail that a strong ‘self’ is dependent on ethnic-homogeneity because of the historical similarity and sense of solidarity that these people share. Conservativism is weighted towards the preservation of this distinct cultural identity and what inevitably transpires is the immense disdain for cultural mixing. Not surprisingly, this ethnic-nationalistic ideology was accompanied by exclusionary methods in dealing with the ‘other’. The uniqueness of the ‘self’, meant that the ‘other’ was inevitably and necessarily excluded (Shahabuddin, 2016, p.30). During the colonial period, German Chief-of-Staff Von Schlieffen wrote to the Kaiser saying : ‘the racial war which has flared up can only be brought to an end by the extermination or total subjugation of the one party’ (Shahabuddin, 2016, p.74). This exclusionary policy is substantiated by Reimer who affirmed that only people with Germanic blood would be given equal rights when the Germans were juxtaposed with the ‘other’ (Shahabuddin, 2016, p.81).

Liberalism

The liberal doctrine arose in France in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Liberalism is characterised by moral egalitarianism, meaning that, in liberal understanding, every man is equal. Hobsbawm conveyed this when asserting that in Liberal understanding, the nation is ‘a political body of citizens inhabiting a specific territory and constituting a sovereign political unit irrespective of their ethnic, linguistic, or other similar characteristics’. This shows how ethnicity is merely viewed as a peripheral feature, devoid of relevance in the nation-building process. Liberalism contends that the conservative vision of ethnicity is irrational and a hindrance to human advancement (Shahabuddin, 2016, p.34). Cultural homogeneity has been sacrificed for the greater good: loyalty and territorial integrity. The Liberal understanding of the ‘self’ is similar to the Conservative, in that it perceives itself as the ‘higher culture’. What distinguishes Liberalism from Conservatism is the treatment of the ethnic ‘other’.

The liberal ever-present desire to spread its higher culture made it inevitable for the primitive ‘other’ to be subject assimilation (Betts, 1961, p.8). Assimilation means that the primitive has to acquiesce the way of life of the higher ‘self’. This is best exemplified by Gabriel Hanotaux who said that “extending overseas, to regions only yesterday barbarian, the principles of a civilization” was France’s holy task (Betts, 1961, p.29). This excerpt expressly conveys the civilizational ‘self’- ‘other’ dichotomy between the two ethnic societies. The ‘higher’ French was allowed to have colonies because the ‘power of education’ would have corrected the discrepancies between the two universal men (Betts, 1961, p.15). In a letter received by Governor-General Pelissier, the Emperor stated that France had not come to Algeria to oppress and exploit, but to bring the benefits of civilization (Betts, 1961, p.19). The ethnic other vis-à-vis the majority, was accepted in the society. This is shown by Article VI of the 1795 Constitution which stated that the colonies were an integral part of the Republic, subject to the same constitutional law (Betts, 1961, p.13). Indeed, as Betts has revealed, the upper classes of the colonies had become assimilated to French culture and were even given the right to send representatives to Parliament (Betts, 1961, p.20-21).

Assimilation however is only egalitarian at face value. The Preamble of the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice expressly refers to forced assimilation as an ‘injustice’ and ‘offence against dignity’ (O’Nions, 2007, p.73). This is because assimilation is essentially a strategy based on the ‘superiority of the dominant cultural group’; minority groups will be accepted in society so long as they abandon their distinct culture (Betts, 1961, p.40). This conclusion is only reached once one takes the ethnic group’s point of view. From this perspective, assimilation is no different from the Conservative treatment of the ‘other’; both conduct to cultural domination. This is because it purports a loss of definition through absorption and domination by another ethnic group’s own personality. This shows how this doctrine is all about abandoning your ethnic allegiance in favour of the majority, thereby weakening and decreasing your group vis-à-vis the majority. The ethnic ‘other’ is ‘modernised’ in this process and the collateral effect is that the majority’s culture is universalized. In the drafting of the Genocide Convention, cultural genocide was considered (Betts, 1961, p.191). This however did not survive the final draft and the subtle civilizational pretext has permeated international minority protection regimes until this day.

Minority Protection under the League of Nations

Thornberry describes the League’s minority regime as ‘the most extensive developed by the international community’ (Betts, 1961, p.187).’ This is because it was the first general international guarantee of minority rights. It is during the interwar period that we are able to see the ‘self’ – ‘other’ ethnic dichotomy expressed through liberalism and conservatism. As Helen O’Nions rightfully argues, the need to protect minorities appears to have stemmed from fears about European Security rather than from a benevolent concern for the plight of the disadvantaged groups (Betts, 1961, p.187). The new Europe was ripe for a propagation of ethnic conflicts due to nationalism and irredentism. There also was an urge to impede a Greater German unification – through its delocalised nationals – which would have undermined the new boundaries. This presented an incredible opportunity for the liberal West to impose their assimilationist policies on the conservative East. This was the process of modernising the East through an international regime. The minority regime was based on numerous bilateral treaties’ that were to be guaranteed by the organisation itself. The treaties imposed the obligation of protecting the minorities’ conservative in the conservative sense. Minority rights were broadly defined to include not only the liberal right to equal treatment but also positive rights of cultural preservation accommodating ethnicity (Wirsing, 1981, p.10). As regards the Eastern and Central European states (hereafter ECE), there was a clear understanding that the liberal concept of non-discrimination alone was insufficient. Consequently, groups, as well as individuals, were given rights to petition the League (O’Nions, 2007, p.187). What this means is that the regime was a compromise between the liberal and conservative concepts of ethnicity. Despite accommodating ethnicity, the system was inherently weighted towards assimilation. This was conveyed by Woodrow Wilson when he stated that the widespread desire was for the ‘Germans in Poland to assimilate and become Polish’ just as other minorities in the West (Shahabuddin, 2016, p.104). Thus while the international community recognised the salience of ethnicity in group formation, the framework was done for them to assimilate on the long-term, losing their ‘primitiveness’.
The ‘self’ – ‘other’ dichotomy is most explicit in the asymmetric obligations of the regime. There was a distinction between the liberal West and the conservative ECE. The ECE states, unlike the West, embraced the conservative vision of a nation. This conservative ideology reduced the ECE to the primitive ‘other’ in the European context vis-à-vis the West. Indeed, the obligations were not of a universal application but only applied to the ECE states (Shahabuddin, 2016, p.10). The ECE states viewed the regime as an intrusion into their sovereignty and a breach of the principle of sovereign equality of states. As aforementioned, the then Polish Prime-Minister, dissatisfied with the provisions, emphasized for the need for reciprocity, in that even the West should be bound by the obligations (Shahabuddin, 2016, p.113). However, the Allied states justified the differential obligations vigorously stating that this was not a departure from the public law of Europe since recognition from the Great Powers has always been a precondition for accession into the family of nations (Shahabuddin, 2016, p.114). This shows how the regime was constructed in a way to ‘civilize’ the primitive, conservative East, who accorded central importance to ethnicity. The West portrayed the obligations imposed, as ‘principles of government’ to which they already adhered. This reproduces the civilizational discourse because not only is there a standard of civilization set by the ‘self’, but accession into the family of nations depended on recognition from the ‘civilized’. Armenia sought to make a claim for self-determination at the Peace Conferences by portraying their culture in liberal terms. As for the Western states, they were beyond the reach of the regime. Indeed, the idea of protecting minorities was not even conceived as necessary. Using the words of Weber, Liberals believed that the ‘primordial phenomena’ of ethnic affiliation would’ve decreased and eventually vanished with modernisation and individualism (Eriksen, 2010, p.2). Protecting groups due to their ethnocultural traits was fundamentally inconsistent with their vision thus, the minorities in the Western States were left unprotected in a liberal-assimilationist atmosphere.

Once one focuses on the ECE states themselves, the idea of minorities being undesirable becomes more apparent. The ethnic ‘other’ within the ethnic ‘self’ was marginalized and excluded in the quest for a culturally homogenous nation-state. Poland relied on de-Germanisation in the process of constructing its own identity (Shahabuddin, 2016, p.132). In fact, firstly Poland denied citizenship to numerous Germans who found themselves resident within its borders. Moreover, the ethnic Germans who opted for German nationality were also expelled from the Polish territory. This case of exclusion was mutual because as a response to the expulsion of numerous ethnic Germans from Poland, Germany expelled Polish citizens in order to ‘make space for the returning Germans’ (Shahabuddin, 2016, p.124). We can see the salience of ethnicity in numerous Polish measures which aimed to construct its distinct national identity. German language was made conditional upon passing a burdensome test before an all-Polish panel and many ethnic Germans were transferred to Polish schools (Shahabuddin, 2016, p.133). The Polish Land Reform which redistributed land owned by the German’s to the Poles resulted in severe unemployment for the German minority (Shahabuddin, 2016, p.133). The ethnic ‘other’ was marginalised and excluded in the process of building the national identity. This is an explicit portrayal of the minorities being labelled as undesirable. By the mid-1930’s it was incontestable that Poland had deviated from the league’s minority obligations in constructing its nation-state by marginalising the primitive minority within.

Minority Protection from the League to the U.N

In the aftermath of the Second World War, International law rigorously dismissed every attempt to protect minorities in the conservative sense. Goronwy Jones rightfully contends that Hitler’s use of minority rights as a vehicle for expression of Nazi ideology marked the nail in the coffin for the group rights vocabulary of Europe (O’Nions, 2007, p.188). This nail in the coffin purported a paradigm shift, and, as Shahabuddin notes, in dealing with minorities, the paradigm shifted from the conservative notion of ‘minority protection’ under the League of Nations to the liberal doctrine of ‘non-discrimination’ (Shahabuddin, 2016, p.151). This is seen in the Charter of the United Nations where the subject of minority protection was carefully avoided. Article 1(3) reasserts the liberal tenets of non- discrimination and equality. Articles 55 and 56 merely repeat the importance of human rights. This supports Kunz’s argument that the United Nations have always been reluctant to do something about minority protection’ (Kunz, 1954, p.286). Furthermore, by looking into the travaux préparatoires of numerous international instruments, it becomes evident that Shahabuddin and Kunz are both right in making such assertions. Using Humphrey’s words, there was never any genuine intention of doing anything to help preserve the minorities’ distinctiveness (Humphrey, 1968, p.870). Such findings however, should not be surprising because, as aforementioned, protecting groups on grounds of ethnicity is simply irrational in liberal vision.

Minorities Perceived as ‘primitive’

By critically analysing international regimes and their travaux préparatoires, it becomes apparent that minorities are conceptualised as the ‘primitive’ ‘other’. There is no general consensus over what constitutes a minority. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR), which is symbolically the most important minority provision in international law, refers to ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities’ whereas the regional provisions such as the Helsinki Final Act and the Framework Convention prefer instead the term ‘national minority’(O’Nions, 2007, p.26). The most comprehensive definition of what constitutes a minority comes from the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of minorities (hereafter Sub-Commission) Special-Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti who defines minorities as being:

“A group which is numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State and in a non-dominant position, whose members possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the rest of the population and who, if only implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language” (Capotorti, 1977)

There are thus four elements; the group has to be numerically inferior and in a non-dominant position vis-à-vis the majority and most importantly there needs to be a distinct common bond (ethnicity, religion or language), and a wish to preserve this identity. This expressly conceptualises minorities as a conservative entity. The fact that they possess characteristics which are distinct, inevitably creates a dichotomy between the minority and the dominant population. In Capotorti’s report on the provisional interpretation of the term ‘minority’, State submissions upheld this civilizational dichotomy. The Greek government contended that the minority’s features are ‘clearly distinguishable from the majority’. An assertion with which the Dutch and Finnish submissions were consistent with. Secondly, the sense of solidarity that minorities express is fatal to their fate and protection on the international sphere. In the interpretative declarations submitted at ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), Estonia emphasized the need for the minority to be ‘motivated’ to preserve their distinctiveness. Even more explicit civilizational dichotomies arose during the draft debates of Article 27 ICCPR. An Australian delegate suggested that Aborigines were too primitive to constitute a minority (Capotorti, 1977, p.194). These are declarations that distance the State from the ‘other’ within the nation. This sense of solidarity is a sign of conservatism, which renders the minorities primitive. Consequently, international law seeks to civilize and eradicate such primitiveness. Minorities labelled as a primitive entity in international regimes is just a transposition of the States’ conceptualisations.

Translation of ‘primitiveness’ into the International Regimes

As Inis Claude asserts, the leading assumptions are that members of national minorities do not need, are not entitled to, or cannot be granted rights of a special character (Kymlicka, 2007, p.29). Encouraging compliance with human rights was perceived to be the best solution to the problem of minorities. Efforts were made to reconcile the protection of cultural identity with the core liberal doctrines of individualism and human rights. The problem is that human rights and individualism are unsympathetic towards conservative entities. This is conveyed by Kymlicka who claims that making the preservation of an ethnic group’s culture intimately dependent on human rights and individualism does not protect the minorities from the long-term assimilationist project (Kymlicka, 2007, p.30). Liberalism sees the formation of ethnic groups as a choice and thus gives the members an individualistic right to associate with their culture. Consequently, international regimes reduce the group to a mere compound of individuals. The apparent egalitarianism of individualism and human rights make the ‘modernization’ of the minority less explicit. The immense disregard of minorities in the UN Charter was compensated by the creation of the Sub-Commission in 1947. This may look like a consciousness of the importance of ethnicity in relation to minorities, and the need to protect the ‘primordial phenomena’. Such conclusion would be wrong and misleading due to the ‘liberal expectancy’. Kymlicka summarises the ‘liberal expectancy’, as an expectation that the gravitational pull of liberal values will operate across ethnic lines, and that the legal system will provide robust protections. Indeed, a year after the establishment of the Sub-Commission, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was published, and once again the issue of minority protection was omitted. This ‘liberal expectancy’ is a foundation of international law and it is thus not surprising that the final version of Article 27 ICCPR states that:

“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.” (HRC, 1988, paras. Paras. 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4)

This article provides nothing more to minorities because it merely reasserts individual rights that every other individual enjoys. The individual is not to be denied the right to exercise and assert their own culture, in community with the other members. The right bearer in this negatively formulated provision is the individual. In the case of Kitok v Sweden the claim by a member of the Sami minority was declared admissible because he had made ‘a reasonable effort to substantiate his allegations that he was a victim of his [individual] right’ to associate with the Sami community. As seen in the Kitok case, the group cannot bring a claim, only the individual can. This expressly shows how international law removes the identity from the group making it easier for States to penetrate their culture and engage in assimilationist policies. Capotorti even admitted that upholding voluntary assimilation was one of the reasons for the deficient formulation of Article 27 (O’Nions, 2007, p.195). Inherent in human rights are non-discrimination and equality, which, as will be seen in the following section, facilitate assimilation.

Liberalism claims to be ethnically neutral and this is why non-discrimination and equality are vigorously upheld. However, all too often, this ‘liberal expectancy’ appears to be ethnically neutral but its effects are indirectly discriminatory and imply the existence of a higher liberal culture. There is an assumption that minorities are not in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the majority. The majority’s culture is not threatened because it is guaranteed by the State. Conversely, governments may, for instance, permit the establishment of culturally based schools. Yet a group may find itself incapable of the task without specific help (Ramaga, 1992, pp.104-119). Thus, by apparent free choice, the children will be sent to schools run by a larger cultural group (Ramaga, 1992, pp.116). This is sometimes seen as voluntary assimilation, but it is no different from forced assimilation. As O’Nions contends, the primacy of the individual over their community does not represent the reality for minorities who are born in unequal and disadvantaged situations (Ramaga, 1992, pp.33). Furthermore, most international instruments merely declare that the state should not interfere with the exercise of ethnic association due to its ‘ethnic neutrality’. Non-interference does not mean that the minorities are protected, it merely seems to entail that the individuals’ right to associate with their culture will be protected for as much as their distinct identity can survive unaided.

This liberal expectancy was challenged by the Sub-Commission in its first session, where a provision which would’ve required positive action was proposed (Shahabuddin, 2016, p.152). Positive action would impose obligations on States to actively participate in the preservation of the identity by funding education and other cultural projects. A positive formulation would also grant them legal recognition as a conservative entity giving them rights as a group. Special-Rapporteur Eide endorsed such pluralism in his recommendations to the Sub-Commission. He stated that separate group identities should be preserved for those who wanted it and who were truly vulnerable (O’Nions, 2007, p.41). However, due to the antagonism between ‘group rights’ and liberalism such truly protective measures never materialised. Positive formulation is present in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) which states that special measures for the protection of minorities do not constitute discrimination (Lerner, 1980, p.32). This is a purposive approach to the liberal doctrine of non-discrimination. It is also present in the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice where Article 1(3) asserts the right to maintain cultural identity. However, the declaration is not legally binding and this further shows how international regimes leave minorities unprotected against States’ assimilationist endeavours (O’Nions, 2007, p.73).

The liberal may argue that that the fact that there is enforcement machinery in numerous instruments discredits the proposition that there is a civilizational discourse. For example, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) allows petitions to be brought to the European Court of Human Rights. Even ICERD, one of the few provisions which give group rights has enforcement mechanisms. However, these arguments are short-sighted. The enforcement mechanisms are dependent on State recognition of the competence of the respective bodies. Part II of the ICERD specifies that a state must make a declaration recognizing the rights of its individuals to petition before such rights can be exercised (O’Nions, 2007, p.74). The FCNM’s monitoring body can only give recommendations to states and its recommendations have no legal effect. This so even under the ECHR where proposals to turn the European minority norms into the judicially enforceable ECHR have consistently been rejected (Kymlicka, 2007, p.41). Moreover, claims that have been upheld as enforceable under the ICCPR are not judicially enforceable. These deficiencies show the refusal of the international community to make minority norms enforceable. The lack of effective machinery in the international regimes enable states parties to provide minimal constitutional protection to members of ethnically distinct groups, while in practice efforts are made to promote assimilation in the name of integration (O’Nions, 2007, p.96).

Ethnic accommodation after the Cold War

From the Cold war onwards, minority protection regimes have explicitly affirmed that positive action and ethnic accommodation were necessary. However, such retreats from pure liberalism were only done for pragmatic reasons. Minority provisions are still permeated with cultural imperialism. The ethnic-consciousness could hardly be avoided. While liberals persistently ignored the saliency of ethnicity in the topic of minority protection, as of early 1993, an estimated 48 ethnic wars were occurring throughout the world (Huntington, 2011, p.35). Furthermore, 164 “territorial-ethnic claims and conflicts concerning borders” existed in the former Soviet Union, of which 30 had involved some form of armed conflict (Huntington, 2011, p.35). It must have been understood that liberal principles of non-discrimination and human rights were not enough to prevent escalation of conservative endeavours. This led to numerous minority provisions formulated towards the preservation of the national ‘other’. In 1993, the European Union, declared that respect for minority rights was one of the ‘accession criteria’s’ that countries needed to meet in order to join the Community. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) took on the 1989 statements of minority rights at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) as the basis of its activities. Its High Commissioner was put in place to pressure the ECE into taking special measures for protecting their minorities. Finally, in 1994, the UN HRC General Comment on the interpretation of Article 27 ICCPR expressly asserted that it could also require ‘positive measures’ to enable the minorities’ to exercise and enjoy their culture.

All these instruments are significant because they show some liberal self-analysis. However, the civilizational discourse still pervades. The EU’s accession criteria reproduce the League’s liberal West- conservative ECE dichotomy. The civilizational undertone is furthermore reinforced because the accession criteria can be seen as the standard of civilization within modern Europe, where the ECE have to abide by conditions imposed by the West in order to join the European family of nations. The OSCE High Commissioner who was put in place to pressure the ECE into protecting minorities has not so far initiated an investigation into, or offered recommendations regarding any western country’s minority record (Shahabuddin, 2016, p.171). This shows how there still is the perception that liberal countries are beyond the reach of the minority regimes, and that the minorities within are ‘backwards’ entities who have to assimilate. The Framework Convention as aforementioned is weak and non-enforceable. It also contains no references to the right of autonomy or any form of power sharing. The importance of the UNHRC’s General Comment is limited because, as the document itself admits, minority protection is dependent on recognition of the group (O’Nions, 2007, p.195). In the absence of a specific legal entitlement to group rights, it would be naïve to expect states to show concern for those who they perceive to be ‘primitive’ and disruptive. Instead, they are permitted to take advantage of narrowly formulated, individualistic provisions, which facilitate their integration policies, which are worryingly analogous to assimilation. This occurred in 1991, where an estimated 400,000 Gypsies were forced to change their names into Bulgarian names (O’Nions, 2007, p.140). Even more subtle is the Slovakian gerrymandering in 1996. Slovakia passed a reform where the voting district boundaries were re-designed (O’Dwyer, 2006, p.133). The effect of this was that ‘the new boundaries minimized the [ethnic] Hungarians voting power’. As Kymlicka said, giving minorities some bodies through which they can express their identity is crucial. This Slovakian policy instead, marginalised and reduced the voice of the ethnic Hungarians. This is an inherent consequence of international law’s disavowal of the saliency of ethnicity in group formation.

Liberalism inherently labels ethnic minorities, who wish to preserve their culture as primitive. This is why minorities are still perceived as backward, and even recalcitrant entities. International regimes continue to refute the saliency of ethnicity in relation to the individual and thus only award liberal doctrines which are inherently pro-assimilation. Where positive rights are claimed, the documents are non-binding or just recommendations which have no weight on the States’ political endeavours. The implications of this are that the minorities have no choice but to assimilate or to try and preserve their identity by force. It would be better for the whole community if international regime obliged States to fund and help cultural preservation. This would require genuine ethnic-accommodation not incentivised by pragmatic and security reasons. Recent history has shown that minority rights cannot be ignored and as Darendorf argues, heterogeneity in a climate of peace and security is preferable to homogeneity as a test of human tolerance (Dahrendof, 1984, p.79-92).

Bibliography

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• HRC (1988) No. 197/1985, CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985, Paras. 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4

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• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR)
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