Ethiopia-Somaliland Deal: A New Threat to Somalia’s Sovereignty?

The recent Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland has sparked regional controversy, threatening Somalia’s sovereignty and reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s decision to lease 20 km of Somaliland’s coastline in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland’s independence, has provoked strong opposition from Somalia and heightened regional tensions. The agreement raises concerns about territorial integrity, regional security, and international law, making it a pivotal issue in East African politics.

Ethiopia, a landlocked country, has long sought direct access to the Red Sea to reduce its dependence on Djibouti for maritime trade. Somaliland, which has operated as a self-governing entity since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, sees the agreement as a step toward gaining international recognition. However, Somalia has condemned the deal as violating its territorial sovereignty, recalling its ambassador to Ethiopia and seeking diplomatic support to block the agreement (Crisis Group, 2024). The Somalia-Egypt defence pact further complicates the situation, given Egypt’s historical rivalry with Ethiopia over the Nile River dispute (Zoubir, 2024). This article further examines the political, legal, and security implications of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU, analysing its impact on Somalia’s territorial integrity and regional stability.

Ethiopia-Somaliland Relations

Somaliland was a British protectorate from 1884 until its brief independence on June 26, 1960. It then voluntarily united with Italian Somaliland to form the Somali Republic on July 1, 1960. However, dissatisfaction with centralised rule led to increasing tensions, culminating in the brutal repression of northern communities by the Siad Barre regime. Following Barre’s downfall in 1991, Somaliland declared independence, maintaining a separate political system ever since (Wells, 2003).

Ethiopia and Somaliland have maintained strong economic and security ties. As a matter of fact, Ethiopia relies on the Berbera Port for livestock and goods exports, while Somaliland benefits from trade through the Wajale border crossing. Consequently, Ethiopia is Somaliland’s primary supplier of goods, including food and the stimulant khat, which plays a crucial economic role in Somaliland (Muhumed, 2016). Ethiopia’s interest in Red Sea access is both economic and geopolitical, as it currently relies on Djibouti for 95% of its imports and exports. The recent MoU with Somaliland aligns with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s broader strategy to secure direct maritime access (Zoubir, 2024).

The Sovereignty Issue: Somalia’s Reaction

The Somali government has officially rejected the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement, viewing it as a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the Somali Parliament declared the deal “null and void,” reinforcing Somalia’s position that Somaliland remains part of its territory. Somalia escalated its response by implementing diplomatic and legal measures, including:

• Blocking Ethiopian air traffic and restricting Ethiopian Airlines from entering Somali airspace.
• Recalling its ambassador from Ethiopia to signal a formal diplomatic protest.
• Lobbying international organisations such as the UN, AU, IGAD, and the Arab League to intervene against the agreement.
• Strengthening defence cooperation with Egypt, further complicating the regional balance of power (Crisis Group, 2024).

Legally, Somalia’s constitution does not allow for any region to secede without a national referendum, reinforcing the claim that Somaliland is still under Somali jurisdiction. Somalia has refused direct negotiations with Ethiopia unless Addis Ababa formally withdraws from the agreement. The Somali government argues that Ethiopia’s unilateral engagement with Somaliland violates international principles of territorial integrity and non-interference, further heightening diplomatic tensions (Crisis Group, 2024).

Security and Regional Tensions 

The risk of armed conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia has escalated due to the MoU. Somalia perceives Ethiopia’s actions as a direct challenge to its sovereignty, making the nullification of the deal a national priority. Although no military action has been taken, tensions remain high, and Mogadishu has ruled out bilateral talks unless Ethiopia revokes the agreement (Crisis Group, 2024).

Ethiopia has a long history of military interventions in Somalia, including its involvement in the Ogaden War (1977-78) and the 2006 invasion against the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Also, Ethiopia maintains a military presence in Somalia through the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and independent counterterrorism operations. If Ethiopia deploys forces to protect its interests in Somaliland, the risk of regional instability will increase (Crisis Group, 2024).

Militant groups such as Al-Shabaab may exploit the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute to strengthen their influence. Historically, Al-Shabaab has framed Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia as foreign aggression, using it as a recruitment tool. If tensions escalate, Al-Shabaab could intensify attacks under the guise of defending Somali sovereignty (Crisis Group, 2024).

Recommendations

To effectively navigate the Ethiopia-Somaliland dispute, Somalia should consider the following strategic actions:

1. Strengthening Diplomatic Efforts:
   • Engage with key international organizations such as the UN, AU, and IGAD to increase diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia.
   • Forge stronger alliances with regional powers to counterbalance Ethiopia’s growing influence.
2. Building Trust with Regional Governments in Somalia:
   • Foster more substantial relationships with Somali federal member states to create a unified stance against Ethiopian interference.
   • Develop collaborative security initiatives to reduce external influence on Somali politics.
3. Remove Ethiopian Troops from Somalia:
   • Gradually phase out Ethiopian military presence to prevent their potential role in fueling internal divisions.
   • Strengthen Somali national forces to take over security operations and border protection.
4. Enhance National Security Measures:
   • Improve military readiness and reinforce border security to prevent potential conflict escalation.
   • Increase counterterrorism operations to prevent Al-Shabaab from exploiting the crisis for recruitment.
5. Legal and Political Strategies:
   • Pursue legal action through international courts, citing violations of Somalia’s territorial integrity.
   • Encourage national political unity to present a strong, unified stance on the issue.

Conclusion

The Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) represents a significant challenge to Somalia’s sovereignty, with wide-ranging implications for regional stability, security, and international diplomacy. By granting Ethiopia access to the Red Sea in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland’s independence, the agreement has deepened tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, raising concerns about territorial integrity and national unity. The Somali federal government has strongly opposed the deal, calling for international intervention and forming strategic alliances to counter Ethiopia’s actions.

Beyond the political and legal ramifications, the deal introduces serious security risks, as it could trigger military confrontations, embolden separatist movements, and be exploited by militant groups like Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, it places geopolitical pressures on regional and global powers, with major stakeholders such as the African Union, the United Nations, the Gulf States, and Western nations closely monitoring the situation (Zoubir, 2024).

To navigate this crisis, Somalia must strengthen its diplomatic engagement, enhance national security measures, and push for international legal action to safeguard its territorial integrity. Ultimately, how Somalia and its allies respond to this challenge will determine the country’s future stability and its role in the Horn of Africa’s evolving geopolitical landscape.

Bibliography

• Chanie, T.A. (2024). ‘Understanding Ethiopia’s Maritime Deal with Somaliland Through Abiy Ahmed’s Foreign Policy.’ International Journal of Geopolitics and Governance, 3(1), pp.110-124.
• Crisis Group. (2024). The stakes in the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal [Accessed 12 Feb. 2025].
• Mahmoud, S. (2022). ‘Understanding the Secession of Somaliland: History of the Formation and Failure of the Somali State (1960-1991).’ Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. Available at: https://doi.org/10.31430//SATL7325 [Accessed 12 Feb. 2025].
• Wells, J. (2003). Cabinda & Somaliland – A Comparative Study for Statehood & Independence. African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific Conference Proceedings, p.3.
• Zoubir, Y.H. (2024). ‘Ethiopia and Somalia on the Edge of War.’ Middle East Council, 4 Nov. Available at: https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/ethiopia-and-somalia-on-the-edge-of-war/ [Accessed 12 Feb. 2025].