INDOMALPHI: A Future for Southeast Asian Security? 

Disclaimer: This article was co-authored by Joshua Bernard Espena and Joaquin Alfonso V. Toledo. All views and opinions are entirely their own and do not reflect the official policy of their respective affiliations. 

Introduction

A pandemic-stricken Southeast Asia which currently preoccupies states does not excuse them to forego security cooperation where adversarial elements mount to take advantage against them.  One initiative is the Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Patrol (INDOMALPHI) in the Sulu and Celebes Seas. INDOMALPHI provides a winning prospect in developing common security interests against security threats, namely, transnational criminal organizations and terrorists, and China.

Sulu and Celebes Seas: Sketching Geostrategic Triangle  

States will need to maximize their relative power if they wish to survive in an anarchic international system. However, the stopping power of water provides gaps and questions about how much security they would need. The Sulu and Celebes Seas – which form a tri-border – provide geostrategic importance for three maritime Southeast Asian states.

The two seas are one of the significant maritime trade routes in the world along with Malacca Strait. However, the lack of relatively strong state institutions and defensive capability of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines compared to great powers, have made the waters vulnerable against security threats both known and unknown. This vulnerability prompted states to prevent the seas from becoming the “new Somalia.”

INDOMALPHI was established in 2016 to address this said issue using the Malacca Strait Patrol as a model exploring on coordinated maritime security-related military activities, joint military commands with ad hoc liaisons, maritime and aviation patrols, technical working groups for operational directions, transit corridor for designated sea lanes, intelligence exchange, and database sharing.

The first trilateral patrol ensued in 2017 right in the middle of the Siege of Marawi, stressing that terrorism is a transnational security issue. It was evident that during the crisis, other nationalities were on the ground participating as belligerents. Further emphasizing that terrorism cannot be defeated by any single nation, but thus the collective efforts of regional partners must be at play.

In March 2020, the Philippines hosted a conference for the INDOMALPHI members in focusing on upping their ante in their shared operational environment through intensified patrols and information exchange. INDOMALPHI should continue to develop as a featured security initiative in the area for several security threats.

Security Drivers

Piracy in the region was already a problem due to the rich trade relations in pre-colonial Southeast Asia. Although the rate of piracy incidents in Asia has been continually going down in the past years, 2020 has seen a sudden rise in occurrences, increasing at an alarming rate. Compared to the 28 incidents of piracy and armed robbery in the first half of 2019, 2020 has already seen 51 cases in the same period. The pandemic contributed to this surge due to the scarcity of resources in almost all aspects, and it would continue to grow as long as COVID-19 remains. With this, INDOMALPHI will need to enhance its current collective capabilities in the area.

In parallel to the concerned states’ security efforts, sustainable growth for the region is also key to further developing the region, which benefits all actors. In 1994, the Brunei-Darussalam – Indonesia – Malaysia – Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) was established, paving the way to enriching a traditionally and historically prosperous area within Southeast Asia. This area may be considered the trump card of INDOMALPHI economic progress. It is of importance that the area remains to be in the safe hands of a unified front.

The fall of the Islamic State, or the Daesh, in the Middle East has signified a tactical win for the global war on terrorism. Returning fighters in the Middle East have now spread radicalization efforts in Southeast Asia. Over the years of unsuccessful attempts to establish a caliphate in the Middle East, the group inspired existing terrorist groups in INDOMAPHI to affiliate themselves with Daesh and carry out attacks on cities in the region, like the Siege of Marawi in 2017 and the recent Sulu bombings this year. These scenarios should stimulate INDOMALPHI to enhance their shared efforts.

Aside from nontraditional threats, the rising security concern for INDOMALPHI is China. Even amid a global pandemic, China has proven that it would not rise peacefully for its regional hegemonic ambitions. One of its goals is to dominate the first island chain, stretching from southern Japan from the north across the East and South China Seas, Taiwan, to Singapore in the south to push the United States back in the second island chain right in the middle of the Pacific Ocean.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012 witnessed a radical reform of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to embark on the dream of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The PLA Navy has now started embracing a multi-pronged approach for its maritime ambitions. One is the interagency coordination between the Chinese coast guard and maritime fishing militia with the PLA Navy “leading from behind.” Beijing’s 2019 National Defense White Paper argued that the Asia-Pacific region is generally stable. But it is only stable in the sense of avoiding conventional war – known as Gray Zone – in the South China Sea. China has also taken advantage of Southeast Asian states like Malaysia and the Philippines to enter trade and investment agreements, which yielded no positive net effects on its economy but debts.

Yet as the US-China strategic competition grows in 2020, China has started flexing its conventional capability against the US. In August, China launched “aircraft carrier killer” medium-range ballistic missiles in protest of a US spy plane in the Paracels. With a point of no return, facing the US likely requires China to take its conventional capabilities out of hiding. But to win the heart of its neighbors China would continue projecting peaceful activities using maritime militia – and INDOMALPHI members should take this as a grave concern.

So far, Chinese island-building activity in the South China Sea features allowed Chinese maritime activities to harass its neighbors point-to-point. These Chinese vessels have also committed illicit activities such as dredging, which destroys marine biodiversity. Moreover, these island bases now served as submarine bases for maneuver, domain awareness, and strike capability.

If Chinese dredging activity spills over to the Sulu-Celebes seas, then food and economic security are in danger, which fuels transnational crimes and terrorism at the grassroots. If this escalates, the defense sector of INDOMALPHI members would be distracted in hunting such groups to the detriment of losing attention to prepare against conventional war scenarios against the PLA. Also, there is no telling if Chinese submarines have already been exploring the said waters in their objective to penetrate the second island chain in the middle of the Pacific Ocean.

In August 2019, the Philippines slammed a Chinese naval incursion in Sibutu Strait in the Sulu Sea, arguing that it poses a security risk for Philippine security. The Chinese embassy in Manila fired back, claiming that archipelagic and internal waters are two different things. China’s refusal indicates China’s disrespect for archipelagic states like the Philippines and Indonesia, fueling regional instability. Furthermore, as the US stands ready to defend the second island chain in Palau and Guam, China will likely use the Sulu-Celebes seas as an avenue for its blue-water navy and submarines to confront the Americans without prior notice for passage from INDOMALPHI states.

Challenges and Opportunities

The recent escalation between Malaysia and the Philippines on the Sabah issue may hamper INDOMALPHI in the short-term range. In July 2020, Philippine foreign affairs secretary, Teodoro Locsin Jr., tweeted that Sabah does not belong to Malaysia as overseas Filipino workers returned to the Philippines via Sabah to Davao, resulting in tweet exchange with its Malaysian counterpart. In 2016, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and former Malaysian prime minister Najib Razak agreed to temporarily set aside the Sabah dispute to cooperate in various sectors such as maritime patrols. From this logic, INDOMALPHI was a product of setting aside the Sabah issue, and with the Sabah dispute at present, political apathy may trump geostrategic concerns.

This dilemma may pose a victory for terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, and China. Yet, as history has proven, states are rational to weigh each action’s costs and benefits to survive. Past governments in Manila and Kuala Lumpur have perceived that ambiguity is better than apathy.

Conclusion

The Sulu-Celebes seas provide limits to states’ relative power needed for survival amid insecurity. As Southeast Asia continues to fight against the pandemic, the INDOMALPHI member must continue fighting for achieving maritime security. Further information exchange and flexible approaches to the issues at hand would be the best option for the region, given its vulnerable state from a number of factors. A multitude of joint patrols and exercises may be at the forefront of this trilateral partnership to minimize current threats in the area. The states also must engage not just in the defense sector, but also in environmental protection, and natural resources conservation. Since the world is uncertain and adversaries have a vote too, INDOMALPHI members should continue struggling to build and organize by weighing its entailed costs and benefits for their security against terrorists, transnational criminals, and China.