Airpower, Drones and Decapitation: Operational and Strategic Lessons from Operation Epic Fury and Roaring Lion in the Middle East

The joint U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran that began on 28 February 2026, Operation Epic Fury (United States) and Operation Roaring Lion (Israel), offers an important case study in  contemporary high-intensity warfare (CENTCOM, 2026). Early open-source reporting  suggests rapid air superiority, large-scale precision strikes and substantial damage to Iran’s conventional forces (JINSA, 2026). At the same time, Iran and its proxies have retained  limited but meaningful capacity for retaliation, particularly through missiles, drones and regional escalation (ISW, 2026).

Campaign Overview

Official and analytical sources describe an intensive air and missile campaign combining fifth-generation aircraft, legacy fighters, bombers and standoff munitions (CENTCOM,  2026). The stated objectives included degrading Iran’s air defences, long-range strike systems and naval assets, alongside targeted attacks on regime leadership and command-and-control nodes (JINSA, 2026).

Within roughly the first 100 hours, coalition forces reportedly struck thousands of targets across Iran, focusing on air bases, missile sites and naval infrastructure (Army Recognition, 2026). While precise target counts vary by source, independent assessments converge on the view that Iran’s air-defence capabilities were severely degraded (Army Recognition, 2026).

Rapid Air Superiority and SEAD 

A defining feature of Epic Fury was the speed with which meaningful air superiority was achieved over key parts of Iran (CENTCOM, 2026). U.S. and Israeli F-35 variants played a central role in penetrating Iranian airspace, suppressing radar and surface-to-air missile systems and enabling follow-on strikes by other assets (JINSA, 2026).

Reporting indicates that multiple Iranian air bases, including those hosting F-4 and Su-22  aircraft, sustained heavy damage in the opening waves (Army

Recognition, 2026). This  combination of stealth, electronic warfare and real-time intelligence suggests that, against a known and largely fixed target set, SEAD timelines can now be compressed from weeks to  days (Britannica, 2026). However, sustaining this posture demanded continuous ISR and high rates of munitions expenditure, with clear implications for logistics and industrial capacity  (CSIS, 2026).

Leadership Targeting and Decapitation 

Epic Fury is notable for its unprecedented focus on senior leadership targets, including  Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (JINSA, 2026). Multiple journalistic and analytical  accounts, drawing on U.S., Israeli and regional sources, report that Khamenei was killed in  the opening strikes alongside numerous senior IRGC and security officials (Forbes, 2026). SITREPs from the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism refer to Khamenei as a  “martyr” and discuss early succession dynamics, reinforcing the assessment that he was in  fact killed (ICT, 2026). Nonetheless, the exact structure and authority of any interim leadership arrangement remain only partially visible from open sources (Hilltop Online,  2026).

Doctrinally, this demonstrates that with sufficient intelligence and precision capability,  leadership decapitation is technically feasible early in a campaign (Ujasusi, 2026). Yet,  continuing Iranian missile and drone activity and persistent regime messaging indicate that  political and coercive structures can survive significant leadership losses (ICT, 2026). This suggests decapitation can disrupt decision-making but should not be assumed to produce  rapid regime collapse (Washington Institute, 2026).

Drones, Attrition and Industrial Capacity 

The conflict underscores the growing importance of cheap, attritable uncrewed systems in  modern warfare (Defense One, 2026). Iran has long employed Shahed-series drones and other loitering munitions to threaten regional adversaries and to supplement missile forces  (Defense One, 2026). In Epic Fury and its lead-up, Iranian forces and proxies used drones and missiles against Israel, U.S. facilities and regional infrastructure (JINSA, 2026). In response, the United States introduced low-cost one-way attack drones such as the LUCAS system, marking their first reported combat use (DefenseScoop, 2026). These platforms are  described as Shahed-like and are intended to provide a relatively inexpensive strike option that can be fielded in significant numbers (DefenseScoop, 2026).

CSIS estimates that the first 100 hours of Epic Fury cost approximately $3.7 billion in munitions and related operational expenditures (CSIS, 2026). This figure illustrates how  quickly a high-end air and missile campaign can consume resources, even for states with  large defence budgets (Business Today, 2026). Over time, the side able to produce and  replenish large numbers of drones, interceptors and precision weapons at scale is likely to hold a decisive advantage in any attrition contest (CSIS, 2026).

Multi-Domain and Regional Spillover 

Epic Fury has also highlighted how contemporary conflicts routinely spill across domains and borders (Hudson Institute, 2026). Iranian responses have included not just kinetic attacks but  also cyber operations, disinformation efforts and threats to critical infrastructure in Israel and Gulf states (ISW, 2026).

These activities resemble patterns observed in earlier Iranian cyber campaigns and in Russia’s multi-domain operations in Ukraine, where military, economic and informational lines of  effort are tightly intertwined (Hudson Institute, 2026). At the regional level, Hezbollah, the  Houthis and other Iranian-aligned groups have retained the ability to threaten shipping,  energy infrastructure and Israeli territory despite heavy blows to Tehran’s leadership (JINSA,  2026). This demonstrates the resilience of proxy networks and their capacity to continue  imposing costs even after severe strikes on the patron state (Ujasusi, 2026).

Emerging Lessons for Future Warfare 

Taken together, early evidence from Epic Fury and Roaring Lion suggests a likely pattern for future high-end conflicts (CENTCOM, 2026). First, a stealth-enabled, ISR-rich initial phase aims to blind and paralyse the adversary’s air defences, long-range strike assets and leadership (JINSA, 2026). Second, this is followed by a longer period of multi-domain  attrition, in which drones, cyber operations, proxies and economic pressure become central (ISW, 2026).

For Western and allied planners, the campaign underscores the need to scale industrial  production of attritable systems, strengthen logistics and stockpiles, and integrate cyber and critical-infrastructure defence into campaign design from the outset (CSIS, 2026). It also cautions against assuming that spectacular tactical success, including leadership decapitation, will translate automatically into rapid or durable political victory (Washington Institute,  2026).

Bibliography 

Army Recognition (2026) ‘US Strikes Iran Air Bases Destroying F-4 & Su-22 Fighter Jets  and Shahed Drones’, 3 March. Available at: https://www.armyrecognition.com

Business Today (2026) ‘$3.7 billion in just 100 hours: Inside the massive cost of the first  phase of Operation Epic Fury’, 7 March. Available at: https://www.businesstoday.in.

Britannica (2026) ‘What is Operation Epic Fury?’. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/question/What-is-Operation-Epic-Fury

CENTCOM (2026) ‘Operation Epic Fury Fact Sheet’ and related updates, March. Available at: https://www.centcom.mil 

CSIS (2026) ‘$3.7 Billion: Estimated Cost of Epic Fury’s First 100 Hours’, 5 March.  Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/37-billion-estimated-cost-epic-furys-first-100- hours

Defense One (2026) ‘Shahed drone meets clone in US war on Iran’, 28 February. Available  at: https://www.defenseone.com

DefenseScoop (2026) ‘After first combat appearance, LUCAS drones “remain ready” for  additional use in Iran strikes’, 1 March. Available at: https://defensescoop.com

Forbes (2026) ‘How Years Of Regional Conflict Led To The Strike That Killed Iran’s  Supreme Leader’, 1 March. Available at: https://www.forbes.com

Hilltop Online (2026) ‘U.S.–Israel Launch “Operation Epic Fury” Against Iran; Khamenei  Killed’, 3 March. Available at: https://thehilltoponline.com

Hudson Institute (2026) ‘Operation Epic Fury: Iran’s Declining Capabilities and Emerging  Strategy as the Conflict Nears Its Second Week’. Available at: https://www.hudson.org

ICT – International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (2026a) ‘Operation “Epic Fury”: SITREP  (28 FEB 2026)’. Available at: https://ict.org.il

ICT – International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (2026b) ‘Operation “Epic Fury”: SITREP  (01 MAR 2026)’. Available at: https://ict.org.il

Institute for the Study of War (ISW) (2026) ‘Iran Update Special Reports, March 2026’.  Available at: https://understandingwar.org

JINSA (2026) ‘Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion: March 2026 Updates’. Available  at: https://jinsa.org

Ujasusi (2026) ‘Operation Epic Fury: US–Israel Strikes on Iran, Khamenei Death Explained’,  28 February. Available at: https://www.ujasusi.com

Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2026) ‘Epic Fury and Roaring Lion: From War  Scenarios to Pressing Postwar Questions in Iran’. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org