Electoral Repression and Transnational Risk in East Africa

An analysis of the lessons from Uganda’s 2026 Elections and the implications for Ethiopia.

Electoral violence in East Africa isn’t just a group of isolated events. It’s a pattern that’s getting worse. Uganda’s Jan. 15, 2026 presidential election, in which the incumbent Yoweri Kaguta Museveni was declared winner with 74.25% of the vote, is the most recent and sharpest illustration of a repression cycle that is intensifying, spreading across borders, and quietly writing the rules for what comes next. What comes next is Ethiopia’s June 1, 2026 general election; the country’s first since the 2022 Tigray peace agreement, and arguably the highest stakes vote in the region in a decade.

This article draws on verified data from ACLED, OHCHR, Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, and Afrobarometer. The goal is threefold: to measure the scale of repression surrounding Uganda’s election, to map the cross-border suppression architecture now operating across Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, and to assess what all of it means for Ethiopia.

Uganda 2026: Measuring the Repression Cycle

Firstly, Uganda’s 2026 election did not take place in a “normal” political environment. While Uganda prepared for the January 2021 election and in the two days surrounding the Nov. 18, 2020 arrest of opposition candidate Robert Kyagulanyi, Ugandan security forces killed at least 54 people in protests, primarily in Kampala (Human Rights Watch, 2021). The National Unity Platform further claimed that 458 of its members had been abducted, but the government only admitted to having 171 of them in custody (Amnesty International, 2022). That year, Museveni won with 58.6% of the vote, his lowest share since multiparty elections were restored in 2006 (House of Commons Library, 2021). That 15.65 percentage-point jump to 74.25% in 2026 occurred not because of increased popular legitimacy, but against a backdrop of intensified repression.

Ahead of the 2026 vote, OHCHR documented at least 550 opposition arrests and 160 enforced disappearances during 2025 alone (OHCHR, 2026). Five major civil society organisations, including Chapter Four Uganda and the Alliance for Election Finance Monitoring, had their permits suspended on Jan. 9, six days before voting started. To make matters worse, the Uganda Communications Commission broke its earlier promise and imposed a nationwide internet shutdown from the evening of Jan. 13, mirroring complete shutdowns in both 2016 and 2021 (Garbe, 2024). On election night, at least seven people were killed near a vote-tallying centre in Butambala District (Al Jazeera, 2026). To add salt to the electoral violence wound, 118 National Unity Platform members were charged with unlawful assembly in the days that followed (Human Rights Watch, 2026a).

Furthermore, a 2021 Afrobarometer survey found that 47% (18 percentage points higher than in 2019) of Ugandans feared becoming victims of electoral violence. By 2022, that figure had barely moved, at 46%, suggesting fear of electoral violence has become a permanent feature of political life (Afrobarometer, 2024). This data point matters because it shows how normalised fear suppresses opposition turnout, structurally advantaging incumbents beyond any formal vote-rigging.

Uganda 2021 vs. 2026: forced disappearances, deaths, internet shutdown days.

Sources:          HRW (2021, 2026); OHCHR (2026); House of Commons Library (2021); Afrobarometer (2023); Al Jazeera (2026); Amnesty International (2022)

A Regional Architecture of Repression

Secondly, there is evidence that Uganda’s repression is no longer contained within its borders. A documented pattern of cross-border abductions now implicates Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in coordinated political suppression. In November 2024, veteran opposition leader Dr. Kizza Besigye was abducted from Nairobi by Ugandan operatives and transferred to face treason charges in Kampala.

Various incidents reveal some kind of interstate coordination with the sole aim of retaining power by the East African ruling elites. These incidents kept on happening and in July 2024, 36 Forum for Democratic Change supporters were jointly seized by Kenyan and Ugandan security officials on Kenyan soil (African Arguments, 2026). Moreover, Tanzanian activist Maria Sarungi Tsehai was abducted in Nairobi in January 2025 and two Kenyan civil society figures named Bob Njagi and Nicholas Oyoo were held incommunicado for 38 days after being taken by operatives on Kenyan territory in October 2025.

However, what shocked most East Africans was the Tanzanian October 2025 elections, which provide a regional benchmark for my analysis. ACLED recorded 70 political disorder events in Mainland Tanzania in just three days (Oct. 29–31), an unprecedented spike considering that Tanzanians have always been considered the most peaceful people in East Africa. A Southern African Development Community preliminary observer report documented ballot stuffing, intimidation of observers, and lethal force against demonstrators. The scale confirmed what the Besigye abduction had signaled months earlier: repression in East Africa now operates as a shared regional system, not a set of isolated national incidents.

Timeline map: transnational repression incidents, 2024–2026, Kenya/Uganda/Tanzania.

Ethiopia June 2026: Forward Risk Assessment

The data from Uganda and Tanzania frame a harsh background for Ethiopia’s June 1 vote. To show that Ethiopia’s conflict environment has deteriorated sharply since 2023, this article looked at the data from January through November 2024 where ACLED recorded over 9,000 fatalities from the Amhara and Oromia insurgencies alone (Freedom House, 2025). ACLED’s August 2024 monthly report recorded 227 political violence events and 945 fatalities in a single month of which the 141 events and 637 fatalities happened in Amhara, where Fano militia clashes with government forces peaked (ACLED, 2024). The cumulative toll of the Fano insurgency, which began in April 2023, is compounded by the government’s documented use of drone strikes. In this case, ACLED recorded over 430 fatalities from ENDF drone strikes in Amhara since April 2023 (VOA, 2024). Since 2019, OHCHR estimates that human rights abuses have affected more than 8,200 victims in Amhara and Oromia in 2023 alone, a 56% increase year-on-year (VOA, 2024).

In Ethiopia, over 3.3 million people remain displaced across Amhara, Oromia and Tigray (Human Rights Watch, 2026b). Whereas there has not been significant displacement of people in Uganda, Ethiopia’s institutional environment mirrors Uganda’s in two key respects. First, the Ethiopian media legislation passed in April 2025 shifted oversight of the press to a direct political appointee of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Second, a Civil Society and Media Act adopted in June 2025 grants the government sweeping powers to restrict independent organisations (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2026). None of the above two aspects creates favourable conditions for credible electoral observation.

With the above data, the baseline risk scenario for June 2026 is a low-legitimacy election where the Prosperity Party returns a dominant majority while Fano and OLA-affected constituencies in Amhara and Oromia are effectively disenfranchised by insecurity and post-election unrest. The unfavourable scenario of renewed Tigray clashes, opposition boycotts, and a constitutional crisis carries lower probability, but materially higher impact. Particularly, on the EAC’s trade corridor and Ethiopia’s $2.2 billion IMF Extended Credit Facility, currently under active review.

ACLED line chart: Ethiopia monthly political violence events.

Source: (ACLED, 2024)

Conclusion

As a result, the quantitative record is unambiguous as it shows that repression in East Africa is intensifying across electoral cycles. Uganda’s 2026 election results, with a 15-point jump in Museveni’s declared margin produced under conditions of mass arrest, enforced disappearances and internet shutdowns. This is not a data anomaly. It is a legible outcome of a repression system that has become both more efficient and more regional in scope. Ethiopia approaches its June 2026 election with 9,000+ conflict fatalities in 11 months, 3.3 million displaced persons, and a media environment under executive control. For investors, the relevant variable is not the election result itself, but whether the institutions capable of contesting are functionable. In Uganda, the evidence suggests they do not. In Ethiopia, the evidence is only growing.

References

ACLED (2024) ‘In Amhara, over 7 million people are exposed to political violence: August 2024’, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, 13 September. Available at: https://acleddata.com/update/amhara-over-7-million-people-are-exposed-political-violence-august-2024 (Accessed: 9 March 2026).

Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2026) ‘Ethiopia: Expanding representation while managing centrifugal forces’, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 13 January. Available at: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/en-elections-2026/ethiopia/ (Accessed: 9 March 2026).

African Arguments (2026) ‘Have election crackdowns become the norm? Domestic and cross-border repression in East Africa’, African Arguments, 11 February. Available at: https://africanarguments.org/2026/02/have-election-crackdowns-become-the-norm-domestic-and-cross-border-repression-in-east-africa/ (Accessed: 9 March 2026).

Afrobarometer (2024) ‘AD866: Political freedom at risk? Almost half of Ugandans fear intimidation and violence during elections’, Afrobarometer, 26 September. Available at: https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad866-political-freedom-at-risk-almost-half-of-ugandans-fear-intimidation-and-violence-during-elections/ (Accessed: 9 March 2026).

Al Jazeera (2026) ‘At least seven killed overnight in Uganda after tense presidential election’, Al Jazeera, 16 January. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/16/incumbent-president-museveni-takes-strong-lead-in-uganda-election-count (Accessed: 9 March 2026).

Amnesty International (2022) Amnesty International Report 2021/22; The State of the World’s Human Rights; Uganda 2021. Document #2070350, 29 March. Available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2070350.html (Accessed: 24 March 2026)

Freedom House (2025) Freedom in the world 2025: Ethiopia. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/ethiopia/freedom-world/2025 (Accessed: 9 March 2026).

Garbe, L. (2024) ‘Pulling through elections by pulling the plug: Internet disruptions and electoral violence in Uganda’, Journal of Peace Research, 61(5), pp. 842–857. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231168190 (Accessed: 9 March 2026).

House of Commons Library (2021) Uganda: Reaction to the 2021 election. CBP-9206, 27 April. Available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9206/ (Accessed: 9 March 2026).

Human Rights Watch (2021) ‘Uganda: Elections marred by violence’, Human Rights Watch, 21 January. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/21/uganda-elections-marred-violence  (Accessed: 9 March 2026).

Human Rights Watch (2026a) ‘Uganda: Post-election assault on political opposition’, Human Rights Watch, 28 January. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/01/28/uganda-post-election-assault-on-political-opposition  (Accessed: 9 March 2026).

Human Rights Watch (2026b) World report 2026: Ethiopia. Available at: https://hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/ethiopia  (Accessed: 24 March 2026).

OHCHR (2026) ‘Uganda: UN experts urge stronger human rights safeguards ahead of 2026 elections’, OHCHR, 7 January. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/01/uganda-un-experts-urge-stronger-human-rights-safeguards-ahead-2026-elections  (Accessed: 9 March 2026).

VOA News (2024) ‘Ethiopia’s escalating conflicts leave civilians in crossfire’, VOA News, 5 December. Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopia-s-escalating-conflicts-leave-civilians-in-crossfire/7889328.html  (Accessed: 9 March 2026).